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ABSTRACT 
 
This explorative study investigates how bureaucratic public sector client organisations 
deal with information technology (ITO) and business process (BPO) outsourcing in 
terms of internal management. To supplement the lack of studies emphasising pre-
existing client organisational structure and the contextual and internal changes 
intertwined with and required for outsourcing, the thesis develops theoretical 
underpinnings that incorporate change, time, dynamism and context. These consist of a 
structuration theory-informed formal organisation perspective and a processual analysis-
informed multidimensional outsourcing configuration framework. This thesis primarily 
seeks answers to ‗why‘ and ‗how‘ questions such as: why bureaucratic client 
organisations are concerned about IT outsourcing or BPO; in consequence, how they 
construct or change their strategy, organisational arrangements and outsourcing 
contracts; and, what are the contexts and social processes that let those constructions go 
forward? Studied by means of a longitudinal case study approach, with elements of 
comparison, the two cases are the IT outsourcing of the Public Procurement Service of 
Korea‘s e-government procurement system and the BPO of the Teachers‘ Pension 
Scheme administration of the British Department for Children, Schools and Families. 
  
Through contextual and micro-level analyses, the research found that client 
organisations appear to work at transforming outsourcing-related strategy, contract 
structure, and their own organisations—which are mutually interrelated—in the context 
of five IT governance concerns: strategic alignment, delivery of business value, 
performance management, risk management, and control and accountability. 
Institutionalised human behaviours were found to be strongly involved with these 
processes. The thesis provides rich data on how the organisations decomposed and 
recomposed existing bureaucratic structures and processes. This thesis also found three 
standards emerging as rationales for the strategic choices of the client organisations 
when they moved to outsourcing. These were: core vs. non-core perception of 
outsourced functions; high vs. low supplier switching costs; and high vs. low variability 
of business and applied IT. Against expectations, explicit distinctions such as cultural 
differences between two government environments and differences between ITO and 
BPO, did not sufficiently explain the core phenomena regarding outsourcing and client 
organisational change. In practice, core/non-core perception was found to be the key 
shaper of the outsourcing contracts and client organisation construction, though each 
outsourcing arrangement emerged as distinctively different in terms of relevant 
decisions, context, and processes. Overall, the research supports Kallinikos‘s formal 
organisation perspective for explaining outsourcing as an enabler of organisational 
change, and provides an enriched and extended outsourcing configuration framework 
for disaggregating and studying, and for practitioners helping to manage, outsourcing 
arrangements in depth. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Background and motivation 
 
Information technology (IT) outsourcing has become routinely used by contemporary 
organisations that depend on large information systems (IS) to do back office work and 
deliver internal or external goods and services. The definition of IT outsourcing here, 
using that given by Lacity and Willcocks (2006a, p. 1), is as follows: ―the handing over 
of IT-related assets, resources, activities and/or people to third party management to 
achieve agreed performance outcomes‖. 
 
On the other hand, business process outsourcing (BPO) is an associated business 
practice with IT outsourcing. BPO means the partial or entire delegation of business 
processes to a third party supplier. This is not a new phenomenon. External service 
providers have been working in areas such as facility operations, finance, accounting 
and legal services for a long time. However, many IS researchers pay attention to the 
strong IT components necessarily supporting those processes, which is commonly 
observed in contemporary BPO deals (e.g., Bardhan, Whitaker and Mithas 2006; 
Borman 2006; Gewald and Dibbern 2009; Mani, Barua and Whinston 2006; 
Wüllenweber et al. 2008). For example, a finance process service provider could not 
fulfil its contract successfully without a competitive finance system. In this respect, 
BPO may be regarded as the expanded form of IT outsourcing (Feeny, Willcocks and 
Lacity 2009a; Yang et al. 2007). The following description clarifies the distinction of 
BPO well (Wüllenweber and Weitzel 2007, p. 2): 
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BPO is the combination of application development and maintenance 
outsourcing, IT infrastructure outsourcing and outsourcing of business 
activities which are not IT supported like business process redesign.   
 
Accordingly, the IT outsourcing investigation in this thesis is not confined to the narrow 
area of IS operation or maintenance contracts, but extends to IT-enabled BPO. That 
includes IT hardware and software, as is invariably the case in most types of BPO, for 
example the outsourcing of finance, human resources and procurement functions. IT 
does still matter in BPO because IS employed by BPO suppliers are regularly found to 
be key success factors (Willcocks and Lacity 2009a).    
   
From an external services market perspective, spending on IT outsourcing and BPO is 
continuously rising. The global market of IT outsourcing has increased from $9 to $12 
billion in 1989 to $200 to $250 billion in 2007. In terms of BPO, it was a $140 billion 
market in 2005 and the figure is estimated to grow to $350 billion in 2010 (Willcocks 
and Lacity 2009a). In their research, Willcocks and Lacity suggest that BPO is 
outpacing IT outsourcing because many organisations have no intention of investing in 
back office innovation and external service providers can build enough capabilities to 
improve the efficiency of complicated processes. This phenomenon is well summarised 
as follows (p. 17): ―Many of the BPO deals will swallow much of the back office IT 
systems.‖  
 
This suggestion is intuitively acceptable as well in that most back office works are the 
common functions of organisations; therefore, specialised service providers can take 
advantage of abundant and cost-effective opportunities to acquire knowledge and 
develop/access powerful IS. For example, they are able to collect lessons from many 
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different organisations‘ practices and deliver those to other clients by use of the same IT 
platform without a significant additional cost. On this point, Lacity, Shaji and Willcocks 
(2009) identify that BPO is suitable for well-defined, self-contained, modular, IT-
enabled and easily measurable processes. 
 
There is plentiful evidence of the prevalence of IT/BP outsourcing practice. Even by 
2000, 90% of the United States (US)‘s and 77% of the United Kingdom (UK)‘s large 
and medium organisations investigated were found to have already entered into 
meaningful IT outsourcing contracts (Kern and Willcocks 2001). Furthermore, and 
importantly for the present study of comparative cases in public sector outsourcing,  IT 
outsourcing is more popular in specific industries, and in particular  the public sector in 
developed economies (Dunleavy et al. 2006; Fountain 2001). Given that IT outsourcing/ 
BPO represent a large and still growing set of   business practices, this thesis will argue 
that the internal management of such outsourcing deserves considerable focus, despite 
its relative neglect, as an organisation-embedded component of the governance and 
management of contemporary organisations. This can be supported by the reflection of 
IT executives‘ management concerns that a global survey reveals.   
 
Five consecutive researches on global IT leaders‘ concerns appear in MIS Quarterly 
Executive after 2004, which present previous years‘ survey results completed by the 
Society for Information Management (SIM) (Luftman and McLean 2004; Luftman 
2005; 2006; Luftman and Kempaiah 2008; Luftman, Kempaiah and Rigoni 2009). 
These researches conducted consistent surveys to investigate the management concerns 
of IT executives. The various numbers of each survey‘s respondents were from 105 to 
301; all participants were described as IT executives or IT managers from diverse 
industries. Among these IT management concerns, ‗Managing outsourcing 
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relationships‘ can be referred to as a concern directly associated with IT outsourcing. 
The rank of this declined from 15
th
 in 2003 and 2004, to 18
th
 in 2005 and then 29
th 
in 
2007.
1
 Does this mean that IT outsourcing became a less important issue of IT 
management? The answer is ‗No‘ based on following rationale; what has happened is 
that outsourcing is no longer an isolatable phenomenon in management terms. 
Outsourcing issues must be dealt with as overall and embedded components in the 
management of IT.    
 
It is worth examining the survey responses in more detail to underline this point. 
Although outsourcing was reported as only the twenty-ninth most important concern of 
IT executives in 2007, most of the other concerns seem to be recognised as being 
connected with IT outsourcing. As the simplest example, how can the ‗Staff reduction‘ 
concerns (24
th
 in 2005 and 21
st
 in 2004) be addressed without a consideration of 
outsourcing? It is the same with the concerns about ‗Offshoring‘ (21st in 2005, 20th in 
2004 and 19
th
 in 2003) and ‗IT asset management‘ (22nd in 2005, 17th in 2004 and 14th 
in 2003). ‗Offshoring‘ is a choice of diverse options of IT outsourcing; and ‗IT asset 
management‘ should be decided based on an organisation‘s IT strategy regarding IT 
outsourcing. Along with these simple examples, broader discussion is required to fully 
understand the comprehensiveness of IT outsourcing-related concerns which this thesis 
argues. As was emphasised by the researchers, three of the top ten management 
concerns in 2008 are related to IT human resources, as follows: ‗Build business skills‘ 
in 2
nd, ‗Attracting new IT professionals‘ in 4th and ‗Retaining IT professionals‘ in 9th 
(Luftman, Kempaiah and Rigoni 2009). It is acceptable to assume that IT executives 
must decide first whether they will outsource such expertise or not when they are 
                                               
1
 Only the top ten management concerns were announced in the result of the 2008 
survey.  
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concerned about IT human resources. It is also an issue as to what their skills must be, 
as internal employees, in the light of outsourcing as a highly prevalent business practice. 
It is also an issue as to how outsourcing can provide human resource capability, and if 
so which skills in what numbers—as exemplified by the growing contemporary practice 
of offshoring not just for costs but for resources.  
 
In terms of the third most important concern of ‗IT strategic planning‘, the authors 
found that senior managers are trying to identify strategic opportunities to leverage IT 
for cost reduction and efficiency enhancement under the economic downturn during the 
research period. According to them, one of the mainstream strategies to do this is to 
negotiate new outsourcing contracts with vendors. Similarly, ‗Reduce the cost of doing 
business‘ (7th), ‗Improve IT quality‘ (8th) and ‗Security and privacy‘ (10th) concerns 
could be resolved only by having good relationships and contractual arrangements with 
outsourcing suppliers who run and develop relevant IS.  The final relevant management 
concern is ‗IT and business alignment‘ which has been the number one issue since 2003, 
except for 2007 when ‗Attracting, developing, and retaining IT professionals‘ was at the 
top of the table. IT/business alignment was then ranked 2
nd
. Detailed descriptions of this 
management concern appear in their first paper in 2004. The definition of IT and 
business alignment was given as follows (Luftman and McLean 2004, p. 96):   
Alignment means applying IT in an appropriate and timely way, in harmony 
with business strategies, goals and needs. This definition addresses both 
how IT is aligned with the business and how the business should/could be 
aligned with IT.  
The factors enabling IT and business alignment were explained as communications 
between IT and business, value measurements, governance, IT/business partnership, 
technology scope and skills. However, three reasons for this concern being pervasive 
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and continuous are well identified in their most recent work (Luftman, Kempaiah and 
Rigoni 2009). First, it is difficult for decision makers to reach a consensus due to the 
vague terminologies used in the concept of alignment such as integrated, partnership, 
harmony and needs. Second, alignment cannot be achieved when the issue is 
misunderstood as that IT should be aligned with the business; instead, it is a matter of 
how IT and business are aligned with each other. Third, apart from the expectation, 
there is no single general solution of this problem. Many business and IT leaders still 
focus only on IT infrastructure—networks, software, databases, applications, etc. 
However, organisations need to combine all relevant strategic alignment maturity 
components like communication, governance and human resources.   
 
Returning to the discussion about the connectedness between IT/business alignment and 
outsourcing, the latter should be considered when an organisation pursues the former. 
For example, the communication problem does not occur only in the communication 
between business and in-house IT organisations. Those between external IT suppliers 
and internal business or strategy parts of organisations should be well designed and 
crafted in the relational and contractual elements with external suppliers. 
 
Consequently, most management concerns are accompanied by the consideration of IT 
outsourcing explicitly or implicitly. There might be some organisations that do not have 
any outsourcing contract at all; however, it does not mean that they have never been 
concerned about outsourcing. Indeed the possibility, or more pragmatically in Lacity 
and Hirschheim‘s (1995) terms, the threat of outsourcing, have formed an important 
part of the internal management repertoire of large organisations for many years (see 
also Lacity and Willcocks 2008). Among the top ten concerns in 2008, all of which stay 
as the top priority during this multi-year research, only two concerns of ‗Making better 
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use of information‘ and ‗Managing change‘ are not found to be directly related to IT 
outsourcing, though even there it can be seen that one of the reasons outsourcing is 
often entered into is to make better use of information while all outsourcing does 
involve transition, but also a change in the way the organisation manages, whether 
consciously entered into, or  as a response to the problems engendered by not changing. 
After reviewing other mid-ranked concerns before 2007, we can draw the same 
conclusion. The following concerns are examples: ‗Measuring the value of IT‘, ‗IT 
governance‘, ‗Business process reengineering‘, ‗Evolving CIO leadership role‘, 
‗Creating an information architecture‘ and ‗Introducing rapid business solutions‘. It 
would seem that most IT management concerns in contemporary organisations involve 
an IT outsourcing component.  
 
This conclusion is also drawn from this thesis author‘s six-year professional experience 
as an IT manager in a large government organisation. The key management concerns 
identified by Luftman and his colleagues are consistent with the author‘s own 
experience and the argument in the above section was developed based also on the 
author‘s observations during that period. 
 
On this subject of the impact of IT outsourcing (understood as including IT-enabled 
business process outsourcing), the research already carried out in IS studies shows that 
outsourcing provides a wide research area in terms of technology and organisational 
change. Considering the nature of IT outsourcing, which brings external assets and 
management over to client organisations, it necessarily raises the issues of 
reconstructing power, organisational forms and processes. These, it is suggested, should 
be tackled at a more holistic and governance level, rather than through an atomistic and 
technological approach focusing only on the IT components.  
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There are some grounds in favour of this perspective. First, IT outsourcing is strongly 
linked with other IT-related managerial issues, as lengthily discussed up to now. Second,   
the phenomena of BPO is expanding into every back office, many middle office and 
some front office domains (Gottfredson, Puryear and Phillips 2005; Lacity and 
Willcocks 2006a; Oshri, Kotlarsky and Willcocks 2009). Third, IT outsourcing has 
become both a perennial and multi-faceted endeavour. IT outsourcing is not an 
independent or one-off project, but a collective and continuing one. Furthermore, IT 
outsourcing environments have been becoming more complex, as represented by the 
trend towards outsourcing contracts with multiple suppliers, IT and business process 
arrangements, and offshore outsourcing (Cohen and Young, 2005; Willcocks and Lacity 
2009a). 
  
To summarise, IT outsourcing is a business practice that pervades every aspect of IT 
management and multiple domains of a contemporary organisation‘s work; furthermore, 
it has great influence on the technology and organisation design from an operational 
point of view to a strategic governance perspective. There have been many studies with 
an individual research focus on for example IT outsourcing, IT management and 
governance, technology and organisation change, or innovation. However, few studies 
as yet view IT outsourcing as an organisational component, and explore relative 
phenomena in the context of organisational governance and/or at the institutional level; 
more particularly, even fewer do this over time, and in the light of changes in what are 
dynamic contexts. This problematisation forms the background of the research interest 
and the author‘s motivation to select the subject of this thesis.   
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1.2 Research purpose and scope 
 
This research aims, through the theoretical lenses of IT outsourcing and organisation 
studies, to understand the phenomena involved in IT outsourcing practices, 
organisational changes and their underlying social context in terms of bureaucratic 
organisations. It will do so through adopting a processual analysis of organisational 
change, using a longitudinal comparative case study approach.  
 
More specifically, the research purpose is to discover how and why organisations 
construct and change their relevant structural components—such as organisational 
forms and processes, and contract structure—to develop improving governance and 
achieve innovation in IT outsourcing-related management practices. Within this 
research purpose, three scoping issues will be presented in advance.  
 
The first is the research boundary regarding the parties involved. This thesis is client-
focused research because the original research interest lay in the governance issues of 
client organisations. This approach can be justified by a taken-for-granted assumption 
that it is the client that crafts its outsourcing contract and can change its own 
organisational components, even though such decisions are supported by external 
entities. On this point, client organisations‘ capabilities—according to most research 
even more than so than the capabilities provided by external partners—are always key 
success factors for innovation and performance enhancement in IT outsourcing. This is 
supported by Willcocks and Feeny (2006). Four out of their nine core in-house IS 
capabilities immediately relate to outsourcing as follows: ‗Informed buying‘, ‗Contract 
facilitation‘, ‗Contract monitoring‘ and ‗Vendor development‘. That said, both case 
studies examined in this thesis also look at how client capabilities evolve and fit with 
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supplier capabilities over time in the light of changes in requirements, emerging 
problems and dynamic changes in context. 
 
Second, this thesis does not address in-depth discussion about IT outsourcing success. 
For example, the criteria for IT outsourcing success and the evaluation of each deal‘s 
achievements are beyond the research scope. Considering that the research purpose is to 
understand the organisational setting pursuing IT outsourcing-related innovation, the 
assessment of innovation may be an element to discuss. It is, however, too big to be 
tackled as a secondary major subject of this thesis.  However, this thesis does reveal 
stakeholders‘ own evaluations of practices and outcomes, and these vary across the 
‗success-failure‘ spectrum depending on the stakeholder‘s position and the issue at hand. 
This approach is also consistent with the conclusion of recent comprehensive research 
into conceptualising IT outsourcing success. Cullen, Seddon and Willcocks (2009), 
based on the results of a critical literature review of eighteen IT outsourcing success 
literature and case studies of 63 large organisations, concluded that:  
Unrecognized in most of the literature is that outcomes sought from 
outsourcing have a temporal dimension, as well as varying from 
organization to organization (p. 304). 
In assessing ITO success, each respondent must first indicate which goals 
were important to his/her organization at the time of interest, then ITO 
success should be evaluated in terms of the achievement of those goals, not 
the achievement of all possible goals (p. 305). 
 
As another aspect of IT outsourcing success, the authors posed the question of whether 
the relationship with the supplier is an outcome of successful outsourcing or a means to 
obtain success (Cullen, Seddon and Willcocks 2009). Reserving a final answer, the 
authors declared that there was no doubt about the importance of a good relationship 
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between client and supplier in achieving IT outsourcing success based on their own 
analyses of empirical studies and prior literature. Searching this literature, the present 
author would point to Alborz, Seddon and Scheepers 2005; Corbett 2005; Dibbern et al. 
2004; Grover, Cheon and Teng 1996; Kern and Willcocks 2002. This conclusion is consistent 
with the research purpose of this thesis in that building a good relationship was revealed as 
one of the explicit goals of outsourcing strategy in the two case study organisations.     
 
The third research scope set up in this thesis is the object of outsourced activities. To 
state the conclusion first, the main focus is the outsourcing of existing IT operation and 
service delivery by using those IT rather than the outsourcing of application 
development. IT outsourcing can be generally differentiated from other outsourcing 
deals due to its influence on organisational processes (Kern and Willcocks 2002); 
however, this feature is amplified in this kind of IT outsourcing because it is melted into 
a client organisations‘ day-to-day operational business. Compared to this, an IS 
development project is one-off, short-term, and it is more concretely target-driven. 
However, it also has to be pointed out that the ambiguous boundary between application 
maintenance and development increases the complexity of IT service outsourcing 
management, as will be discussed later. 
 
In short, the research purpose of this thesis is to explore the changes in client 
organisation structure, management and contract arrangements in response to IT 
outsourcing and BPO in dynamic contexts. To what degree do innovations in structure, 
management, and governance occur over time in response to outsourcing. This is related 
to many detailed concerns from governance level such as the allocation of the decision-
making authority between client and supplier or between IS and business staff, to 
management level, like the deployment of organisational process, structure and 
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IS/business staff or the constitution of contract. The author has chosen to focus in 
particular on public sector organisations in two different countries  because their pre-
change bureaucratic structures provide a common, and in the organisation studies 
research literature well rehearsed backdrop to organisational change, and because the 
cross country dimension provides the ability to tease out comparative, and distinctive, 
factors operating in each of the cases.  
 
1.3 Research and thesis structure  
  
This thesis operates an interpretive multiple-case study approach dealing with two 
government organisations. The first case is the IT outsourcing of the electronic 
government procurement (e-GP) system of the Public Procurement Service (PPS) of the 
Republic of Korea (Korea); and the other is the BPO of the Teachers‘ Pensions Scheme 
(TPS) administration for the Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF
2
) of 
the UK. These case studies are not linked with any commercial research project. In 
addition, this research was not subsidised from any fund; however, the author of the 
thesis was given free financial assistance in part by the Korean government as an 
incumbent government official of PPS during the study of this subject.   
 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. The present Introduction chapter describes the 
research background, purpose and scope, thesis structure and intended contribution. 
Motivation of this research is provided in terms of the importance of outsourcing as an 
embedded organisational component for the governance and management of IT and 
contemporary organisation.  
                                               
2
 DCSF was renamed the Department for Education after the May 2010 UK election. To 
maintain consistency, however, this thesis uses DCSF as the title of case organisation.    
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Chapter Two, Literature Review, introduces and discusses relevant literature on the 
following three criteria: IT outsourcing and client organisation change, organisation 
studies and IT outsourcing, and information systems and structuration theory. The first 
two groups of literature are examined to find prior researches on the relationship with IT 
outsourcing and client organisation change; and the last group is reviewed to construct a 
social theory underpinning the theoretical perspective of this thesis.  
 
In Chapter Three, Research Design and Methodology, the framing of the research 
questions and research strategy, with philosophical underpinning, is discussed; 
subsequently, the employed methodological options are presented. A methodological 
characteristic of this research is related to a strongly subjective position of the author in 
one of two cases. In order to handle this issue, some discussions about interpretive 
research quality criteria are made as methodological background. In addition, 
argumentation analysis—that is rarely used in IS research—is introduced as a data 
analysis method.     
 
Chapter Four, Conceptual Framework, describes the intellectual perspective that 
informs this study. A structuration theory-informed formal organisation perspective is 
chosen as a theoretical perspective and a processual analysis-informed multidimensional 
IT outsourcing configuration framework is reinvented as an analytical framework. 
These conceptual frameworks are reworked from diverse research areas of organisation 
studies, structuration theory, processual analysis, IT governance, lifecycle perspective 
of sourcing process, and IT outsourcing configuration.  
 
Chapters Five and Six address each of the empirical case studies—of PPS and DCSF. 
Both cases are analysed using the same analytical framework developed in Chapter Four. 
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A principal finding in the PPS case study is the recognition of interrelationships among 
strategy, contract structure and organisational construction, or among structure, human 
behaviour and the institutional context. The most significant, (though not only) issue 
emerging and investigated in PPS is the retention of IS capabilities to deliver everyday 
e-GP services. The BPO case of DCSF reveals the same interest in developing in-house 
capabilities. But, unlike in the PPS case, DCSF pursues those capabilities in terms of 
performance evaluation and risk mitigation to achieve cost reduction and avoid over-
dependence on a specific supplier. There is a different balance in terms of dependence 
on internal and external capabilities found in the cases, and the research investigates, 
amongst other things, the within-case, cultural and contextual reasons for this difference. 
This acts as a prelude to the much greater comparative detail in the next chapter.  
 
Chapter Seven, Synthesis and Comparison of Case Studies, discusses a comparative 
analysis of the two cases. In spite of many similarities in the background and context of 
outsourcing, this analysis identifies wide differences between the two sets of practices. 
An immediate and fundamental background of those seems to be the difference in 
strategic positioning (core/non-core) of related business. Finally, the overall conclusion 
and interpretation, construction of contribution and further research opportunities are 
given in the conclusion chapter.   
 
1.4 Intended contribution 
 
The expected contribution of this work is categorised into academic and practical. 
Academically, although IT outsourcing can be regarded as just a business practice, it is 
worth revisiting it through the lenses of the appropriate theories because the impact on 
organisation and its implications for IS and organisational studies are significant.  
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First, this research is expected to reveal what is happening in the field of IT outsourcing 
in detail from contract constitution, pricing method, organisation format and process 
design to participants‘ perceptions and reactions. Findings will be interpreted as 
organisational and behavioural change intertwined with given technologies and 
outsourcing management skills. Synergistic analyses will be conducted and presented 
through the dimensions of different contexts and outsourcing environment: Korea vs. 
the UK and IT outsourcing vs. BPO. In addition to these, three standards to interpret 
findings and explore implications will be derived as follows: core vs. non-core function, 
high vs. low switching cost and high vs. low variability. In these respects, this thesis can 
provide IS researchers with abundant empirical data around ITO/BPO outsourcing and 
organisation change in dynamic contexts.   
    
Secondly, this research is intended to supplement the lack of studies on the structure of 
the client organisation and changes therein during outsourcing. Despite high profile 
discussions about a so-called network or virtual organisation, traditional bureaucratic 
elements are still observed in the real world, as will be disclosed in this research. 
Specifically, this research will contribute to understanding both aspects of decomposing 
and recomposing bureaucracy brought about by outsourcing in modern organisations. 
This is both a significant and under-researched phenomenon. For example, Kallinikos 
(2006), as a leading researcher in bureaucracy, identifies outsourcing as an important 
instance of these phenomena, as follows:  
[Outsourcing and subcontracting] provide novel incentives for reframing the 
logic upon which boundedness, location and hierarchy as major and 
constitutive organizational principles have been predicated. (p. 92) 
[D]isaggregation could be interpreted as a means for exploring the 
decomposability of organizational operations, and taking advantage of the 
possibility of relocating externally a significant number of operations 
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previously conducted in-house. (pp. 102-103) 
Nevertheless, outsourcing was not an independent topic in his work. However, in the 
present thesis, outsourcing is acknowledged as one of the strongest generic catalysts 
promoting organisational change. On this point, the thesis will point to the need to 
reappraise the growing significance, and the relative isolation of outsourcing as it is 
researched and discussed in IS and organisation studies.  
 
As the last academic contribution, the outsourcing-related literature can definitely be 
strengthened by further work on theoretical underpinnings and in-depth case studies. 
This thesis will be a trial to expand the application of structuration theory and 
organisation studies to outsourcing studies; social context and institutionalised human 
practices underlying IT outsourcing will be explored by use of the processual analysis 
method. In addition, in spite of a consensus that governance matters in terms of IT 
outsourcing success, there has been little link between IT governance and the IT 
outsourcing literature. This thesis will deal with IT outsourcing in a wider context of IT 
governance issues.  
 
This research is also expected to have implications for practitioners. The analytical 
framework it produces can provide practical focal points in bureaucratic organisations. 
Practitioners can use the framework in order to examine their own status, and design 
organisational elements and contractual arrangements. The practices developed and 
employed in the light of the problems and contexts to hand will provide normative  
lessons to practitioners, always remembering that this research does not support ‗best 
practice‘ techniques or solutions, rather than examples of what works and does not work, 
in specific contexts, as described by practitioners, and re-interpreted by the researcher.  
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
CHAPTER TWO  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter offers the result of the literature review with respect to the research 
purpose and scope delineated in the previous chapter. This thesis aims to investigate 
how bureaucratically structured client organisations deal with IT outsourcing in terms of 
internal management. The applications of relevant literature are at the heart of this 
research. Diverse theoretical lenses are involved in the selection of the research topic, 
the exploration of phenomena and the interpretation of findings. By employing such 
theoretical underpinnings synthesised from what works in the research literature, this 
thesis suggests that a more comprehensive and substantial understanding of IT 
outsourcing-related phenomena can be expected.  
 
The literature reviewed in this chapter primarily involves overall theoretical 
underpinnings that identify the research topic, develop the intellectual framework and 
give guidelines regarding how phenomena may be understood. Against this, a specific 
theoretical background for guiding methodology and empirical studies will be 
intensively examined in Chapters Three and Four describing methodology and 
conceptual framework, respectively.  
 
Five bodies of literature—categorised as three—are identified as relevant. The first 
category is referred to as IS/IT outsourcing, where the IT outsourcing-specific literature 
and other IS work regarding organisation change are examined. The second one is 
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organisation studies and IT outsourcing. Two bodies of literature here are studies on 
bureaucracy as institution, and public management studies. The final category focuses 
on structuration theory and gives overall, founding direction regarding how this thesis 
views structure, human behaviours and their relationships.     
 
2.2 Information systems and IT outsourcing 
 
2.2.1 IT outsourcing and client organisation change 
 
2.2.1.1 IT outsourcing research strand 
 
This thesis explores the IT outsourcing literature to obtain perspectives on IT 
outsourcing and organisation change, which is established as the research subject. Due 
to the growing importance of IT outsourcing, the number of academic research papers 
on IT outsourcing has increased dramatically in very recent years. Three literature 
reviews by IS researchers were examined first in order to classify prior studies.  
 
Dibbern et al. (2004) provide a very comprehensive analysis of literature in this area. 
They reviewed 84 articles from 21 academic journals and conference proceedings 
between 1988 and 2000. These authors used diverse layers of analysis in terms of 
outsourcing stages (why, what, which, how, outcome), theoretical foundations (agency 
theory, transaction cost theory, game theory, resource theories, strategic management 
theories, social exchange theory, innovation theories, power and politics theories, 
relationship theories, etc.), and research approaches (positivist, descriptive, interpretive, 
conceptual and mathematical).   
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More recently, Gonzalez, Gasco and Llopis (2006) found 131 articles between 1988 and 
2005 out of 18 academic journals. These authors divided the articles into five groups by 
topic, such as the client‘s perspective, the provider‘s perspective, the relationship 
perspective, the economic theory perspective, and others. Almost half the articles were 
judged to belong to the client‘s perspective category, which is connected to the research 
interest of this thesis. This group has five sub-classifications: success factors, reasons, 
risks, decision making and the general view.  
 
Most recently, Lacity, Shaji and Willcocks (2009) conducted a literature review based 
on 357 papers across 71 journals from 1990 to 2008. Those papers were selected 
according to the criterion of the rich implications for practice that a specific paper had, 
which was established as their review aim. The papers were categorised as follows: 
determinants of IT outsourcing; IT outsourcing strategy; IT outsourcing risks; 
determinants of IT outsourcing success; client and supplier capabilities; and sourcing 
varietals (offshore, application service provision and BPO).  
 
Within the above three literature review articles, no specific research or taxonomy on IT 
outsourcing and client organisation change was identified. For example, Lacity, Shaji 
and Willcocks (2009) discuss relevant issues. On the one hand, IT outsourcing success 
determinants are explored in terms of outsourcing decision, contractual governance and 
relational governance; on the other hand, client and supplier capabilities for the success 
of IT outsourcing are investigated. However, these discussions do not address any 
straightforward implications about clients‘ organisation structures. Instead, those are 
based on the consideration of human resources, strategy, contract structure, or trust and 
cooperation.  
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Against this research stream, the present thesis attempted to investigate literature 
addressing the topic more directly. At the early stage of this study, EBSCOhost 
Business Source Premier and ScienceDirect databases were searched for articles 
published between 2000 and 2007 in 13 journals with the terms ‗outsourcing‘, 
‗organization‘, ‗management‘, ‗bureaucracy‘, or ‗innovation‘ in their titles, abstracts or 
keyword lists. Those terms were selected according to their possible relevance to this 
thesis‘s research interest. Ninety-four articles were found with the term ‗outsourcing‘ 
only. Among them, 55 articles contained the following secondary terms: 26 with 
‗organisation‘, 23 with ‗management‘ and 6 with ‗innovation‘. No studies were found 
using the terms ‗outsourcing‘ and ‗bureaucracy‘ together. Six articles containing 
‗innovation‘ were found in only two business journals: Harvard Business Review and 
MIT Sloan Management Review. The result of this literature examination is provided in 
Table 2-1; no article is found to contain duplicate secondary terms.   
 
These 55 articles containing ‗outsourcing‘ as well as a secondary term form the basis for 
our IT outsourcing-specific literature review. As with Gonzalez, Gasco and Llopis‘s 
analysis (2006), many articles addressed outsourcing strategies of client organisations 
and also explored success factors, reasons for success/failure (e.g., Adeleye, 
Annansingh and Nunes 2004; Baldwin, Lrani and Love 2001; Chesbrough and Teece 
2002; Gottfredson, Puryear and Phillips 2005; Hancox and Hackney 2000; Loebbecke 
and Huyskens 2006; Lorence and Spink 2004; Nohria et al. 2005). On the other hand, 
not many of the articles‘ authors seemed to have similar research interests as this thesis, 
that is, organisation change and IT outsourcing management. However, some articles 
focused on the management of overall IT/IS assets without really considering IT 
outsourcing (e.g., Peppard, Lambert and Edwards 2000; Sambamurthy and Zmud 2000; 
Vaast and Levina 2006). One interesting approach was used in the literature regarding 
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client and IT outsourcing supplier relationships based on psychological contracts (Koh, 
Ang and Straub 2004; Miranda and Kavan 2005). The main feature of this approach is 
the recognition of informal relationships outside formal outsourcing contracts.  
 
Table 2-1: Results of the IT outsourcing literature investigation 
Journal 
Number of articles including specific terms 
Outsou-
rcing 
Bureau-
cracy 
Organi-
zation 
Innov-
ation 
Manage-
ement 
Any one of 
secondary terms 
EJIS 9 0 2 0 3 5 
I&M 17 0 5 0 7 12 
IJIM 10 0 0 0 3 3 
ISJ 5 0 2 0 1 3 
ISR 6 0 1 0 2 3 
IT&P 1 0 0 0 0 0 
JIT 4 0 1 0 0 1 
JMS 3 0 1 0 0 1 
JSIS 9 0 7 0 0 7 
MISQ 6 0 1 0 1 2 
OS 1 0 1 0 0 1 
HBR 21 0 5 5 5 15 
SMR 2 0 0 1 1 2 
Total 94 0 26 6 23 55 
 
* EJIS: European Journal of Information Systems; I&M: Information and Management; 
IJIM: International Journal of Information Management; ISJ: Information Systems 
Journal; ISR: Information Systems Research; IT&P: Information Technology and 
People; JIT: Journal of Information Technology; JMS: Journal of Management 
Studies; JSIS: Journal of Strategic Information Systems; MISQ: MIS Quarterly; OS: 
Organization Science; HBR: Harvard Business Review; SMR: (MIT) Sloan 
Management Review 
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2.2.1.2 IT outsourcing and contextual analyses 
 
In assessing the relevant literature, a common weakness, or more accurately omission, 
noted in these studies was the lack of consideration of the factors involving clients as 
they apply to organisational change. In order to do so, in-depth analyses of client 
organisations‘ social contexts and the way they change are required. In particular, most 
studies were primarily interested in the construction of contracts, while client 
organisations, their structures and their ability to absorb and initiate change seem to be 
regarded as constants. However, existing client organisations and constructed 
outsourcing practices have interrelationships: on the one hand, change in client 
organisations‘ forms and processes can improve outsourcing performance; on the other 
hand, outsourcing can lead to the reorganisation of clients, not only in outsourced areas, 
but also in retained domains. Such change should be discussed both within IS functions 
and in the wider context of overall IT assets management, including the business side of 
every organisation, as has been suggested by many more general governance-related 
researchers (e.g., Mead and Boeschoten 2006; Peppard, Lambert and Edwards 2000; 
Weill and Woodham 2002).  
 
To summarise the results of the literature review, the existing literature on IT 
outsourcing is restricted to studies of client organisations‘ strategy—why is outsourcing 
adopted; what is to be outsourced; how are outsourcing deals made?—or  relationship 
construction between client organisations and outsourcing suppliers. Outsourcing-led 
organisational change studies have been neglected, this thesis suggests, due to the 
misunderstanding of outsourcing as something outside the organisation. For example, 
Clegg (2007) presented supply chains and outsourcing as examples of decomposing 
bureaucracy. This aspect is evidenced by a BPO case study of a British government 
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organisation in Chapter Six, where a large-scale transfer of assets, responsibilities, risks 
and workforces occurred. This thesis‘s research interest, however, arose from the 
postulate that outsourcing is a phenomenon connected with the recomposition of 
bureaucracy. This perspective is supported by a Korean case study discussed in Chapter 
Five, in which diverse internal management matters and organisation changes appear. 
Even in the British case in Chapter Six, the client organisation had to establish new 
functions, such as contract management. 
 
This thesis intends to examine how and why clients reshape organisational components 
to manage outsourcing contracts and to construct relationship with suppliers. To achieve 
this, the research employs an in-depth longitudinal case study approach and broad social 
theories exploring interrelationship among structure, human behaviours, and context, as 
suggested by Kern and Willcocks (2002). Those authors found that such contextual 
empirical outsourcing research focusing on client organisations was very rare. Our own 
review of the subsequent (post-2002) literature suggests that the approach is very under-
utilised in outsourcing studies, given what can be gained in insight and understanding 
from the approach.  
  
2.2.1.3 Implications of IT outsourcing literature review 
 
A potential alternative approach to examining this phenomenon is studies of contractual 
and relational governance. Contractual governance involves diverse organisational 
structures and crafting and monitoring complex contracts to resolve business 
requirements and contingencies. Relational governance embraces informal, long-term 
relationships between the client and supplier. Trust emerges as a key concept in defining 
good relational governance (Sabherwal 1999). Many researchers identify these two 
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governance mechanisms as substitutes for one another. For example, good relational 
governance decreases the need for well-organised contractual governance, and vice 
versa (Choudhury and Sabherwal 2003; Kishore et al. 2003). However, Poppo and 
Zenger (2002) and Goo et al. (2009) find and confirm a positive relationship between 
relational governance and formal contracts. On the one hand, formal contracts support 
relational governance by mitigating opportunistic behaviours through well-defined 
control mechanisms; on the other hand, relational governance complements formal 
contracts by entrusting both parties and resolving contractual conflicts. This 
complementarity view is described as follows by Poppo and Zenger (2002, p. 713). 
Formal contracts promote relational governance in exchange settings and 
relational governance enables the refinement of contract and promotes 
stability in interorganizational exchanges.  
However, the main bodies analysed by these studies were conventional contractual 
arrangements and the understanding of organisational/personal relationships, instead of 
the overall client organisation that implements all of these strategies and changes.  
 
This thesis is distinct from, and adds to such previous studies, in that the research 
focuses on client organisation, its bureaucratic structure and change thereof. Dibbern et 
al. (2004) confirmed this potential future direction of IT outsourcing research as a 
change in focus, as follows (p. 89): 
Although companies outsource for a variety of reasons, the view that the 
primary reason is cost savings appears to be falling out of favor. More and 
more companies appear to be entering into outsourcing ‗deals‘ not so much 
to reduce costs but for the sake of management focus (Halvey et al., 1996). 
In other words, they outsource certain parts of IS in order to free up 
management and IS personnel to work on specific value-added functions; 
turning their attention to those areas where the internal skill sets add 
strategic value to the organization. Internal IS departments can no longer 
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expect to continually grow in size by internally acquiring all the skills sets 
they need to maintain IS in their host organizations. The corporate mandate 
to downsize affects IS departments as it does all other departments. Focus 
becomes the key. IS groups are thus determining which areas they provide 
value-add, with outsourcing vendors being chosen to handle all other area.  
This suggestion strongly implies that investigating client organisation change—as 
pursued by this thesis—is highly useful for establishing aspects of restructuring and 
enhancing in-house management and capabilities, as being pursued increasingly in 
actual outsourcing arrangements. In addition, this thesis can enrich previous research 
findings by conceptualising and integrating contractual and relational governance as 
multidimensional decision points in a holistic manner. This becomes a significant 
contribution because, as argued above, the prior IT outsourcing literature hardly 
delivered a rich base of client organisation change-focused empirical studies.  
 
To develop a focus on this integration objective, the wider literature regarding the 
characteristics of IT outsourcing contracts and the client-supplier relationship needs to 
be examined. In this respect, there is an interesting way into this issue. Executives‘ 
common concerns about outsourcing are revealed by exploring what occurs after their 
outsourcing contracts are terminated. Most companies re-make contracts with 
incumbent suppliers, one-quarter switch suppliers, and one-tenth bring IT back in-house 
(backsource) (Lacity and Willcocks 2006b). The reasons for these decisions were 
investigated by Whitten and Leidner (2006) as perceptions of product quality, 
relationship quality, service quality and switching costs. Each quality is described as 
follows (pp. 607-609): 
Service quality: perceived judgement resulting from a comparison of client 
expectations with the level of service customers perceive to have received 
from the outsourcing vendor 
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Product quality: the perception of performance, features, reliability, 
conformance, durability, serviceability and aesthetics characterizing 
product; in particular, reliability as the most important attribute for software 
product 
Relationship quality: the quality of trust, commitment, communication 
quality, cultural similarity, and balanced interdependence 
Switching cost: costs associated with either moving service to another 
vendor or bringing the outsourcing activities back in house 
According to these authors, clients switch vendors or bring IT back in-house, only when 
they recognise switching costs to be low. Where low switching costs exist, a client with 
good service/product quality and poor relationship quality will attempt to switch 
vendors; and poor service and product quality-experienced clients prefer backsourcing.       
 
High transaction costs in IT outsourcing arrangements emerge from the literature as an 
important characteristic of IT outsourcing. IS and outsourcing activities‘ embeddedness 
with organisation/business activities can explain these high transaction costs. This 
makes IT outsourcing and IT-enabled BPO distinct from other types of outsourcing or 
goods procurement (Ang and Straub 1998; Kern and Willcocks 2002; Kishore et al. 
2003). Under these circumstances, a well-organised control and monitoring system is 
strongly required because clients cannot switch vendors easily. For example, 
Choudhury and Sabherwal (2003) found that clients use a mixture of diverse modes and 
mechanisms for the control of suppliers in information system development projects. As 
shown by these findings, many clients have no choice but to make contracts with the 
same suppliers and, in addition, to strive to develop organisational capabilities to 
control their existing suppliers. This trend will be explored through this thesis‘s subject 
of organisation change in terms of format, work processes and control mechanisms. 
This will be assisted by utilising  the IT outsourcing configuration framework (Cullen, 
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Seddon and Willcocks 2005) and the lifecycle perspective of sourcing process (Cullen, 
Seddon and Willcocks 2006), the uses of which will be discussed in detail in the 
conceptual framework chapter of this thesis. 
 
2.2.2 Information systems and organisation change 
 
The second body of literature relates to the topic of IS and organisation change. This is 
a very persistent subject of IS research. This category is chosen in order to obtain 
theoretical foundations to consider organisational change as it relates to IT. By 
analysing prior literature, Galliers and Baets (1998) presented four forces as the drivers 
and mechanisms behind organisation transformation triggered by IT adoption. These are 
described as IT, organisational behaviour, corporate strategy and cognitive psychology. 
From this analysis, it becomes clear that organisation strategy, human practice and 
psychological perceptions, beyond IT itself, are also involved in transforming 
organisations. As discussed in the previous section, IT outsourcing-specific research 
that focuses on organisational change has, surprisingly, been rarely carried out. 
However, we can infer that an integrated approach including behaviour, strategy and 
structure is required to explore fully the relationships between organisational 
transformation and IT outsourcing.  
 
Most empirical research on this subject is related to specific IS and their ability to 
enable organisation change; the resistance of organisation to this change; or flexible or 
inflexible characters of technology and organisation. For example, Bjørn-Andersen and 
Turner (1998) found that a groupware for electronic document management is a key 
enabler of the organisation‘s transformation into a flexible structure. On the other hand, 
more holistic and institutional approaches are encouraged by many researchers. 
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Avgerou (2000) explores the relationship between IS and organisational transformation 
through the use of institutionalist theory. She suggests that there are two 
institutionalisation processes: on the one hand, legitimation of IT innovation as a taken-
for-granted validity; on the other hand, organisational efforts to achieve and absorb a 
radically different organisational regime. She argues that IT should not be regarded as 
simply an enabler or an embedded component of organisation change; instead, it should 
be understood as a mutual interaction within institutionalisation processes. Similarly, 
Orlikowski (1996) conceptualises IT-related organisational transformation as the 
enactment of situated practices of actors and of improvisational ongoing changes, 
grounded in everyday practices.   
 
Although a wide range of literature has addressed the issues of IS and organisation 
change, IT outsourcing has not been recognised as an independent, let alone a major 
subject in this research trend. However, the significance of this research trend to this 
thesis is the theoretical foundation, this previous research can provide  regarding how to 
view and understand IT, human practices, structure and organisation strategy when 
ITO/BPO become the research object.           
 
Regarding these theoretical foundations, Giddens‘s (1984) structuration theory was 
chosen as a grand social theory, to be introduced later in this chapter. Furthermore, 
Pettigrew‘s processual analysis (Pettigrew 1985; 1990; 1997) is employed to guide the 
empirical study of this thesis. This method will be discussed as a constituent element of 
the conceptual framework of this thesis in Chapter Four. 
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2.3 Organisation studies and IT outsourcing  
 
2.3.1 Bureaucracy as institution 
 
The literature regarding bureaucracy is examined because our research focus is related 
to the bureaucratic structure of organisation. Bureaucracy remains a conventional 
theoretical framework in organisation studies, although the salience of Weber‘s modern 
bureaucracy model has been frequently criticised by those espousing the need to focus 
in contemporary organisations on the ‗post-bureaucratic or network organisation‘ 
(Courpasson and Reed 2004, du Gay 2005). As du Gay (2005) suggested, those 
critiques can be overcome or re-contemplated if the concept of bureaucracy were 
accepted as an institution.   
 
In order to explore the concept of bureaucracy as an institution, two characteristics of 
post-bureaucratic or network organisation must be examined. These were well 
summarised by Clegg (2007, p. 11) as follows: ―reduction of hierarchy and of coercive 
elements in bureaucracy and a move towards less rigid and perhaps apparently less 
rationalistic ways of organising.‖ As implied by these trends, many current discourses 
on bureaucracy have been conducted on aspects of organisational forms or processes. 
 
However, bureaucracy includes another aspect of institution from Weber‘s original 
concept, as aptly described by Casey (2004, p. 60) below: 
In the classical Weberian view, modern bureaucratic production and 
administrative organizations manifest in their everyday processes and 
enactments the forms of rationalization and secularization characteristic of 
societal modernization. The modern bureaucratic organization epitomizes 
the systematic, methodical, rational-legal instrumentality of industrial 
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society. 
Despite this institutional characteristic, overemphasis on stable structural arrangements 
of organisation caused bureaucracy to be partially understood as only an organisational 
form. As an institution, however, bureaucracy could be understood in the wider contexts 
of social, political and economic domains. For example, Courpasson (2000) analysed 
bureaucracy through the lens of organisational politics, and Kärreman and Alvesson 
(2004) identified it as a socio-ideological layer of control. In addition, Thompson and 
Alvesson (2005) recognised contemporary organisation changes as the re-configuration 
of bureaucratic forms, rather than their dissolution. Based on the same critique against 
post-bureaucratic organisations, Salaman (2005) found that there also exist the same 
rules, norms and techniques in so-called post-bureaucratic organisations.   
 
Among these research strands, to find bureaucratic regimes through the use of 
bureaucracy as an institution within contemporary organisations, Kallinikos (2006) 
provided an inclusive term of bureaucracy as both an institution and an organisational 
form in modernity. His perspective is more strongly relevant to this study because he 
invented it as an institutional perspective inspired by institutional implications of 
information growth and IT change. His concept of formal organisation means 
bureaucracy. He criticises the contemporary critique of bureaucracy as follows: ―the 
dominant understanding of bureaucracy tends to [falsely] view bureaucracy as a largely 
introvert and ossified social form‖ (p. 117). Below is the definition of bureaucracy 
(formal organisation, in his term) that he presents (p. 125): 
Social entities (most notably firms and public agencies) that operate under a 
specific regime of rules and regulations, as the outcome of the jurisdictional 
responsibility granted to them through legal, administrative or political 
processes 
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Bureaucracy is not the functional collectivity of organisational arrangements, but a 
central institution representing a specific form of governing social relations. This is 
coherent with other conceptualisations of bureaucracy as an institution.  
 
On the other hand, while admitting that outsourcing and subcontracting are implicated 
in the development of new network organisations, he insisted on the continuous 
existence of embedded bureaucratic orders. The following lengthy citation reveals this 
insight well (p. 119): 
Even though network relationships may be formalized in a variety of 
contracts, the network lacks jurisdictional responsibility which would lend it 
a formal status. For as far as profit appropriation is associated with the 
corporate form (Kraakman 2001), and work is predominantly carried out in 
institutional settings regulated by employment contracts (no matter how 
flexible or time limited) it is difficult to think of networks as an alternative 
to formal organization. Unless the network is constituted as a unit of 
jurisdictional responsibility (which would require its transformation into 
some sort of formal organization) it is destined to remain no more than a 
social arrangement or practice; a strategy, as it were, for the reallocation of 
resources in a highly volatile economy within which information and 
communication processes assume primary importance.   
Regarding the essence of the formal organisation, understood as the transformed form 
of jurisdictional responsibility above, Kallinikos explained it as follows (p. 149): 
No matter how important they may be in other respects, the dimensions of 
centralization, standardization, formalization and specialization develop 
within the constitutive framework of relations established by the non-
inclusive forms of human involvement and the selective, mobile and 
reversible terms by which individuals are tied to organizations. These terms 
provide the very foundation of the bureaucratic organization.  
The author suggested that human involvement in organisations should be either 
inclusive or non-inclusive. The non-inclusive form of human involvement above 
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pertains to the social relationship linked by the labour contract observed in 
contemporary organisations. In a private discussion about perspective, he emphasised 
patronage as a criterion for the inclusive relationship of involvement. 
 
In conclusion, the concept of bureaucracy as an institution expands the understanding of 
bureaucracy from a static organisation structure to a dynamic and instantiated social 
relationship based on certain social orders in modernity. Among those, Kallinikos‘s 
(2006) formal organisation perspective provided a direct implication about the 
juxtaposition of a contract-based relationship and underlying traditional bureaucratic 
orders, such as centralisation, standardisation and specialisation. The formal 
organisation perspective—together with the structuration theory presented in this 
chapter—will be explored again in detail in Chapter Four to formulate a theoretical 
perspective in this thesis.   
 
2.3.2 Public management and IT outsourcing 
 
2.3.2.1 Limited literature on IT outsourcing in public management 
 
For our purposes the public management literature also needs to be examined. Two case 
studies (concerning central government bodies of Korea and the UK) require this 
thesis‘s author to draw upon literature about public management in addition to 
conventional literature about IS and organisation study. After a careful review of this 
literature, three findings emerge that help to delimit the kinds of literature relevant for 
use. 
 
The first finding is that very little academic research literature exists on IT outsourcing 
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in public organisations. For example, Flynn (2007) and Walsh (1995) recognise 
outsourcing as a distinct phenomenon in contemporary public sector management. 
However, they focus on original public services such as healthcare, refuse collection 
and street cleaning; IT was introduced as just a possible area of outsourcing. A similar 
example is the work of Domberger (1998), who provides insightful perspectives on 
diverse aspects of outsourcing in contemporary organisations. He even explores the 
characteristics of public sector outsourcing with an individual chapter, but there is little 
consideration of IT and organisational aspects. Furthermore, with the exception of 
Dunleavy et al. (2006), IT outsourcing is rarely an independent subject even in the 
public management literature of e-government (see for example Fountain 2001). This 
was confirmed by Chen and Perry (2003, p. 405) who explores outsourcing for e-
government as follows: ―Against the background of the emergence of IT outsourcing, 
however, the growth of knowledge about government IT outsourcing is surprisingly 
sluggish.‖ Apart from the several research papers on the subject by Willcocks and 
colleagues (collected in Willcocks and Lacity 2009b), the only paper identified as 
dealing with general characteristics of public sector IT outsourcing is the work of 
Hancox and Hackney (2000), which compares the two sectors according to criteria of 
core competencies, transaction cost economics, agency theory and partnership. These 
authors suggest that one of the contributions of their paper is to introduce sectoral 
comparison, which has been ignored in other studies of IT outsourcing. Consequently, 
this lack of literature may imply, by omission, that there is no significant difference in 
research trends between public and private sectors with respect to IT outsourcing, and 
no specialised theoretical background for research needed on public sector IT 
outsourcing.  
 
The second finding is that most concerns about outsourcing in public organisations are 
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not peculiar to those organisations but are common to them and private organisations; if 
different they are different in the degree rather than the nature of the concerns. For 
example, loss of knowledge that had been gained from experience was presented as a 
concern about outsourcing in the public sector (Walsh 1995). This is necessarily true of 
any IT outsourcing; private companies also worry about their core capabilities. As 
another example, benefits from public sector outsourcing may not be forthcoming due 
to market failure of public services (Flynn 2007); we can see the same phenomenon in 
the private sector where high transaction costs exist.  
 
The third finding is that research into public management has paid attention to external 
effects of outsourcing deals. In terms of costs, Grimshaw, Vincent and Willmott (2002) 
and Walsh (1995) suggest that significant costs are externalised and unacknowledged in 
the public sector. For example, in the UK government context, short-term cost reduction 
may be offset by increased long-term expenditure on National Insurance contributions 
and additional costs of unemployment compensation. These authors also found that 
public sector managers worried about erosion of the public sector ethos (fairness, 
antipathy to corruption, reliability and so on) among workers. Consistent with this view, 
Hancox and Hackney (2000) reveal that local authorities were concerned about 
frustration with the democratic process arising because of standardised products and 
services provided by private suppliers. However, this seems relatively less important in 
IT outsourcing because the nature of IT components has little relationship with political 
aspects of public policies. In addition, this can be ignored in this thesis because the 
research scope will be limited to the managerial and organisational levels and does not 
concern institutional impacts, including the broader socio-economic impacts of 
outsourcing.   
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Consequently, the existing intellectual frameworks within IS and organisation studies 
are evaluated here as being applicable to cases of public sector IT outsourcing as well.  
This thesis will also include general discussions about outsourcing in public 
management as a way in to helping to understand the context of two case organisations 
and their specifically IT outsourcing/BPO experiences. This was something attempted 
by Seddon, Cullen and Willcocks (2007) when they tested, and validated, whether 
Domberger‘s theory about general outsourcing could also be applicable to IT 
outsourcing. Interestingly, as a further twist, Domberger‘s theory was itself developed 
in the context of extensive research into general public sector outsourcing cases 
involving both non-IT and IT activities. 
 
2.3.2.2 Information systems, e-governance and public management 
 
From a public management perspective, information systems and their impact on 
contemporary public organisations came to be recognised as an emerging major 
research area mainly in terms of e-government reform. Three pertinent and 
representative research studies are selected to review such a trend. First, Fountain (2001, 
pp. 102-103) suggested seven propositions that will see IT being enacted variably in  e-
government or, using her term, in founding the ‗virtual state‘:  
Government agencies will resist the potential for dramatic efficiency gains 
if those gains translate into loss of resources (budget and personnel) for the 
agency. 
Federal interagency networks will be difficult to build and maintain because 
the formal institutions of the federal government reward agency-centred 
activities and discourage cross-agency activities. 
Agencies lack resources for learning to use IT. 
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Intergovernmental and public–private networks will over-shadow cross-
agency IT-based networks because the institutional context favours those 
arrangements more readily than cross-agency federal networks. 
Agencies are likely to focus reform efforts on constituents, or ―customers,‖ 
who also are potential or actual strategic allies in the appropriations process. 
The nature of changes necessary to develop a network will affect the 
probability of success of the effort. 
The culture, history, mental models, and standard practices of a policy 
domain or agency will affect technology enactment – that is, whether and 
how an agency uses the Internet. 
 
She also conducted a tangible comparison by distinguishing the virtual bureaucracy 
required by contemporary public organisation from classical Weberian bureaucracy 
with seven elements as shown in Table 2-2. This provides a typical analysis of the 
change in bureaucratic organisational form from a public management perspective.  
 
Table 2-2: Comparison of Weberian and Virtual Bureaucracies 
Elements of a Weberian 
bureaucracy 
Elements of a virtual bureaucracy 
Functional differentiation, 
precise division of labor, clear 
jurisdictional boundaries 
Information structured using information technology 
rather than people; organizational structure based on 
information systems rather than people 
Hierarchy of offices and 
individuals 
Electronic and informal communication; teams carry 
out the work and make decisions 
Files, written documents, staff  
to maintain and transmit files 
Digitized files in flexible form, maintained and 
transmitted electronically using sensors, bar codes, 
transponders, hand-held computers; chips record, 
store, analyze, and transmit data; systems staff 
maintain hardware, software, and telecommunications 
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Employees are neutral, 
impersonal, attached to a 
particular office 
Employees are cross-functional, empowered; jobs 
limited not only by expertise but also by the extent 
and sophistication of computer mediation 
Office system of general rules, 
standard operating procedures, 
performance programs 
Rules embedded in applications and information 
systems; an invisible, virtual structure 
Slow processing time due to 
batch processing, delays, lags, 
multiple handoffs 
Rapid or real-time processing 
Long cycles of feedback and 
adjustment 
Constant monitoring and updating of feedback; more 
rapid or real-time adjustment possible 
 
* Source: Fountain (2001, p. 61) 
 
Recently, Dunleavy et al. (2006) developed a new paradigm for public management 
reform by use of the term Digital Era Governance (DEG) that focuses on the central role 
of IT in organising and delivering public services. The authors suggested that DEG will 
be able to replace new public management (NPM) theory which has been predominant 
during the past two decade. By a comparative study of seven countries, the research 
reveals DEG as seems exploitation of enhanced IT as a fundamental principal means of 
operating in contemporary public management. This suggestion appears clear in the 
following statement (p. 217): 
The whole thrust of this book has been to stress that government IT changes 
are no longer peripheral or routine aspects of contemporary public 
management and public policy changes, but increasingly important and 
determinant influences upon what is feasible. 
On the other hand, these authors take a view also consistent that underpinning this 
thesis–of bureaucracy as institution and with a structurational perspective regarding 
technology and organisation change. This is revealed in the following statements (p. 
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217): 
We see this influence of IT systems as having effects not in any direct 
technologically determined way but via a wide range of cognitive, 
behavioural, organizational, political, and cultural changes that are linked to 
information systems broadly construed.    
 
The authors conclude that the performance of DEG or e-government differs from 
country to country according to factors such as context, internal expertise, resource 
allocation, government-IT company relationships, and so on. An interesting finding is 
the impact of governance institutions and bureaucratic cultures. These authors showed 
that cultural differences had less influence on IT performance than expected. They 
presumed that IT outsourcing-dependent environments of public organisations may 
explain this phenomenon, since applied IT outsourcing methodologies were developed 
by many global IT suppliers; and have been used in the individual contracts of many 
countries. To explore this, the authors investigated the competitive tension and the 
power of the IT industry around each government, but they could not find a 
straightforward causal relationship between specific IT outsourcing types and 
performance. These authors provisionally concluded that it depends on the individual 
context of each government.  
 
Another study relevant to our purposes is provided by White and Korosec (2005). In 
revealing the frequent failures of public sector IT projects in the federal and local 
governments of the US, the authors attempted to explore the issues in contracting and 
outsourcing IT in the public sector. First, these authors confirmed the limitations of 
using private sector software within the public sector (p. 411):    
Unfortunately, government agencies found that software developed for the 
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private sector often needed to be reworked to meet the unique needs of 
government, usually resulting in significant additional development costs 
and project delays. 
Other than this self-explanatory factor, no further examples were provided in their 
research. For example, they presented the political background, such as NPM, as a 
characteristic driving force of public organisations‘ IT outsourcing. However, there is 
no reason why this should be distinguished from the innovation required by the private 
sector. White and Korosec (2005) also made reference to the government‘s adoption of 
the Software Acquisition Capability Maturity Model (SA-CMM) as a new procurement 
skill of software and IT services. Again, this was originally developed by and for the 
private sector. Two of the leading conclusions of this research were (White and Korosec 
2005, p. 413):  
First, public agencies must focus on long-term strategic approaches to 
managing IT outsourcing agreements (Chen and Perry 2003). 
Secondly, managers must remember that IT outsourcing requires more 
management skills than traditional (government-provided) procurements 
(Smith et al. 2001). 
How these are to be achieved within the context of public organisations remains unclear. 
However, the latter conclusion listed above implies a need for special requirements, at 
least with respect to public management.  
 
In summary, the scholars previously mentioned came to recognise the importance of IT 
or e-governance; however, specific forms of internal management and structures of 
client organisations were rarely considered, even within these IS-oriented public 
management studies.    
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2.3.2.3 Comparison of public- and private-sector IT outsourcing 
 
Public and private organisations have much in common, including their IT outsourcing 
determinants, strategies, success factors and concerns. Although much public 
management literature reveals characteristics of public sector outsourcing, this is not the 
case for IT outsourcing only, as explained in the previous section.  
 
However, an attempt to compare public and private sector organisations is meaningful, 
not to obtain a general solution but to learn how to better understand the context of 
public sector practices. For example, Hancox and Hackney (2000) compare the two 
sectors based on interviews with thirteen IT managers in six private companies and 
seven local authorities in the UK, as summarised in Table 2-3. 
 
Table 2-3: Comparison between public and private sector IT outsourcing 
Framework Public Private 
Core 
competencies 
Core/non-core classification as 
outsourcing determinant 
low low 
Requirements of cost reduction and 
service improvement as outsourcing 
determinant 
medium high 
Perception of IT as strategic resource low high 
Total Cost 
Economics 
Transaction cost high medium 
Agency Theory Concern of labour opportunism high medium 
Partnership Shared risk/award low high 
* Source: Hancox and Hackney (2000) 
 
Besides the direct comparison above, some descriptive comparisons noted in relevant 
researches provide this thesis with some implications. Six differences can be identified, 
four of which are relative differences. Only two points are peculiar to the public sector. 
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The first distinction is the positioning on global sourcing. Dunleavy et al. (2006) found 
that global sourcing is not a hot issue in the public sector, contrary to the private sector. 
There is no similar movement of global sourcing in government contexts (author note: 
this is changing as at 2010, though) whereas this is a mainstream practice in private 
sectors. The second distinction is more complex. Recognising a distinction between 
responsibility and accountability, Hancox and Hackney (2000) conceptualised that 
democratic accountability belongs to client government organisations; whereas, private 
outsourcing suppliers are only charged with contractual responsibility. However, Walsh 
(1995) suggests that the development of market-based approach to public service 
management does raise the issue of accountability in government (p. 213): 
Markets break the clear lines of hierarchical accountability that, at least in 
theory, characterise the traditional Weberian bureaucracy, with public 
servants reporting up the line to senior officials, who, in turn, report to 
politicians [who represent democratic value].  
Five reasons for this challenge were presented (p. 213-214):  
Separation of the political and the managerial levels within organisations 
Interaction of commercial and service motivations, and the challenge to the 
‗public service‘ ethic 
Difficulties that arise in assigning responsibility in a more differentiated 
public service 
Growth of appointed bodies that operate without traditional controls and are 
not accountable through the electoral process 
Decline of the role of intermediary political levels and the consequent 
concentration of power in the hands of central government politicians, in the 
case of the UK 
 
Walsh‘s concern about the accountability seems a persistent issue throughout all public 
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sector outsourcing. He insisted on the requirement of significant levels of political 
reform accompanying the reforms of the management of the public services represented 
by market-based service delivery. This issue is not to be discussed in detail in this thesis, 
since this kind of institutional analysis is outside the research scope.    
 
The other four descriptive differences apply to diverse aspects of IT outsourcing. First, 
the importance of IT outsourcing is strengthened by the fact that the government is 
unable to compete with private industry in recruiting good quality IT experts, due to, 
amongst other things,  insufficient finance (Dunleavy et al. 2006; Fountain 2001; 
Grimshaw, Vincent and Willmott 2002). On the other hand, Slaughter and Ang (1996) 
found that public organisations outsource functions even when they have an adequate 
monetary budget because of inflexible human-resource management in government 
bureaucracies.  
 
Second, many client organisations, particularly in the public sector, believe that unless 
they have direct control over the inputs required for production, they have little if any 
control over the outputs (Domberger 1998). This is best discussed along with the third 
concern, namely performance management.  
 
Due to relative diffidence on performance management, public organisations are likely 
to be more reliant on input control—which makes the present research particularly 
relevant from both an academic and a practitioner perspective. This was shown by many 
researchers who consider the shortage of capability in crafting specifications, 
performance monitoring and contract management. By its nature, the performance of 
public services cannot be easily calculated (Domberger 1998; Flynn 2007; Grimshaw, 
Vincent and Willmott 2002; Hancox and Hackney 2000; Walsh 1995). In particular, 
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over-dependency on key performance indicators (KPI) was noted by Domberger (1998) 
as a problem in the public sector.  
 
A final point is the recognition of costs. It is difficult to determine the cost of public 
services, in particular, of complex and common core-support services in the public 
sector (Flynn 2007; Walsh 1995). This is true because we can see the limitations of 
market mechanisms within the public sector. Simultaneously, it is false because, on the 
one hand, if we confined our discussion to IT outsourcing it would be easier to calculate 
costs here than for any other public service outsourcing, and on the other hand, the 
nature of IT resource management in public organisations seems similar to that of the 
private sector. Even in private companies, the calculation of costs and benefits has 
become more and more difficult due to the integrated nature of large IS. 
 
General discussion about the public-private distinction seems to be not particularly 
illuminating. Cases need to be examined individually because most differences are only 
relative ones and are, as will emerge from the research, dependent on the nature of 
specific public services. However, these findings provide an appropriate framework for 
understanding the context and provide confidence in using the theoretical and analytical 
framework rooted in IS studies rather than just in public management. 
 
2.4 Information systems and structuration theory 
 
As briefly mentioned already, structuration theory is the informing social theory 
underpinning the thesis‘s exploration of IT outsourcing and organisation change. 
Giddens‘s structuration theory has been adopted by many IS researchers since the late 
1980s (Jones, Orlikowski and Munir 2004). One key feature of the structuration theory 
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is the recognition of the duality of structure that re-conceptualises the dualism of 
objectivism (e.g., naturalism and functionalism) and subjectivism (e.g., hermeneutics or 
phenomenology) (Giddens 1984). On this point, he proposed the interaction between 
structure (representing objectivism) and activities of human agents (representing 
subjectivism), which work as both causes and results during the process of recursive 
reproduced relations. Giddens‘s key concepts are as follows (p. 25): 
Structure(s): rules and resources, or sets of transformation relations, 
organised as properties of social systems 
System(s): reproduced relations between actors or collectivities, organised as 
regular social practices 
Structuration: conditions governing the continuity of transmutation of 
structures, and therefore the reproduction of social systems  
 
The concept of rules composing structure consists of rules of social life and formulated 
rules. The former means ―techniques or generalizeable procedures applied in the 
enactment/reproduction of social practices‖, and the latter refers to ―codified 
interpretations of rules rather than rules as such‖ (Giddens 1984, p. 21). Bureaucratic 
rules are presented as the typical form of the latter. In addition, he claims that 
―[r]esources are drawn upon and reproduced by knowledgeable agents in the course of 
interaction […] Resources are media through which power is exercised, as a routine 
element of the instantiation of conduct in social reproduction‖ (p. 16). Meanwhile, it is 
important to understand Giddens‘s voluntary concept of human agency, which states 
that ―the seed of change is there in every act which contributes towards the reproduction 
of any ‗ordered‘ form of social life‖ (Giddens 1976, p. 108; as cited in Jones et al. 2004, 
p. 304). He also suggested that human activities do not require actors‘ consciousness. 
According to structuration theory, human agents‘ intermediary roles, in particular 
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emerging as institutionalised behaviours—whether those are intended or not—are 
always requisite in the perception of social systems. These aspects are clearly revealed 
in his understanding of power and time-space zone (Giddens 1984): 
Power is thus seen as being instantiated in action rather than being a type of 
act, or a resource to be drawn on, and all sanctions, no matter how 
oppressive and comprehensive, even the threat of death, carry no weight 
without the acquiescence of those threatened with them (p. 175). 
As time-space is zoned in routinised social practices it is regionalized, with 
certain spaces becoming associated with particular activities (p. 305). 
 
Regarding the application of structuration theory to IS studies, Pozzebon and 
Pinsonneault (2008) discuss its challenges as follows: first, structuration theory is too 
complex, addressing high level abstractions, to be applied to empirical studies of IS 
phenomena; and second, it cannot be easily combined with other theories or 
methodological approaches in a coherent manner. These points have been criticised as 
common weaknesses by many other researchers (Jones, Orlikowski and Munir 2004). 
Given the above, Halperin and Backhouse (2007) summarised the types of structuration 
theory application in IS research, presented in Table 2-4.  
 
In spite of Giddens‘s suggestion of a harmonised approach between objectivism and 
subjectivism, as Halperin and Backhouse (2007) noted, structuration theory is 
understood to be founded in constructive and interpretive perspectives against other 
perspectives focusing on scientific truth and social reality. This is very coherent with 
the overall philosophical stance of this thesis, as described in the next chapter. In 
addition, as examined in Chapter Four, this thesis employs structuration theory to form 
a conceptual framework. More specifically, this means using it as a meta-theory 
informing other theoretical foundations. For example, structuration theory contributes 
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towards overcoming the weaknesses of functionalists‘ perspectives revealed in other 
theoretical perspectives employed in this thesis. 
 
Table 2-4: Types of structuration theory application in IS researches 
Types of structuration 
theory application 
Categories of application proposed in the literature 
Application of 
structuration theory in 
empirical IS studies 
Operational studies 
Analyze 
Structuration theory applications in IS research 
Use of structuration 
theory with other 
theoretical approaches 
Use as meta-theory 
Use of structuration theory with other theories 
Use of structuration 
theory concepts in IS 
research 
Use of individual concepts 
Use of structuration theory concepts and related Giddens‘ 
writing  
Theorization of IS 
domains using 
structuration theory 
Theorise 
Development of an IS specific version of structuration 
theory 
* Source: Adapted from Halperin and Backhouse (2007, p. 3) 
 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to identify theoretical foundations in order to give 
shape to the research question and to provide intellectual frameworks for the analysis of 
phenomena and the interpretation of the study‘s findings. Five bodies of literature have 
been examined, and the implications of each body can be summarised as follows. From 
the IT outsourcing literature, knowledge of IT outsourcing characteristics improves the 
general understanding of IT outsourcing environments. For example, there are usually 
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high transaction costs observed; and relationship management is investigated as a 
particularly critical success factor in outsourcing. However, the lack of studies 
regarding client organisations‘ structures and their change in terms of IT outsourcing is 
recognised, driving this thesis‘s research interest presented in the introduction chapter.  
 
Second, from the IS and organisation change literature, two weaknesses are revealed. 
On the one hand, contextual analyses of structure, history, human behaviour and mutual 
interactions are scarce in the existing literature. On the other hand, this research strand 
seldom addresses IT outsourcing-specific analyses—that is, its interest is restricted to IT 
and its impact on organisation change, or on the process of enactment. There is little 
research on client organisation change brought about by the outsourcing of IT. As 
explained in the next chapter, the research question of this thesis is designed to fill this 
gap in knowledge, partially by applying the IS and organisational change literature      
 
Third, as reflected by Dunleavy et al. (2006) and Fountain (2001), there is a shortage of 
studies on IT, and IT outsourcing and BPO in public management studies. On this point, 
we inevitably find ourselves referring to the general IS literature to study e-government 
cases. Theories rooted in private sectors are also posited as useful for explaining the 
phenomena observed in government organisations. Nonetheless, evidence obtained 
from public management studies is also usable to achieve a richer contextual 
understanding of public sector phenomena. 
 
Fourth and fifth, the formal organisation perspective and structuration theory were 
investigated as proper viewpoints of bureaucracy, structure, human behaviours, rules, 
and related concepts. This was also supported by Dunleavy et al.‘s DEG work and 
proposal, as previously mentioned. Technology is not a sole and independent 
 64 
determinant of organisation change. These theories provide solid theoretical foundations 
for understanding and interpreting social systems and IT. These provide substantial 
frameworks for understanding change and dynamic context in a holistic manner. For 
example, organisational change in this thesis will be conceptualised as a more 
multidimensional term, including changes of structure, human capability, behaviour, 
technology and strategy.  
 
In conclusion, following the literature review, IT outsourcing and client‘s bureaucratic 
organisation change are put forward as a specific research topic, which has to date been 
rarely explored within the IS research tradition. Bureaucracy as institution and 
structuration theory are selected to form a theoretical perspective and to supplement the 
shortage of contextual significance of social systems and processes from the functional 
viewpoint of many otherwise relevant IS studies. These aspects will be more thoroughly 
explained in the methodology chapter that frames the research question, and in the 
conceptual framework chapter, where we build this thesis‘s theoretical and base and 
analytical framework.  
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3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter describes a research design to frame the research structure and 
methodological considerations for scientific social research. The main purpose of this 
chapter is to provide evidence of research rigour. This goal will be achieved by 
demonstrating a cohesive research framing process and appropriate research methods to 
be employed in this thesis.  
 
In explaining the process of research framing, chosen philosophical stances against the 
research background introduced in Chapter One are explored and the construction of 
research questions is presented, intertwined with philosophical background, research 
interests, employed theories, and research methods used. To explain the research 
method, constructed research design components such as research strategy and other 
methodological choices are given after the research frame is explained. The field studies 
section that follows details the specific research methods employed in two case studies, 
along with their rationale. Finally, justification for the chosen methodology according to 
the methodological background mentioned above is discussed.  
 
While focusing on the methodological considerations of this thesis, this chapter presents 
and justifies research questions, research strategy and methods, underpinning 
philosophy; it also provides a general discussion of associated methodological 
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components. Additionally, some of the elements involved, such as the theoretical 
perspective and analytical framework, are briefly introduced, but a detailed discussion 
will be given in Chapter Four. 
 
As a preliminary, the author‘s involvement in one of the two selected cases needs to be 
explained. The author worked on the development and implementation of the e-
government procurement system as a government official—first as an assistant director 
and later as a director of an IT division—in the PPS from 2000 to 2006. In addition, he 
plans to return to his position after the study. This research position raises issues for 
methodology. These will be dealt with separately in the section on methodological 
appropriateness. 
 
3.2 Framing the research 
 
3.2.1 Philosophical stances and research frame 
 
Research topics are derived from researchers‘ ontological perceptions of social reality 
and epistemological perspectives on ways of acquiring knowledge. With respect to the 
definition of ontology, Bhaskar (1978, pp. 29-30) divides it into philosophical and 
scientific ontology. The former is referred to as ―the sense of the kind of world 
presupposed by a philosophical account of science‖; the latter means ―the sense of the 
particular entities and processes postulated by some substantive scientific theory‖. In 
addition, in a social science view, Searle (1995, pp. 5-6) explains ontology as follows: 
―Since our investigation is ontological, i.e., about how social facts exist, we need to 
figure out how social reality fits into our overall ontology, i.e., how the existence of 
social facts relates to other things that exist.‖ To summarise, ontology means the study 
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of being, of existence.  
 
On the other hand, epistemology is the theory of knowledge. One of its definitions is 
―the theory of knowledge embedded in the theoretical perspective, described as 
philosophical stance informing the methodology and thus providing a context for the 
process and grounding its logic and criteria, and thereby in the methodology‖ (Crotty 
2003, p. 3). Aside from in-depth discussion of this subject, epistemology can be 
exemplified by positivism, realism, constructivism, interpretivism, critical theory, 
postmodernism, and so on (Crotty 2003).  
 
Confusion about terminology exists in epistemology as these are very abstract concepts. 
For example, Crotty (2003) separates epistemology and theoretical perspective, and 
objectivism, constructionism and subjectivism are presented as epistemology. In his 
terms, positivism and interpretivism belong to a theoretical perspective. Kaplan and 
Duchon (1988) also use a theoretical perspective for these. On the other hand, Mingers 
(2001a) and Smith (2006) describe these as paradigms; however, it is more important to 
understand ontological and epistemological propositions and the senses of subjective 
and objective rather than the classification of terminology. Searle (1995, pp. 8-9) 
explained these concepts in terms of the following cohesive metaphor:   
The statement ―Mt. Everest is more beautiful than Mt. Whitney‖ is about 
ontologically objective entities, but makes a subjective judgment about them. 
On the other hand, the statement ―I now have a pain in my lower back‖ 
reports an epistemically objective fact in the sense that it is made true by the 
existence of an actual fact that is not dependent on any stance, attitudes, or 
opinions of observers. However, the phenomenon itself, the actual pain, has 
a subjective mode of existence. 
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Whether explicitly or implicitly, social reality can be understood and explored from the 
combined perspectives of ontology and epistemology, as in Searle‘s explanation. Each 
researcher‘s ontological position is understood as lying in the continuum between two 
extreme positions, objectivism and subjectivism (Searle 1995). Regarding ontology, 
critical realism came to be acknowledged as an appropriate philosophy for IS research, 
including interpretive studies (Mingers 2004; Smith 2006; Walsham 2006). On the other 
hand, in IS studies, positivism and interpretivism have been regarded as the two 
dominant forms of epistemology. Despite the overwhelming strength of positivism in 
the IS field of the 1980s, interpretivism seems to have been considered a valid approach 
from the early 1990s (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991; Smith 2006; Walsham 1995a). In 
fact, Weber (2004) notes that interpretivism has become prevalent in current IS studies. 
Similarly, Crotty (2003) and Smith (2006) also explain that strong traditions of 
positivism have decreased as post-positivism has developed. Within the research 
interest provided and the author‘s professional experience in IS fields, the philosophical 
stances of this thesis can be explained as laying within the mainstream research 
traditions of critical realism and interpretivism.  
 
3.2.2 Critical realism and interpretivism 
 
Critical realism forms the ontological background of this research. In this philosophical 
approach, knowledge is classified into two dimensions: intransitive (subject-
independent characteristic of social reality) and transitive (constructive perception of 
world) (Bhaskar 1978; Sayer 2000). On the one hand, a subject-independent critical 
realist‘s ontological perception leads the thesis author to explore objectified realities 
(e.g., organisational format/process and IT outsourcing contract); on the other hand, the 
recognition of interpretable transitive knowledge will help the author understand 
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phenomena beyond the observed. 
 
Meanwhile, interpretivism is an epistemology in contrast with conventional positivism. 
A description for it has been given by many researchers, but that of Crotty (2003, p. 67), 
in contrast with positivism, is given first: 
A positivist approach would follow the methods of the natural sciences and, 
by way of allegedly value-free, detached observation, seek to identify 
universal features of humanhood, society and history that offer explanation 
and hence control and predictability. The interpretivist approach, to the 
contrary, looks for culturally derived and historically situated interpretations 
of the social life-world. 
Common and shared concepts of interpretivism are as follows: producing an 
understanding of context and process as an aim; recognising subjective interpretations 
of actors and researchers; signifying meanings behind language, consciousness, shared 
meanings and other artifacts; sustaining the distinction of social scientific methods from 
those of natural science such as hypothesis testing (e.g., Avgerou and Walsham 2000; 
Klein and Myers 1999; Lee 1991; Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991; Sayer 2000; Walsham 
1993).   
 
On the other hand, Sayer (2000) suggests that critical realism is different from 
conventional realism in that it focuses on necessity and contingency instead of 
regularity; it assumes a more open social system with different contexts than a closed or 
concrete open system. Simultaneously, it does not reject the characteristics of social 
processes dependent on actors‘ interpretations. As a result, critical realism is widely 
compatible with diverse research methods, from positivism to interpretivism. Moreover, 
its perspective of causative mechanisms with conditions determined by contexts 
between cause and effect provides a proper analytical framework for this thesis. Against 
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positivistic causality as a constant conjunction of events, mechanically mapping inputs 
to outcomes, Smith (2006) epitomises the interpretivists‘ causality as circular and 
multidimensional. In this respect, critical realism-based interpretivists‘ causation can be 
understood as, in Sayer‘s terms above, contexts and actors‘ interpretation-mediated 
causation.   
  
Critical realism is also argued to be recognised as an epistemological stance: Bhaskar 
(1978) suggested comprehending ontological and epistemological questions within it, 
and Mingers (2001b) supports this view by revealing epistemological aspects of 
transitive knowledge. He regards the transitive dimension as an epistemological domain. 
In addition, Sayer (2000) explains that critical realists leave room for interpretive 
understandings of social reality. Based on this characteristic, critical realism addresses 
abundant rationale for the epistemological question of ‗how reality is known‘. 
 
However, interpretivism can also be identified as a coherent epistemological stance of 
this research, considering the constructive character of the transitive knowledge in 
critical realism. This coherency is insightfully proposed by Smith (2006, p. 207), as 
follows: 
[Critical realism] gives a solid ontological grounding for interpretivist 
research reaffirming the importance for a focus on meanings, interpretation, 
and context as causal influences without unnecessarily denying their 
existence. 
 
To strengthen the consistency between subject-dependent epistemic understanding and 
subject-independent ontological characteristics of critical realism, some supporting 
concepts need to be drawn upon. For example, Haraway (1991) criticises ‗strong social 
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constructionism‘ from a critical realist‘s point of view. The concepts of ‗mild 
constructivism‘ (Sismondo 1993), ‗moderate essentialism‘ (Sayer 2000), and ‗a broadly 
interpretive approach‘ (Avgerou and Walsham 2000) sustain that combined 
conceptualisation.   
 
3.3 Research design  
 
3.3.1 Construction of research questions 
 
Research questions can be constructed based on the research interest introduced in 
Chapter One and the philosophical stances above. In order to do this, a research framing 
scheme needs to be reviewed. Crotty (2003) provides a hierarchy of four elements to be 
considered in a research proposal, namely, methods, methodology, theoretical 
perspective, and epistemology. Inspired by this approach, Figure 3-1 displays the 
hierarchical research framing scheme of the thesis, comprising ontology, epistemology, 
a conceptual framework, a research strategy and methods.  
 
The figure is interpreted as follows. Research can be framed by a sequential and 
hierarchical structure. As explained, researchers‘ philosophical stances (ontology and 
epistemology) drive the construction of research questions. Critical realism and 
interpretivism have been presented as those philosophical stances. After research 
questions are set up, a conceptual framework needs to be invented; relevant research 
strategy and methods should then be chosen based on those intellectual backgrounds. To 
provide related elements in advance, a conceptual framework consists of theoretical 
perspective and an analytical framework to be presented as structuration theory-
informed formal organisation perspective and a processual analysis-informed 
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multidimensional IT outsourcing configuration framework, respectively.  
 
Figure 3-1: Research frame and associated intellectual elements  
 
Critical Realism 
Interpretivism 
Longitudinal comparative 
case study 
Data collection and data 
analysis method, etc. 
Research questions 
Theoretical perspective and 
analytical framework 
Ontology 
Chosen elements Framing scheme 
Epistemology 
Construction of  
research questions 
Conceptual framework 
Research strategy 
Methods 
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The selected research strategy is a longitudinal comparative study; main data collection 
methods are participant observation and interview; the primary data analysis method is 
argumentation analysis. Among these, the conceptual framework will be explained in 
Chapter Four, whereas the other components are explored in this chapter. 
 
The significance of this research framing scheme lies in its contribution to the 
maintenance of consistency among chosen philosophical and theoretical perspectives, 
research strategy and research methods. Though admittedly a combined approach, there 
are definitely inconsistent combinations of these elements. For example, critical realists 
cannot hold the subjectivist position of extreme interpretivists, because they believe that 
―researcher and reality are inseparable‖ (Weber 2004, p. iv); however, the nature of 
critical realism also differs from that of objectivism.  
 
Here is an actual example of the benefit of this scheme. While assuming critical realism 
and interpretivism as philosophical stances and a single case study as a research strategy, 
the author had initially set up a research question as building an IT outsourcing 
governance model when this research began. In addition, while following epistemic 
positions as constructible and interpretable social reality mediated by human behaviour, 
and while applying Giddens‘ structuration theory (Giddens 1984) requiring a contextual 
approach, some functionalistic frameworks such as an IT outsourcing configuration 
framework (Cullen, Seddon and Willcocks 2005) were attempted without critique.  
 
However, during contemplation of research framing illustrated in Figure 3-1, the author 
came to recognise that those were methodologically confusing and inconsistent. An 
initial research question required a positivistic approach employing significant multiple 
cases and theory testing to lead to a functional outcome. In addition, a possible invented 
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model needed to be generalised while minimising the impacts of local contexts and the 
need to maintain strong causation between model components and managerial practices. 
Nonetheless, those were against the author‘s philosophical stances, and output is 
necessarily unachievable by use of the intended research strategy. For example, Smith 
(2006) summarises the interpretive research purpose as follows (p. 197): ―The goal of 
much interpretivist research is not to uncover universal laws, but instead to supply 
descriptive narratives of the events under exploration.‖ The previously stated initial 
research question had falsely pursued a universal law through interpretive research.        
 
Consequently, to correct the immaturity of methodology, existing conceptual 
frameworks were invented to follow a contextual approach by use of Pettigrew‘s (1997) 
processual analysis; involved theories were not employed to be tested, but as the criteria 
of exploration; no effort was made to generalise the results. Finally, the research 
purpose was altered from model building to understanding of phenomena. Generalised 
implications of this thesis should be understood as tendencies rather than predictions, as 
suggested by Walsham (1995b), as interpretive research generalisations; theories are 
used to guide empirical research and to interpret research findings, as encouraged by 
Avgerou and Walsham (2000).  
 
From this philosophical background and findings in the literature review, provisional 
questions were developed, as follows:  
How do bureaucratic organisations relate to and deal with IT outsourcing in 
dynamic contexts?   
What are the structures of bureaucratic client organisations and the 
organisational changes occurring in tandem with the pursuance of IT 
outsourcing? 
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What are the contextual features and social processes shaping the 
underlying choices and modes of management undertaken by client 
organisations in regard to IT outsourcing? 
These questions are motivated by the findings of the critical literature review, this 
author‘s own professional experience, and a related pilot study. Regarding the results of 
the literature review, this will be a trial to supplement the lack of outsourcing studies on 
client organisation, as stated in the literature review section. No study of outsourcing 
was found emphasising pre-existing client organisational structure or contextual and 
processual change impacting its own bureaucratic structure. Besides IT outsourcing 
research, within the literature on organisation studies, no significant empirical studies 
thoroughly addressing this issue specific to outsourcing IT were found either. 
Consequently, to link the outsourcing literature with organisation studies, this thesis was 
motivated by the need to develop theoretical underpinnings incorporating change, time, 
dynamism and external and internal contexts, to bridge the gap between two relevant 
research areas.  
 
The chosen critical realist‘s perception and interpretivists‘ perspective on social reality 
will keep this thesis consistent in driving the study as follows: on one hand, a subject-
independent critical realist‘s ontological perception leads to exploration of objectified 
realities, such as organisational arrangements such as organisation form and IT 
outsourcing contract, and Sayer (2000) provides bureaucracy as an example of critical 
realists‘ real and actual object; on the other hand, the recognition of interpretable 
transitive knowledge of critical realism and interpretivists‘ epistemology will help this 
author understand phenomena beyond the observed. As previously suggested, this view 
is reinforced by the perspectives of structuration theory. For example, the author‘s 
observations reveal that reproduced social practices have much more influence on social 
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phenomena than hierarchical administrative authorities do, even in a strong government 
bureaucracy, as discussed later. 
 
Finally, in regard to the research question, Silverman‘s (2005) ‗kitchen-sink‘ approach 
to narrowing research topics was considered. This proposition is well stated as follows: 
―If you define your topic very widely, you will usually be unable to say anything at 
great depth about it‖ (p. 80). It is composed of the following strategies: draw a flow 
chart, find a puzzle and use a zoom lens. These describe reflexive considerations in 
constructing achievable and contributable research questions. The questions are focused 
on bureaucratic organisational structures of client organisations and their changes. 
These have been delimited from wider governance issues in the early stages. In addition 
to the current questions, initial research interests had covered the following: exploring 
IT outsourcing success factors, designing organisation in terms of business and IT side 
(in-house and outsourcing suppliers), identifying the capabilities of in-house staff, and 
conceptualising a new bureaucracy characterised by IT outsourcing. These still stay as 
relevant subjects of this thesis and are explored to support existing questions; however, 
the focus of the research question was devised to examine client organisations‘ 
bureaucratic structures, though structure here does not mean a conventional concept of 
organisational form, as discussed in the section on bureaucracy as institution, in Chapter 
Two.      
 
3.3.2 Research strategy 
 
According to Yin (2003, p. 5), the research strategies of social science can be 
categorised as follows: experiment, survey, archival analysis, history, and case study. 
Among these, the case study was selected because, following Yin, the type of research 
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question is ‗why/how?‘, control of behaviours or events is not required, and it covers 
contemporary events. A longitudinal comparative case study method forms the specific 
case study strategy employed in this thesis. According to Pettigrew (1997), this method 
reveals recurrent patterns in processes and provides the opportunity to explore holistic 
explanations within and between cases; however, this is not large cross-sectional 
comparative research to achieve generalised and representative results. On the contrary, 
this is an intensive and interpretive case study to explore social processes, underlying 
contexts and human behaviours. In this respect, this thesis does not aim primarily to 
explore commonness of or differences between cases. Based on Pettigrew‘s processual 
analysis, embedded in the analytical framework of this thesis, it is used to gain a holistic 
understanding of bureaucratic organisational structure and its changes in terms of IT 
outsourcing. However comparisons can be made across the two cases to help elicit 
causation and impacts of the variety of factors being brought to bear in each case. 
 
On the other hand, this intensive study approach is also justified by the criteria 
emerging from the chosen philosophical and theoretical literature. It is appropriate for a 
critical realist, ―strong on causal explanation and interpreting meanings in context‖ 
(Sayer 2000, p. 21). This has also been proposed as a proper approach to structuration 
theory, which will be discussed in detail in a later chapter. Jones, Orlikowski and Munir 
(2004, p. 322) conceive of this approach as follows: 
[I]n-depth studies of a single or few organizations allow us to see the 
different ways in which structures can be enacted, which would otherwise 
be completely missed in large cross-sectional samples, where such 
differences would tend to cancel each other out.  
A more detailed analysis of this longitudinal comparative case study strategy will be 
provided in the conceptual framework in Chapter Four and implemented in empirical 
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investigation chapters thereafter.  
 
This thesis selects two cases. The first is outsourcing of the e-GP system of the PPS of 
Korea. This was researched as a pilot study for this research as well. Pettigrew (1997) 
emphasises that a single pilot case study is the best approach to the study of 
organisational change and development because it can be used to form and verify 
relevant concepts and initial pattern recognition. Another case is outsourcing of the TPS 
administration of the DCSF of the UK. These two case studies are described in Chapters 
Five and Six, respectively, and synthesised and compared in Chapter Seven.   
 
The rationales for selecting these case organisations can be described as follows. First, 
these two organisations are accessible to the author. The author is currently a PPS 
government official; hence, he can make use of that position. On the other hand, there 
exists a link to DCSF through the author‘s associated school‘s research institution. 
Beyond this accessibility rationale, these two cases reveal contrasting characteristics, as 
will be discussed in Chapter Seven. In spite of these differences, the two organisations 
are expected to share some commonalities as government organisations from Korea and 
the UK. In these terms, the choice of these two case organisations fits the requirement 
of the provided research questions involving a bureaucratic organisational structure.   
 
3.3.3 Research methods  
 
3.3.3.1 Unit of analysis 
 
In case studies, this thesis analysed the following areas: where IT outsourcing-related 
decisions are made and implemented; where IT outsourcing deals are contracted and 
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monitored; and where IT outsourcing-related activities are managed, assessed and fed 
back. Only an overall approach is presented here as research methods are considered in 
the research design stage.  
 
In the case of the PPS, IT divisions were the most important units, according to these 
criteria. This is consistent with the statements above regarding narrowing of research 
questions. The unit of analysis is delimited as well, to focus the research questions; 
however, some phenomena observed in the combined work of IT and business divisions 
are noteworthy, since they have required serious organisational change. The unit of 
analysis will expand to such areas. The time boundary of the PPS case study was set 
between 2000 and 2008, when the current version of a large e-government procurement 
system was implemented and outsourced.  
 
On the other hand, no IT division remained after BPO within DCSF. In addition, as 
explored later, the case of DCSF is not categorised as IT outsourcing, but as BPO. 
Under these circumstances, the remaining organisation of the client is relatively small, 
with around 25 staff members, compared with about 250 staff members on the 
supplier‘s side. Moreover, the number of initially transferred staff from DCSF to a 
supplier was about 500 in 1996. In this sense, the unit of analysis in the DCSF case 
study is the entire division relevant to TPS business. This is an independent mission 
unconnected with other divisions of DCSF; however, in this respect, the supplier‘s side 
will be more seriously explored compared with the case of PPS, in that it was a prior 
government bureaucratic organisation and relevant IT functions and achievements 
emerged. The time span of the DCSF case study was set between 1996 and 2008.     
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3.3.3.2 Data collection method 
 
Participant observation, interviews and document analysis are employed as data 
collection methods. The main data collection methods of PPS‘s and DCSF‘s case study 
are participant observation and interviews, respectively. In the process of data collection, 
Yin (2003) presented three principles as follows: ―obtain multiple sources of evidence‖, 
―create a case study database‖ and ―maintain a chain of evidence‖ (pp. 97-106). 
Ultimately, this thesis follows those processes in terms of data collection. For example, 
participant observation will be triangulated by interviews in PPS; interview result will 
be double-checked by documents. In particular, interview data from diverse interested 
parties—the client, supplier, manager-level, staff-level—can be another route of 
triangulation based on multiple sources. These data will be cohesively interpreted by the 
criteria of solid analytical framework, as will be shown in the empirical chapters.  
 
Regarding the PPS‘s primary data collection method, possible disputes about participant 
observation surround the scientific rigour maintained by the researchers. This point may 
be raised due to the subjective position of the author, which forms the ethical issue of 
this thesis and is explained in a separate section later.  
 
The researcher has selected to use the semi-structured interview, which may require 
improvisation with an incomplete script (Myers and Newman 2007). Key questions and 
their structure were created by the criteria for an analytical framework given in Chapter 
Four. In addition, this thesis will maintain interview-related rigour by following the 
seven guidelines for qualitative interviewing proposed by these authors: (1) situating the 
researcher as an actor; (2) minimising social dissonance; (3) representing various 
―voices‖; (4) everyone is an interpreter; (5) using mirroring in questions and answers; 
 81 
(6) flexibility; and (7) ethics of interviewing. Finally, this thesis will report details of the 
interview process, as suggested by Myers and Newman (2007), including period, 
recording technique, etc. The application of these will be presented in the section 
regarding field study. 
 
Regarding the seven interview ethics, the Research Subject Information and Consent 
forms for agencies were read and signed by all four parties in two contracts of PPS and 
DCSF; and the individual Informed Consent Form for Research Study was signed by 
and collected from every interviewee (see Appendix 1 for these forms). According to 
these documents, the titles of the involved organisations can be disclosed, whereas 
every interviewee was handled anonymously.   
 
Finally, it is important to explain the structure of the interview. A theoretically informed 
interview pro-forma was recommended for the processual analysis (Pettigrew 1997), 
and this was employed as part of the analytical framework. Pettigrew suggested that: 
―Comparative case study work such as pro-formas provide the analytical spine for the 
study—a constant reference point and tracking device through the study. Normally, 
such pro-formas are tested and refined in the set of early interviews‖ (p. 344). As 
implied by this approach, semi-structured interview scripts were open to change before 
and during the interviews.  
 
3.3.3.3 Data analysis method 
 
Regarding data analysis, Yin (2003) proposed a strategy for ―linking data to 
propositions‖ as ―pattern matching‖ suggesting that ―several pieces of information from 
the same case may be related to some theoretical proposition‖ (p. 26). In addition, he 
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presented the ―relying on theoretical propositions‖ strategy as the most preferred 
strategy for the analysis of data (p. 111).  
 
This proposition is applied to this thesis. As will be presented in the next chapter, 
processual analysis (Pettigrew 1997) is employed as a component-forming analytical 
framework. In Pettigrew‘s work, he stresses the links between context, processes, 
content and outcomes, as well as the recursive cycle of induction and deduction. This is 
also compatible with the use of theory, suggested by Avgerou and Walsham (2000), in 
interpretive research as a guiding scheme, rather than the target to be tested or 
constructed. Within this research, entire processes of data collection and analysis will 
follow the presented conceptual framework, and all findings will be interpreted by the 
framework‘s components.  
 
For the mode of data analysis, argumentation analysis will be employed. Although it is 
a matter of degree, not many symbolic materials are expected to be data in this study. 
Involved phenomena are the result or process of denotative restructuring government 
organisations or outsourcing contracts. On this point, some conventional interpretive 
approaches—particularly, those that are hermeneutic and semiotic—do not seem 
appropriate. 
 
As a type of content analysis method, argumentation analysis emphasises the 
―interactional view of argumentation, their focus being on the informal use of 
arguments in everyday discourse and within a particular context‖ (Liakopoulos 2000, p. 
153). In particular, Toulmin‘s theory of argumentation provides an analytically 
functional account of argumentation analysis (Liakopoulos 2000; van Eemeren, 
Grootendorst and Kruiger 1987). Toulmin (2003) presented the schematic skeleton of 
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an argumentation structure (originally developed in 1958), as illustrated in Figure 3-2, 
which consists of data (D), warrants (W), backing (B), claim (C), and rebuttal (R).  
 
Figure 3-2: Toulmin‘s argumentation structure  
 
* Source: Reprinted from Toulmin (2003), p. 97 
 
According to Toulmin (2003, pp. 89-100), claims (C) are established by appealing to 
data (D) as foundations. However, warrants (W) are usually required to link D with C. 
He distinguishes D from W by defining D as specific and explicit and W as general and 
implicit. In addition, he addresses the required rebuttal (R) and qualifier (Q), which 
refer to the exception or condition constraining C and R‘s possibility, respectively. Q is 
qualified by such terms as ‗presumably‘, ‗almost‘ and ‗certainly‘. Also, he explains that 
backing (B) is useful when W are challenged. B is distinguished from W in that B is 
expressed in the form of categorical statements of fact, whereas W by hypothetical and 
bridge-like statements. All of the components are not necessarily required. In fact, the 
simplest form may be as simple as ‗D→C‘. Toulmin asserted that the skeleton 
illustrated in Figure 3-2 is complex enough to extend even to complicated arguments.  
 
In spite of its comprehensiveness for the analyses of argumentation, this model is not 
easily applied in empirical research; in particular, the distinction between D, W and B 
So, Q, C D 
Since 
W 
On account of 
B 
Unless 
R 
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appears to be somewhat ambiguous, even arbitrary. Still, the method‘s strength lies in 
its ability to explore and address controversial social phenomena. 
 
This is an appropriate approach for this research for the following two reasons. First, the 
change in client organisations was the result of strong disputes between constituents. 
Argumentation analysis has seldom been used by IS researchers, but this thesis reveals 
that it can be useful in IS fields of controversy. Secondly, argumentation analysis is also 
a proper instrument to enhance interpretive research quality, and, more specifically, to 
overcome this thesis author‘s subjectivity as an ex-participant. The exploration of 
phenomena in empirical investigation from Chapters Five to Six is the result of this 
argumentation analysis. Specific presentations of this application will be attached in 
Appendix 2.   
 
3.4 Field studies 
 
3.4.1 PPS case  
 
In the PPS case study, the author was able to observe most of the phenomena and 
collect documents as a PPS official; the author also conducted some related researches 
regarding this case (e.g., Lee 2007; Lee 2009; Lee et al. 2007; Seong and Lee 2004), 
which describe the overall process of IS building and its performance. Regarding this 
thesis, a pilot study was conducted in March 2007 during the preparation of the research 
proposal. In this pilot study, relevant concepts regarding the employed analytical 
framework were tested and modified to be applicable. In actuality, owing to the author‘s 
sound understanding of the case as a prior participant, the establishment of this 
framework was processed smoothly. It included several telephone interviews and 
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Internet chatting with former colleagues to confirm the application of concepts to the 
current settings.  
 
As discussed above, the description of the field study follows Myers and Newman‘s 
(2007) reporting principles. After the literature review and construction of the 
conceptual framework, the field work was conducted for two weeks, October 13-24, 
2008. While at the offices, the author observed what had been changed and examined 
recent documents. The relevant interviews were conducted from October 16-20, 2008.    
 
Table 3-1: Interviewees of PPS‘s case study (16-20 October 2008) 
Organisation 
Client (PPS) 
Supplier 
Advisory 
group 
Total 
IT Business 
Senior managers 3 2 2 2 9 
Middle managers 3 1 2 1 7 
Staff 2 3 - - 5 
Total 8 6 4 3 21 
 
The total number of interviewees was twenty-one; the group consisted of various levels 
of in-house business and IT staff, outsourcing suppliers and advisory groups, including 
academics and an involved consulting firm. The composition of these informants is 
given in Table 3-1, all of whom have worked for the case since the beginning. The 
interview type was semi-structured and qualitative, which requires improvisation with 
an incomplete script (Myers and Newman 2007); the interviews lasted approximately 
one hour each participant. Questions were asked that corresponded to the three 
dimensions constructed by the framework of this thesis that will be fully presented in 
the next chapter. The interview scripts used in PPS were translated into English by the 
author of this thesis and reused in the DCSF case study. This English version is given in 
 86 
Appendix 3. Furthermore, all interviews were recorded and saved, but not transcribed.  
 
From the interview data, some significant phenomena were revealed, in particular, those 
that happened after the thesis author left the office. With the assistance of the diverse 
informant sources, the interview responses can be revisited and re-interpreted. These 
comprise the empirical investigation detailed in Chapter Five.  
 
3.4.2 DCSF case  
 
A similar approach was adapted to the DCSF case study, including the interview 
structure and procedures. In contrast to the PPS case, however, the primary data 
collection method was the interview. There was no opportunity for participant 
observation, so data sources were restricted to interviews and documents collected from 
the field.    
 
Regarding the interview, the same script as that for PPS was used, though those were 
under ongoing change. A total of 20 interviews were conducted with 19 informants. The 
interviews were held twice, the first stage from 9-11 February 2009 for three days; and 
the second group took place from 29-30 September for two days. The preparation for 
interviews, such as the appointment of appropriate informants and interview schedules, 
was completed before the visits, and the interviews were conducted as planned. 
Including two telephone interviews, all interviews took sixty to one hundred and fifty 
minutes each. Six key informants were interviewed twice, and five interviews were held 
with two interviewees simultaneously. All interviews were recorded and transcribed for 
follow-up review.  
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The first visit focused on understanding the background of the deal, whereas specific 
data to be mapped with this thesis‘s analytical framework were collected during the 
second trip.  
 
The informants were composed of individuals from various levels and associated 
organisational groups. Many of them were key participants and witnesses of the 1996 
outsourcing adoption; hence, they were able to provide profound and rich data so the 
author could better grasp the context and processes that occurred in DCSF during the 
past ten years plus. Such data comprise the 20,000-word empirical investigation chapter 
of this thesis. The groups of informants are summarised in Table 3-2.  
 
Table 3-2: Interviewees of DCSF‘s case study (9-11 February / 29-30 September 2009) 
Organisation 
Client 
(DCSF) 
Supplier 
Total 
Transferred Non-transferred 
Senior managers 2 2 3 7 
Middle managers 1 5 - 6 
Staff 1 2 3 6 
Total 4 9 6 19 
 
Out of 19 informants, only two are IT experts and currently working in related areas. 
The nine transferred staff members refer to DCSF government officials before the 1996 
outsourcing process.  
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3.5 Methodological appropriateness 
 
3.5.1 Interpretive research rigour 
 
This thesis author‘s ex-participant‘s position required that he determine whether his 
involvement style would be that of ‗outside researcher‘ or ‗involved researcher‘ 
(Walsham 2006). This forms the ethical issue of this thesis as stated in the next section.  
With respect to this positioning, Walsham (2006) supported the uses of Klein and 
Myers‘s seven principles and Golden-Biddle and Locke‘s three criteria in interpretive 
research. He proposed these criteria for interpretive researchers to apply for the 
justification of their methodology. On the one hand, Klein and Myers (1999) 
emphasised contextualised iterative critical reflection in a case and research 
environment.  
 
More specifically to the presentation of the result, Golden-Biddle and Locke (1993) 
suggested that convincing ethnographic research needs to meet three criteria of 
authenticity (the research conveys the vitality of everyday life), plausibility (it reveals 
distinctive research contributions while dealing with common concerns within the 
readers‘ community) and criticality (it enables readers to re-examine their taken-for-
granted ideas and beliefs). Together with the Walsham‘s (2006) recommendation above, 
these criteria are important in this thesis research, since most of the PPS‘s case study 
data are similar to those obtained from ethnographic research, in that researcher stayed 
and collected data there for entire period of interest.  
 
The conventional research quality criteria of validity, reliability and representativeness 
have been contended and reinvented for qualitative researches by many scholars (e.g., 
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Gaskell and Bauer 2000; Trauth 1997). An insightful declaration of this viewpoint 
appears in Trauth (p. 242):  
The subjective nature of qualitative methods, in general, and ethnographic 
ones, in particular, therefore, calls for a totally different perspective on 
reliability. […] [Reliability] means producing results that can be trusted and 
establishing findings that are meaningful and of interest to the reader.  
 
In conclusion, this thesis author follows the principles of Klein and Myers‘s (1999) as 
separately discussed in the next section. Golden-Biddle and Locke‘s (1993) suggestions 
will be also abided by in order to achieve the reliability. These authors‘ wording of 
authenticity, plausibility and criticality must be connected with the terms ‗trusted‘ and 
‗of interest to the reader‘ that Trauth (1997) used.  
 
3.5.2 Ethical issues and methodological appropriateness 
 
An ethical issue peculiar to this research is related to the author‘s position as a former 
proactive actor in the PPS case. For all its advantages, it required more effort to 
maintain neutrality. According to Pettigrew (1997) and Farrall (2006), neutrality is a 
common concern among all longitudinal case researchers. Moreover, as Baskerville and 
Wood-Harper (1996) noted, IS study is necessarily a much applied field requiring 
practical solutions. In this respect, an action research method was proposed as the best 
approach for IS studies by these authors. On the other hand, Benbasat, Goldstein and 
Mead (1987, p. 82) defined action research as ―studies in which the author, usually a 
researcher, is a participant in the implementation of a system, but simultaneously wants 
to evaluate a certain intervention technique‖. This research would be an action research 
rather than a case study, if the author had started it five years ago when he was working 
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for the projects. However, this was unable to be an action research any longer, in that 
action research methods were impossible to be conducted from outside the case. 
 
To overcome this weakness, two solutions emerge. Paradoxically, this research 
complies with the scientific rigour required by action researchers, who may have the 
strongest subjective position. Checkland and Holwell (1998) suggested that action 
researchers should declare their epistemology and intellectual framework in advance to 
maintain their neutrality as social scientists. On this point, this thesis‘s conceptual 
framework that will be introduced in the next chapter is the declaration of methodology, 
which embodies the epistemological and theoretical frameworks of this research.  
 
Second, argumentation analysis is selected as a data analysis mode; the author‘s own 
position will be explicitly revealed. By its presentation of all conflicting viewpoints 
including the author‘s own, this approach supports Klein and Myers‘ principles of 
dialogical reasoning and multiple interpretations and Golden-Biddle and Locke‘s 
authenticity and plausibility criteria. To state in advance, the author was a strong 
advocate of the transformation observed in PPS.  
 
Consequently, the efforts of appropriating methodology for this thesis are informed by 
the principles of Klein and Myers (1999). The first and fundamental principle is the 
hermeneutic circle, which suggests ―we come to understand a complex whole from 
preconceptions about the meanings of its parts and their interrelationships‖ (p. 71). Data 
should be re-interpreted intertwined with the context and the researcher-
observation/informant relationship. 
 
The second is the principle of contextualisation. As opposed to a positivist approach, 
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interpretive researchers understand organisational patterns as being constantly changing. 
Considering the research questions and employed intellectual frameworks, contextual 
approach is a key characteristic of this thesis. 
 
The third principle is interaction between the researcher(s) and the subjects, which 
entails unavoidable mutual influence. This is particularly associated with the PPS case 
study where the thesis author worked. As stated above, it is impossible for an author to 
be free from this situation. For example, the author was not only a data-collector, but 
also a data-producer in the case organisation; and interviewees recognised the author as 
their senior, junior, or same level colleague. In this respect, the great scientific rigour 
required by action researchers contributes to the enhancement of this author‘s 
methodological quality.  
 
The fourth principle is that of abstraction and generalisation. Even an interpretive field 
study focusing on a specific context requires theoretical abstractions and generalisations 
in order for readers to follow the researchers‘ theoretical insights. This research also 
reveals the structurational aspects of technology, organisation and human practices 
under the theoretical lenses of structuration theory and formal organisation perspective. 
With respect to the weakness of generalisation in interpretive research, this thesis is 
expected to contribute to other research by addressing broader theoretical issues and the 
output of many multiple-case studies in the literature review and methodology sections. 
This approach was suggested by Yin (2003) to increase the contribution of single-case 
studies.  
 
The fifth principle is dialogical reasoning, which may be discussed together with the 
sixth principle of multiple interpretations. To summarise these, a researcher should 
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identify and confront chosen philosophical and theoretical positions drawn from one‘s 
prejudices. Contrary to the positivist‘s value-free position, interpretive researchers 
should recognise that ―prejudice is the necessary starting point of our understanding‖ 
(Klein and Myers 1999, p. 76). This extends to the confrontation of conflicting 
interpretations of stakeholders besides the researcher himself. In this respect, 
argumentation analysis was selected as an appropriate data analysis and presentation 
mode, as stated above.  
 
The final principle is that of suspicion, which emphasises critical thinking drawn from 
critical theorists. This principle, however, has few implications for this research in that 
different theoretical underpinnings are involved in this study.     
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4 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
CHAPTER FOUR 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the IT outsourcing literature has no major focus on 
considering client organisation change and its dynamic aspects in dealing with 
outsourcing arrangements, whereas organisation studies and public management 
research show little interest in the IT outsourcing component in their wide range of 
works. Accordingly, this thesis needed to develop theoretical underpinnings that 
incorporate change, time and dynamism, and context by linking the outsourcing 
literature with organisation studies. 
 
This chapter describes two layers of the conceptual framework, consisting of a 
theoretical perspective and an analytical framework. These were developed from the 
result of the literature review described in Chapter Two and the thesis author‘s pilot 
study introduced in Chapter Three; and they lead to empirical investigations in the 
following chapters by providing intellectual frameworks for the constructive 
understanding of social processes and the structural analysis of outsourcing practices. 
The former mainly involves the works of Giddens‘s structuration theory (Giddens 1984) 
and Kallinikos‘s formal organisation perspective (Kallinikos 2006); the latter was 
underpinned by Pettigrew‘s processual analysis (Pettigrew 1997), the IT outsourcing 
configuration framework and lifecycle perspective of sourcing process, both of which 
were presented by Cullen, Seddon and Willcocks (2005; 2006),  and various sources in 
 94 
the  IT governance literature. Of these, the concept and implications of structuration 
theory and the formal organisation perspective were already reviewed in Chapter Two.       
 
Consistent with the research scope, these frameworks are employed and restrictively 
verified in order to conduct two specific case studies within this thesis; and any further 
generalisation of the results of this study will not be attempted. However, all of these 
underpinning intellectual frameworks are identified either as a common social theory or 
perspective (in the cases of structuration theory and formal organisation perspective), a 
widely used research method (in the case of processual analysis), and the result of 
multiple case researches (in the cases of the IT outsourcing configuration framework, 
lifecycle perspective of sourcing process and IT governance).  
 
This chapter explains the framework in the following order (1) theoretical perspective—
titled as the structuration theory-informed formal organisation perspective and (2) 
analytical framework—titled as the processual analysis-informed multidimensional IT 
outsourcing configuration framework. The discussion that follows is linked with the 
prior review of structuration theory and formal organisation perspective in Chapter 
Two; additional literature concerning an analytical framework will be examined in 
detail. These relate to processual analysis, IT governance and the IT outsourcing-related 
literature on configuration and lifecycle perspectives. These latter will be deployed to 
develop a multidimensional IT outsourcing configuration framework.     
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4.2 Structuration theory-informed formal organisation perspective 
 
4.2.1 Philosophical background and structuration theory in IS research 
 
Critical realism and interpretivism form the philosophical background of this thesis. As 
presented in the previous chapter, these frame the research question and the 
methodology of this thesis. In addition, these philosophical stances give the direction of 
the intellectual frameworks employed in the research. Structuration theory is selected as 
a theory designed to understand social reality. It has profound implications when 
analysing and interpreting phenomena and contexts in terms of structural elements and 
human behaviours. As reviewed in Chapter Two, this is one of the mainstream social 
theories in IS research (Jones, Orlikowski and Munir 2004); and chosen as an 
appropriate perspective to overcome the dualism of contractual (representing structure 
in Giddens‘s term) and relational governance (representing human behaviour in 
Giddens‘s term) in this thesis. Giddens suggests that the social system is organised as 
regular social practices and consists of the ongoing, reproduced, and instantiated 
relations between actors or collectivities (Giddens 1984). Structuration theory is 
coherent with critical realism and interpretivism as the highest theoretical background, 
in terms of the perception of social reality and scientific knowledge. In a straightforward 
manner, structuration theory can be justified by this thesis‘s interpretivists‘ 
epistemological view; in that structuration theory is rooted in constructive and 
interpretive understanding of social reality and knowledge construction (Halperin and 
Backhouse 2007).   
 
Structuration theory in IS researches has been argued over from the viewpoint of critical 
realism, which, in fact is chosen as an ontological perspective for this thesis. For 
 96 
example, Archer (1995; as cited in Jones, Orlikowski and Munir 2004, p. 309) criticised 
this theory, stating that technological artefacts like IS may have more direct influence, 
regardless of their interactions with human practices proposed by structuration theory. 
In general, this materialistic view may be valid for technological system-involved 
studies. Following this thesis‘s pilot study carried out in PPS, contemporary, large 
infrastructure information systems do not seem so malleable that they can be easily 
reshaped by human practices, as was suggested by social constructionism of technology 
(SCOT) (Pinch and Bijker 1987) or the structurational view of technology (Orlikowski 
1992; 2000).  
 
A key concept for the application of structuration theory to IS researches is the 
interpretive flexibility of technology, the definition of which here depends on Sahay and 
Robey‘s (1996, p. 260) ―capacity of a specific technology (or other knowledge system) 
to sustain the divergent interpretations of multiple relevant groups‖. This concept 
originated from the work of Pinch and Bijker (1987), which conceptualised it in the 
SCOT by adopting the concept of the empirical programme of relativism (EPOR) of the 
sociology of scientific knowledge. According to EPOR, scientific findings are 
recognised to be open to multiple interpretations. Under this perspective, Pinch and 
Bijker (1987, p. 40) suggested that ―technological artefacts are culturally constructed 
and interpreted; in other words, the interpretative flexibility of a technological artefact 
must be shown.‖ This perspective is understood to take a stand opposed to conventional 
technical determinism.  
 
From a structurational viewpoint, SCOT and technical determinism were criticised by 
Orlikowski (1992) as a false dichotomy. She understood Giddens‘s original 
structuration theory as ―recognition that human actions are enabled and constrained by 
 97 
structures, yet that these structures are the result of previous actions.‖ From this 
understanding, Orlikowski explained the structurational view of technology as holding 
that ―technology embodies and hence is an instantiation of some of the rules and 
resources constituting the structure of an organization‖ (pp. 404-405). At that stage, this 
author sustained the view that there are mutual and equal interactions among technology 
and human practice. However, human practices became more dominant than technology 
in her later work (Orlikowski 2000), where she conceptualised technology as 
‘Technology-in-Practice‘ and understood the instantiation, emergence and enactment of 
human practices in the structurational context. In any case, interpretive flexibility is 
generally referred to as the characteristic of IT to make these interactions between 
technology and human practice possible.  
 
Under this wide consensus regarding mutual influence, the boundaries of interpretive 
flexibility have become another important issue. While arguing about the user-centric 
aspect of prior literature with regard to the structurational view of IT, Doherty and his 
colleagues suggested the concept of the ‗functional boundaries‘ embedded in packaged 
software, which was defined as the determinant of ―the extent to which its functionality 
can be appropriated to meet the desired outcomes of specific stakeholders‖ (Doherty, 
Coombs and Loan-Clarke 2006, p. 578). Many empirical studies have supported this 
boundary under the findings that IT is not as malleable as expected, according to 
conventional views, especially with case studies of packaged software like the 
enterprise resource planning (ERP) system (e.g., Cadili and Whitley 2005; Kallinikos 
2002).  
 
An interesting response to this view was provided by Orlikowski herself at an informal 
seminar held by the Information Systems and Innovation Group of the London School 
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of Economics, on the 18
th
 of June 2008. While recognising the functional boundaries as 
an empirical characteristic of IT, she discerned it from her technology-in-practice view 
as follows.  
First, the functional boundaries concept describes the characteristic of 
specific technological artefacts, whereas my understanding in practice lens 
perspective focuses on wider context of technology in phenomena. For 
example, I accept that MS PowerPoint is a rigid artefact, but my point is that 
we can use alternatives for presentations such as MS Word with big-size 
font, if required.  
Second, I did not present the interpretive flexibility as a characteristic of 
artefacts. It was an answer to ontological questions as revealed by my 
choice of terms such as enactment and instantiation. On the other hand, 
Doherty et al.‘s conceptualisation is in empirical and analytical level. So, I 
think, the approaches and research aims are different. I can agree with their 
view in terms of a characteristic of specific technology.          
According to this response, Orlikowski clarifies that her structurational view does not 
reject the inflexibility feature of IT.  
 
As discussed thus far, central debates of structuration theory in IS researches are related 
to the understanding of the relationship between technology and human practices. 
Technical determinists or conventional critical realists may doubt structuration theory, 
in that information systems and technology are independent variables, rather than 
dependent ones that are necessarily intermediated by human practices.  
 
However, aside from this discussion, this critique will not be applied to this research, 
the object of which is not a technological system, but an organisational phenomenon 
regarding IT outsourcing. It depends much more on social domains, although a large IS 
constitute a specific IT outsourcing environment. For example, there will be two IS 
 99 
introduced in the case studies chapters: the e-government procurement system in 
Chapter Five and the pensions administration system in Chapter Six. Nonetheless, the 
research focus will not be on the mutual interactions between organisation and these IS. 
Within the research scope, the technological characteristics of these systems will be 
addressed as having one-way influence on the decisions of outsourcing arrangements 
and relative organisations. This thesis does not concern the IS themselves, but explores 
the phenomena, social processes and underlying context behind outsourcing-related 
organisation change. Mutual interactions implied by structuration theory will be 
concerned about within those areas of human behaviours, outsourcing arrangements and 
organisation structure; while, the characteristics of specific IS are regarded as embedded 
attributes within these structures. Consequently, the structuration theory in this research 
is not subject to possible critique from the chosen philosophy of critical realism.   
 
4.2.2 Formal organisation perspective informed by structuration theory 
 
Kallinikos‘s formal organisation perspective was examined as a significant theoretical 
perspective in this thesis. It provides an inclusive understanding of bureaucracy as both 
an institution and an organisation form. It is useful here to re-present the research 
purpose of this thesis, as described in the introduction chapter. It was described as the 
understanding of phenomena involved in IT outsourcing practices, organisational 
changes and their underlying social contexts in terms of bureaucratic organisations. In 
this respect, the term bureaucracy in this thesis must be transferred from the narrow 
concept of organisation structure and practices to the broader concept of an institution. 
In particular, Kallinikos‘s concept of formal organisation is strongly inspired by the 
consequences of contemporary information growth and by its institutional influence on 
organisations.  
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Besides the comprehensiveness of the term, the formal organisation perspective 
provides grounded implications to this research. Non-inclusive involvement of 
individuals in organisations is a characteristic of formal organisation, which was 
described by ―the primary matrix of relations out of which emerge other derivative 
characteristics, often taken as the epitome of bureaucracy, such as standardization, 
formalization, specialization and centralization‖ (Kallinikos 2006, p. 130). To explore 
this aspect of the separation of the role from the person, he suggested the importance of 
the labour contract as the legal-institutional order in modernity. Outsourcing contracts 
play the same role for IT outsourcing studies. In this respect, outsourcing suppliers can 
be conceptualised as being non-inclusively involved with client organisations via IT 
outsourcing contracts that separate the inclusive roles from non-inclusive persons. This 
appears to be very consistent with the viewpoint of the formal organisation perspective.   
 
This characteristic supports how structuration theory is used as a meta-theory in this 
research, which will be explained in greater detail later. Formal organisation is 
employed to understand social realities as enacted and emergent in dynamic social 
contexts, rather than static functional collectivities. This is an ontological answer to 
inform the formal organisation.  
  
In addition, the broadly known concept of network or virtual organisation representing 
the post-bureaucratic organisation form was also argued over by Kallinikos (2004; 
2006). He insisted on the juxtaposition of networks within formal organisation because 
there is little evidence of the demise of bureaucracy. This is well exemplified by his 
stress on elementary and microscopic level analyses about decomposition and the 
functional recomposition of organisational arrangements, which are disclosed by 
increasing the dissolvability of organisational operations. Consequently, compared to 
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other conventional strands of new organisational forms, such as networks and 
something virtual, Kallinikos emphasises the significance of formal organisations—
represented by bounded and hierarchical systems—within the institutional context. A 
similar conceptualisation can even be found in literature regarding post-bureaucracy. 
For example, Black and Edwards (2000, p. 572) describe virtual systems as ―the 
technology facilitated enactment of activities that used to require a physical presence to 
complete‖. While noting characteristics of complexity in network organisations, these 
authors admitted the existence of traditional organisational orders: ―Being a virtual 
organization does not preclude the using of traditional business methods, just that the 
dominant method of doing business is heavily dependent upon advanced information 
technology‖ (p. 572).  
 
On the other hand, IT outsourcing can be the typical form of networking in a network 
enterprise, which is defined by Castells (2000, p. 187) as a ―specific form of enterprise 
whose system of means is constituted by the intersection of segments of autonomous 
systems of goals‖. Presumably, if we investigated bureaucratic organisations in a very 
microscopic way, as recommended by Kallinikos, we could find the traditional 
bureaucratic orders underlying social phenomena regarding IT outsourcing. For 
example, hierarchical bureaucracy in IS divisions can be transformed into outsourcing 
contract networks. It does not mean, however, that the attributes of modern 
bureaucracy—like standardisation, formalisation and specialisation—will vanish.  
 
The above two explanations of bureaucracy as institution have direct implications for 
the present research, where the traditional bureaucratic structure intertwined with IT 
outsourcing is explored as a main research object. 
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Regarding consistency with other intellectual approaches in this thesis, the employed 
philosophical stances—critical realism and interpretivism—underlie the formal 
organisation perspective, in that Kallinikos pursued both subject-independent 
arrangements of formal organisations and social processes beyond the observed. In 
addition, Sayer (2000) used bureaucracy to explain the concept of the ‗actual‘, and in 
that critical realist‘s work bureaucracy is exemplified as actual reality within a critical 
realist perspective. 
 
However, the formal organisation perspective is also consistent with structuration 
theory in many respects. Before examining the consistency between these two 
perspectives, the use of structuration theory must be reviewed. To state the conclusion 
first, structuration theory is employed as a meta-theory to reinforce the use of the formal 
organisation perspective to understand IT outsourcing-related phenomena and social 
context. This is one of nine categories of structuration theory application presented by 
Halperin and Backhouse (2007) (see Table 2-4). As examined in the previous chapter, 
structuration theory cannot be easily coupled with other theories and applied to 
empirical studies. However, it is suggested that structuration as a meta-theory 
contributes to the reconciliation of the duality of structure, as follows (Halperin and 
Backhouse 2007, p. 2): 
The meta-perspective of structuration theory overcomes the biased character 
of both approaches in IS, such as social constructivism, which emphasizes 
agency, and of theories such as institutional analysis, which emphasize 
structure. […] In particular, attempts have been made to combine 
structuration theory with Actor Network Theory. For example, Walsham 
and Sahay (1999) distinguish between structuration, which they employ as a 
meta-theory, and ANT, which they employ as a more detailed 
methodological and analytical device. 
 103 
Consequently, the ontological understanding of social phenomena in structuration 
theory, as emphasised by Giddens (1990a) himself, reinforces the specific perspective 
of Kallinikos in terms of bureaucratic organisation within the dynamic context in this 
thesis. Following this understanding of the use of structuration theory, the most serious 
issue on theoretical consistency falls on finding coherence between structuration theory 
and the formal organisation perspective. This coherence is developed through the 
following three rationales.   
 
First, Kallinikos‘s recognition of bureaucracy has much in common with the 
sociological perspective of Giddens. Giddens (1984, p. 21) discussed bureaucracy as an 
example of the formulated rule defined as codified interpretations of rules, rather than 
rules as such. Surprisingly, a similar description is found in statements about formal 
organisation, as follows (Kallinikos 2006, p. 19): 
Structural and organisational arrangements are instantiations of, or at least 
expressions of, institutions and the codification of social experience and 
struggles that institutions embody. 
We find another instance of the term ‗instantiation‘ here, which was also presented by 
Giddens as the nature of social processes. This perspective is clearly revealed in his 
statement, as follows: ―human beings are necessarily in a constant state of reflexive 
monitoring of their situation rather than being the ‗cultural‘ or ‗structural dopes‘ 
implied by traditional views of structure‖ (Giddens 1979, p. 52; as cited in Jones, 
Orlikowski and Munir 2004, p. 302). In addition, Kallinikos‘s concept of individuals‘ 
non-inclusive involvement in organisations is also compatible with Giddens‘s view that 
social relations are not embedded in specific contexts that contribute to the globalising 
character of modernity (Giddens 1990b, p. 21; as cited in Jones, Orlikowski and Munir 
2004, p. 305). Consequently, formal organisation can be understood as a ‗formal‘ social 
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system, which was defined by Giddens as reproduced relations between actors or 
collectivities. Institutional characteristics of both theories were definitely and 
commonly emphasised by the two theorists. 
 
Second, these two theories are compatible in terms of their context-free approaches. On 
the one hand, Kallinikos (2006, p. 17) confessed to seek the ―context-free understanding 
of technology as a major regulative regime that can be associated with major shifts in 
social practices and institutions‖; on the other hand, Giddens (1990a) advocated his 
theory that ―I am not particularly interested in epistemology, but in the ontology of 
social life. I do not agree, though, with the idea of the context-bound nature of 
knowledge claims…‖ (p. 300). He also states that ―[my principles] are essentially 
procedural and do not supply concepts useful for the actual prosecution of research‖ (p. 
312). This heuristic feature of the two theories will increase the potential of application 
for establishing theoretical backgrounds in this study. This characteristic allows for a 
more generalised approach to specific empirical research endeavours.     
 
Third, the formal organisation perspective, representing bureaucracy as an institution 
here, is an appropriate approach for extending the use of structuration theory to the 
institutional and longitudinal levels of analyses, recommended by Jones, Orlikowski 
and Munir (2004). The recognition of structure or formal organisation as processes or 
the instantiation of processes can be well informed by these two theories.  
 
Under these rationales, structuration theory informs the formal organisation perspective 
for a wider understanding of social realities in this thesis; hence, the formal organisation 
perspective informed by structuration theory forms the theoretical perspective of this 
study.  
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4.3 Processual analysis-informed multidimensional IT outsourcing configuration 
framework 
 
To construct a tangible analytical frame, the processual analysis-informed 
multidimensional IT outsourcing configuration framework is reinvented as an integrated 
framework. This has been developed from many prior studies, and these will be 
examined in the next two sections. 
 
4.3.1 Processual analysis and longitudinal case study  
 
Pettigrew‘s processual analysis was developed for process research, in particular, 
organisational change research. Pettigrew (1997, p. 338) understands process to be ―a 
sequence of individual and collective events, actions and activities unfolding over time 
in context‖. He sustained the view that social reality is a dynamic process, rather than a 
steady state; hence, phenomena regarding organisational change cannot be explored 
without the consideration of the longitudinal aspects—in terms of human activities, 
structures and context—that can be triangulated by other cases. Finally, he concluded 
that a primary research method for process research is a longitudinal comparative case 
study.  
 
His suggestion for good longitudinal case studies follows three analytical rationales 
(Pettigrew 1997): searching for patterns in the process; searching for underlying 
mechanisms shaping any patterning; and recursive verifications between inductive 
pattern recognition and deductive data analyses. Only by following these rationales, he 
suggested, can process researchers produce a case study rather than a case history.  
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In addition, he argued that five guiding assumptions were required by process 
researchers (Pettigrew 1997). The first is the recognition of the aspect of both context-
embedded process and process-embedded context. Social processes are embedded in the 
contexts, and both are mutually interrelated. Accordingly, researchers need to study 
processes across a number of levels of analysis of context to grasp the core of 
phenomena behind observations. The second assumption is temporal interconnectedness 
in history. This is well epitomised by his statement that ―The past is alive in the present 
and may shape the emerging future.‖ (p. 341); hence, process researchers should 
understand the meaning of sequential events over time. The third guiding assumption is 
that human actions and interpretations intertwine within context. The essence of this 
assumption is shown again in the following statement: ―Context is not just a stimulus 
environment but a nested arrangement of structures and processes where the subjective 
interpretations of actors perceiving, learning, and remembering help shape process‖ (p. 
341). Human actions observed in phenomena should be explained in a contextual 
manner in this view. The fourth assumption is the importance of a holistic approach. 
This emphasises an integrated approach of the above three assumptions to explore 
social reality in terms of time, human actions and context. In addition, this makes the 
longitudinal case study method a primary method of process research because it makes 
possible holistic explanations within and between cases. The last assumption is process-
outcome interrelationship study, which links the analysis of process to outcomes. By 
defining outcomes, the complexity in process studies can be reduced, and clear focal 
points can be provided to comparative case studies. It also contributes to the exploration 
of variations as to how and why outcomes are shaped by process and context. These 
five assumptions guide the establishment of the analytical framework for this study.     
 
Regarding the intellectual coherency between the processual analysis method and other 
 107 
philosophical and theoretical perspectives, the first four assumptions explicitly reveal 
the same understanding with those of structuration theory, in that both stress contextual 
aspects; human behaviours; interrelationship between structure, human practices and 
contexts; and holistic approaches. In addition, holistic causation in the fourth 
assumption can also be compatible with the contextual causation promoted by Sayer‘s 
critical realist‘s view, which stresses contingency and conditions (Sayer 2000).  
        
Under this sustaining view of process research, an applicable longitudinal field research 
framework was presented in his early writings. Pettigrew (1985) advocated four 
components of holistic, contextualist analysis: namely external context, internal context, 
process, and outcome. He (1990) also added content as an independent domain, 
describing process, contexts and content as ‗how‘, ‗why‘ and ‗what‘ questions, 
respectively. This was proposed as an analytical framework for processual analysis. 
Pettigrew (1997, p. 347) summarises the contribution of the processual analysis method 
as follows. 
The major contribution of process research (as characterised here) is to 
catch reality in flight, to explore the dynamic qualities of human conduct 
and organisational life and to embed such dynamics over time in the various 
layers of context in which steams of activity occur.  
 
4.3.2 Relevant literature on multidimensional IT outsourcing configuration 
framework 
 
4.3.2.1 IT outsourcing configuration framework   
 
Among much relevant literature, the IT outsourcing configuration framework has direct 
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implications upon this thesis‘s analytical framework. Cullen, Seddon and Willcocks 
(2005, p. 359) define it as ―a high-level description of the set of structural choices made 
in crafting IT arrangements of IT outsourcing‖. These authors establish the purpose of 
this framework as described below (p. 357): 
The articulation of the concept of configuration as a taxonomy of IT 
outsourcing structural characteristics, the key attributes, and demonstration 
that configuration is an important concept for understanding, comparing, 
and managing IT outsourcing arrangements. 
These authors provided seven attributes of the frameworks and many options that mean 
the specific decision within each attribute, as summarised in Table 4-1. 
 
Table 4-1: Attributes and affiliated options of IT outsourcing configuration 
Attribute (Options) Description 
1. Scope grouping What services are provided to whom, and where 
 Service scope The nature of the work, aligned with the traditional 
segmentation of an IT function 
 Entire service scope Outsourcing of entire service scope 
 Selected scope Outsourcing of selected service scope in terms of service 
segmentation or the degree of outsourced activities 
 Recipient scope The groups that have been identified to receive specific 
outsourcing services 
 All business units Standardised outsourcing service to all business units 
 Business unit self 
select 
Different service specifications based on the customised 
business requirement of each business unit 
 Geographic scope The physical locations that have been identified to receive 
particular outsourcing services 
 All geographies Integrated services from one site 
 Geography self 
select 
Different service delivery sites responding to regional 
business environment 
 109 
2. Supplier grouping How many suppliers provide the outsourced services 
 
 Sole supplier Single service provider that provides all outsourcing 
services, no subcontracting 
 Prime contractor Head service provider subcontracts work but is accountable 
for all outsourced services 
 Best of breed Multiple suppliers, each providing unique services, as well 
as overlapping services 
 Panel Multiple service providers providing similar services under 
continuous competition 
3. Financial scale The financial value to the organisation using Relative and 
Absolute dimensions 
 Relative The % of operating spend represented by the outsourcing 
portfolio  
 Absolute The per annum value of the outsourcing portfolio 
4. Pricing framework The method by which the payment to the supplier/s is 
calculated 
 Lump sum/fixed 
price 
Lump sum price over specified parameters  
 Unit-based Price per specific transaction unit 
 Cost-based Actual costs plus a percentage mark up or fixed 
management fee 
5. Contract duration Agreed length of the contract 
 Single term Fixed one term deals 
 Rollover terms Fixed initial term with options to extend 
 Evergreen term No define contract expiry date, either party can invoke 
various termination rights 
6. Resource ownership Which party controls and/or owns the various service 
delivery resources (assets, facilities and labor) 
 Infrastructure Supplier/s provides asset and facilities 
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 Onsite Supplier/s provides labor and assets 
 Service & facility Supplier/s provides facility and labor 
 Asset buy-in Supplier/s provides assets only 
 Facility host Supplier/s provides facility only 
 Labor Supplier/s provides workforce and/or management only 
 Total outsourcing All resources are provided by supplier/s 
7. Commercial 
relationship 
 
The high-level organisation to organisation nature of 
relationship structure 
 Arms-length Independent parties for which the relationship is solely 
transactional 
 Value-added Independent parties with a combination of arms-length 
contract/s and shared business initiatives 
 Co-sourced Independent parties providing a mix of service labor and 
assets, with integrated end accountability 
 Equity Related entities providing services to one another or 
through a combined entity 
* Source: Cullen, Seddon and Willcocks (2005; 2007) 
 
The application of these attributes and affiliated options will be demonstrated in the 
empirical investigation chapters. These seven attributes are the points to be decided by 
the outsourcing designers of client organisations. This framework is well arranged to 
show what should be taken into account in IT outsourcing arrangements and client 
organisation design. However, this must be reinvented for the study at hand in light of 
the following two limitations of the original framework.   
 
First, the lack of attributes concerning client organisational arrangements could be 
supplemented. The relative distribution of in-house staff and the design of internal 
procedures to manage IT services are two examples. Regarding the former, IT 
outsourcing can be managed and monitored by centralised or decentralised in-house 
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divisions or by business or IT divisions. The roles and responsibilities of business and 
IT divisions can be another issue. Regarding internal procedures, existing workflows 
may be redesigned according to outsourcing configuration portfolios. This requires in-
depth studies of organisational procedures from two angles: the first is management 
functions, like collecting users‘ requests, business-related and technological decision-
making, system change management, deploying new/changed functions and inspection 
of the result, etc.; and the second is the allocation of authority, such as to what extent in-
house staff should participate in which decisions. These are connected with the disputes 
about decomposing and recomposing existing bureaucracy in formal organisation, in 
that the formalised and standardised design of organisational formats and procedures 
represents the features of traditional bureaucracy melded with networked IT outsourcing 
practices.   
 
Second, the structurational approach can strengthen the original framework. 
Structuration, which describes the conditions of instantiated social systems, will form 
the social context underlying decisions regarding configuration options. For example, if 
a client organisation adopts a sole supplier option in the supplier grouping attribute, it 
should have the specific organisational and technological structuration to support that 
decision. It can also be explained by a chosen theoretical underpinning of structuration 
theory-informed formal organisation. An existing portfolio can be understood as the 
shape of instantiated formal organisation.  
 
4.3.2.2 Lifecycle perspective on sourcing process   
 
A lifecycle perspective of the sourcing process was proposed as the framework for 
managing outsourcing processes (Cullen, Seddon and Willcocks 2006). While 
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confirming the significance of outsourcing management as the determinant of 
outsourcing success, these authors describe the research purpose of the lifecycle 
perspective as follows (p. 37): 
The goal is to create a template that defines the fundamental process 
activities for managing outsourcing together with the evidence of their 
importance. 
This perspective concludes that successful outsourcing can be achieved when viewed as 
a strategy with a lifecycle, rather than as a one-off transaction. Outsourcing 
management should follow a path, making systemised feedback and regeneration of 
incumbent value of outsourcing activities possible.    
 
This perspective is employed in this thesis to provide a sequential taxonomy that has 
been commonly observed in outsourcing phenomena. It is specifically important to this 
thesis, which focuses on contextual investigation over time. The lifecycle, in this 
perspective, consists of four phases and nine attached building blocks with a total of 54 
key activities. Four phases are established and described as follows (Cullen, Seddon and 
Willcocks 2006, pp. 38-40): the ―architect phase, where the foundation for outsourcing 
is laid; engage phase, where one or more suppliers are selected and the deal is 
negotiated; operate phase, where the deal is put in place, operationalized, and managed 
through its term; and, regenerate phase, where next-generation options are assessed‖. 
Affiliated building blocks are explained in Table 4-2. 
 
In particular, the term configuration in the ‗Design‘ building block is linked with the 
authors‘ own IT outsourcing configuration introduced in the previous section. These 
authors regard the attributes of IT outsourcing configuration as the decision point of the 
outsourcing deal in the design stage. This approach is also adopted by this thesis, as 
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explained later in this chapter. 
 
Table 4-2: Lifecycle perspective and affiliated phases and building blocks 
Ph-
ase 
Building 
block 
Goal 
A
rc
h
it
ec
t 
Investigate ―Veracity, not ideology‖: Replacing ideological beliefs with goals 
appropriate to the organization‘s circumstances, its industry, and the 
markets where it procures services 
Target ―Appropriate services identified‖: Identifying and profiling those 
areas where client can actually achieve sought-after benefits 
Strategize ―Informed, not speculative strategies‖: Planning to enable objective 
and knowledgeable decisions to be made throughout the remainder 
of the lifecycle 
Design ―Well-designed future state‖: Wrapping up the architect phase by 
defining the planned configuration of the deal 
E
n
g
ag
e 
Select ―Best value for money‖: Increasing the bargaining power by 
leveraging the competitive tension that naturally occurs in this phase 
Negotiate ―Complete, efficient contract‖: Refining the exact wording of 
various documents, instead of give-and-take negotiations over the 
intent of the deal, under the assumption of well crafted prior 
activities in lifecycle management 
O
p
er
at
e 
Transition ―Efficient mobilization‖: Merely executing the plans made earlier 
Manage ―Results‖: Managing outputs, rather than inputs, by using 
negotiation and relationship management in place of direct control, 
and by relying on periodic planning and reviews to take the place of 
day-to-day oversight of service delivery operations 
R
eg
en
er
at
e Refresh ―Refreshed strategy‖: Reassessing initial sourcing decision before 
coming to the end of contract and leading to any one of following 
works including re-tendered, backsourced and renegotiated with the 
incumbent supplier 
* Source: Cullen, Seddon and Willcocks (2006, p. 39-56) 
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4.3.2.3 IT governance   
 
IT governance is an emerging research area within IS studies, as exemplified by a 
special issue of Information Systems Management in 2009 (Cater-Steel 2009). The lack 
of academic research on this issue is suggested throughout that special issue volume by 
many researchers (e.g., Willson and Pollard 2009). Earlier, while titling their paper as 
―Attempting to Define IT Governance: Wisdom or Folly?‖, Webb, Pollard and Ridley 
(2006) disclose that the concept of IT governance itself was not universally accepted. In 
addition, its distinction from other concepts—such as IT service management (ITSM), 
information technology infrastructure library (ITIL), service level management (SLM), 
business service management (BSM), control objectives for information and related 
technology (CobiT), and enterprise architecture (EA)—is suggested as not being clear 
yet (Khaiata and Zualkerman 2009; Winniford, Conger and Erickson-Harris 2009).  
 
The term IT governance as used in the literature has narrow and broad dimensions 
depending on the source. The narrow subject of IT governance is business and IS 
alignment and the appropriation of decision rights regarding IT in organisations. 
However, Webb, Pollard and Ridley (2006) give a broad concept that is based on the 
distinction of governance and management, as suggested by Bird (2001). In this sense, 
IT governance is conceptualised as an overall IT-related strategy. This distinction 
between narrow and broad concepts is supported by Winniford, Conger and Erickson-
Harris (2009).  
 
From a narrow concept view, Mead and Boeschoten (2006) provided guidelines for 
excellent governance regarding IT, while arguing that ―too often IT governance is 
limited to the IT-side decisions‖ (p. 15). These authors categorised two decision 
 115 
domains as follows: the business side (cross-unit governance, business strategy and risk 
management) and the IT side (IT strategy, development portfolio, IT organisation and 
tactical IT governance).  
 
In addition, Weill and Woodham (2002) present a wide range of governance structures 
and affiliated rationales, while defining IT governance as ―specifying the decision rights 
and accountability framework to encourage desirable behaviour in the use of IT‖ (p. 1). 
These authors suggest the importance of studying who decision makers are and how 
decisions are made in the following four domains of IT: IT principles, IT infrastructure 
strategies, IT architecture, and IT investment and prioritisation. According to this 
categorisation, five governance archetypes are identified by empirical investigations of 
40 large firms in the US and Europe. Table 4-3 summarises these.  
 
Table 4-3: Governance archetypes categorised by Weill and Woodham 
Archetype Description 
Business 
monarchy 
Senior leadership (e.g., CEO, CFO, COO) owned decision rights and 
CIO participation as a board member 
IT 
monarchy 
CIO or IT executives owned decision rights 
Feudal Decentralised business units owned decision rights 
Federal Combined participants owned decision rights including senior 
executives, business unit leaders, business process owners, IT 
executives and end-users 
Anarchy Individual business process owners or end users owned decision rights 
* Source: Weill and Woodham 2002 (pp. 3-4) 
 
These authors found that top-performing firms follow many decentralised archetypes—
federal, feudal and anarchy—or centralised business monarchy, compared with other 
firms. It is rare to find successful IT monarchy archetype cases. In particular, certain 
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archetypes are investigated as being more powerful in specific IT domains, as follows: 
the federal archetype for IT investment; the feudal archetype for IT architecture; 
anarchy archetype for IT principle; and the business monarchy archetype for IT 
infrastructure and IT architecture decisions. As discussed thus far, IT governance in a 
narrow sense explores appropriate governance structure in terms of decision rights and 
mechanisms.  
 
IT governance in this sense has direct implications for the design of organisation 
structures and work processes. For example, PPS‘s governance archetype can be 
regarded as ‗IT monarchy‘, while that of DCSF is categorised as ‗Feudal‘ in Weill and 
Woodham‘s (2002) criteria. However, as explained later, the employment of IT 
governance in this thesis is not to establish such rationales behind the construction of 
organisations. Organisation design is one of the key subjects of this study, but it will be 
conducted through the wider contextual consideration intermediated by a broad concept 
of IT governance.   
 
The broad concept of IT governance tackles wider issues of IT-related governance 
concerns. From this point of view, Webb, Pollard and Ridley (2006, p. 7) define IT 
governance as follows:  
IT Governance is the strategic alignment of IT with the business such that 
maximum business value is achieved through the development and 
maintenance of effective IT control and accountability, performance 
management and risk management. 
These authors derive this from the result of their content analysis of prior studies 
regarding IT governance. The following definition of IT governance institute (ITGI) is 
another example of governance in a broad sense (ITGI 2007, p. 5).  
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The responsibility of executives and the board of directors, and consists of 
the leadership, organisational structures and processes that ensure that the 
enterprise‘s IT sustains and extends the organization‘s strategies and 
objectives. 
As shown in these descriptions, the broad sense of IT governance expands the interest 
from narrow governance structures to overall IS/IT alignment strategies, taking into 
account structure and other tangible and intangible organisational resources.  
 
This thesis adopts the above definition of IT governance given by Webb, Pollard and 
Ridley. The broad concept of IT governance is employed to inform the 
multidimensional IT outsourcing configuration framework in the area of context 
regarding IT outsourcing-related decisions. Webb, Pollard and Ridley (2006) 
conceptualise broad IT governance based on the distinction between management and 
governance suggested by Bird. Bird (2001) understands management as day-to-day, 
operation-level activities based on the authority delegated to managers by governors. 
The natures of manager and executive responsibilities are administrative, supervisory 
and facilitating, while those of boards and governance structures are expressed as exercising 
such things as for example, good authoritative judgement and final accountability.  
 
Based on this distinction between governance and management, and as a result of 
reviewing the literature, Webb, Pollard and Ridley (2006) conclude that there are five 
common elements of IT governance: strategic alignment, delivery of business value 
through IT, performance management, risk management, and control and accountability. 
A detailed investigation of these concepts is outside the research scope of this thesis. 
However, these elements are consistent with those of IT governance defined by ITGI 
(2007). There are two differences in these elements. Control and accountability—
according to Webb, Pollard and Ridley—do not appear in those defined by ITGI.  
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Instead, resource management
3
 is included in ITGI‘s conceptualisation. Discarding 
resource management, this thesis takes control and accountability as part of IT 
governance elements. Control and accountability describe the core of governance 
concerns, such as control and authority, whereas resource management covers too wide 
an area to be specified in terms of IT resources including people. Most elements in this 
resource management concept seem to be addressed under other elements. 
Consequently, IT governance elements in this thesis are defined as in Table 4-4. 
 
Table 4-4: Elements of IT governance 
Element Description 
Strategic 
alignment 
Focusing on ensuring the linkage of business and IT plans; on 
defining, maintaining and validating the IT value proposition; and on 
aligning IT operations with enterprise operations 
Delivery of 
business value 
through IT 
Executing the value proposition throughout the delivery cycle, 
ensuring that IT delivers the promised benefits against the strategy, 
concentrating on optimizing costs and proving the intrinsic value of IT 
Performance 
management 
Tracking and monitoring strategy implementation, project completion, 
resource usage, process performance and service delivery, using, for 
example, balanced scorecards that translate strategy into action to 
achieve goals measurable beyond conventional accounting 
Risk 
management 
Risk awareness by senior corporate officers, a clear understanding of 
the enterprise‘s appetite for risk, understanding of compliance 
requirements, transparency about the significant risks to the enterprise, 
and embedding of risk management responsibilities into the 
organisation 
Control and 
accountability 
Leadership, control and direction from those persons within an 
organisation with authority to govern 
Note: Most definitions follow those of ITGI (2007), except for control and accountability, 
the definitions for which come from Webb, Pollard and Ridley (2006).   
                                               
3
 Resource management is about the optimal investment in and the proper management 
of critical IT resources: applications, information, infrastructure and people. Key 
issues relate to the optimisation of knowledge and infrastructure (ITGI 2007, p. 6). 
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The limitations of the IT governance literature for IT outsourcing research was 
identified during the author‘s examination of the literature. Whether a broad or narrow 
concept, IT governance tends to ignore IT outsourcing despite it being a highly a 
prevalent practice in contemporary organisations. On a narrow concept of governance 
related discussions regarding governance structure are restricted to IS/business 
alignment within client organisations. On the other hand, only the overall organisation‘s 
IT strategy and governance concerns are handled in the broad sense of IT governance. 
For example, possible explorations of outsourcing relationships in terms of control and 
accountability are very rare in the extant IT governance literature. Only one major 
attempt based on this view was identified under the title of ―Outsourcing Relationships: 
The Contract as IT Governance Tool‖ (Gellings 2007). In order to identify outsourcing 
success factors, this author analyses contractual components by the criteria of a broad 
sense of IT governance. However, otherwise there is a serious dearth of governance 
literature on the subject of IT outsourcing, despite a marked concern on the issue 
amongst modern practitioners.      
 
4.3.3 Multidimensional IT outsourcing configuration framework informed by 
processual analysis  
 
The analytical framework of this thesis draws upon the above four perspectives or 
frameworks. Aside from processual analysis, which guides the overall contextual 
approach, the IT outsourcing configuration and lifecycle perspectives together with IT 
governance issues inform this study in significant ways upon. The common features of 
these are their heuristic value, meaning that they do not address algorithmic rules, such 
as that selective outsourcing is better than total outsourcing; instead, these form an 
analytical scheme by which one can conduct a study. Accordingly, these are used to 
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create an analytical scheme for selecting and describing components that are applicable 
to empirical research.   
 
However, two limitations are identified in their application to this research. First, these 
three works are positivistic, in that they depend on functional elements composing 
organisation and outsourcing deals. This does not suit the philosophical background and 
research questions of this thesis, although these characteristics allow for their 
elementary applications as analytical frameworks for the empirical investigation. In 
other words, these provide little explanation about the links between individual action, 
organisation and social context, which were presented as the characteristics of 
traditional functionalism by Markus (2004). Consequently, structurational 
understanding intermediated by processual analysis is required to supplement this 
inconsistency between the functionalistic approach of theoretical foundations and 
interpretivists‘ problematisation of this thesis‘s philosophical stance. Due to this 
reinvention, the original configuration framework can be transformed to a 
constructible/institutional scheme from a functional concept.  
 
The second and the most critical limitation in using these models as analytical 
frameworks is the lack of focus on organisational arrangements, such as organisational 
forms and processes. More specifically, this thesis‘s research purpose is to explore the 
structure of bureaucratic client organisation and its change in relation to IT outsourcing, 
whereas the main foci for these original models are outsourcing contract structure, 
contract processes and management schemes. To deal with this issue, a 
multidimensional IT outsourcing configuration framework informed by processual 
analysis is reinvented as the analytical framework of this thesis.  
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The definition of the multidimensional IT outsourcing configuration framework here is 
‗a high-level description of the set of IT outsourcing and organisation arrangements 
decisions and their dynamic relationships in terms of strategy, contract structure and 
organisation construction‘. Figure 4-1 illustrates how this framework is redeveloped in 
terms of other relevant constructs. Overall direction is given by the processual analysis 
method, which consists of context (why?), process (how?), content (what?) and 
outcome domains.  
 
Figure 4-1: Multidimensional IT outsourcing configuration and relevant literature 
 
Outcome 3:  
Organisation Construction 
 Context: IT governance 
 Process: lifecycle perspective 
of sourcing process 
 Content: organisational 
arrangements 
Outcome 2:  
Contract Structure 
 Context: IT governance 
 Process: lifecycle perspective of 
sourcing process  
 Content: IT outsourcing 
configuration 
Outcome 1: Strategy 
 Context: IT governance 
 Process: lifecycle perspective of sourcing process  
 Content: IT outsourcing configuration 
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In accordance with this method and the result of the pilot study for this thesis, IT 
governance, lifecycle perspective and IT outsourcing configuration compose context, 
process and content domain, respectively. Three dimensions of strategy, organisation 
construction and contract structure—each of which is to be analysed by Pettigrew‘s 
content, process and context domains framework—are conceptualised as an outcome 
domain. These are constructed by the set of affiliated content components. This 
approach is justified in that the purpose of this research is to investigate how 
organisational change is related to IT outsourcing. For example, if the purpose were 
related to outsourcing success, outcomes should include the success factor or evaluation, 
to be given values. However, all answers regarding content, context and process are 
designed to explain the changes in these three dimensions. In this respect, the processual 
analysis based framework can be justified. 
 
Regarding the second limitation of the original model mentioned above, in addition to 
seven attributes in Table 4-1, two components of IT outsourcing configuration need to 
be further created, as follows: 
Organisation arrangements: formal organisational arrangements, such as 
organisation form and staffing 
Processes and activities: a set of authority allocation and implementing 
procedures and activities for service management 
 
In conclusion, organisational changes are viewed as three dimensions of strategy, 
contract structure and organisation construction, examined as the outcome domain of 
processual analysis. Each dimension describes relevant phenomena in a holistic manner 
and is explored by three domains of context, process and content, which are explained 
by five IT governance concerns, four lifecycle phases and nine IT outsourcing 
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configuration decision points, respectively. Context answers the question of why each 
dimension is constructed or changed; process involves the question as to how this 
construction or change takes place; and content identifies the related decision points.  
 
Beyond this structural coherence with processual analysis, this framework fits a 
longitudinal comparative case study, which was suggested by Pettigrew (1997) as an 
appropriate process research method. This framework shows strong consistency with 
the five guiding assumptions of processual analysis. With respect to the first two 
assumptions presented in the processual analysis section (see p. 106), comprehensive IT 
governance concerns, explored by chronological viewpoints, are beneficial to explain 
the aspects of context-embedded process and process-embedded context and of 
temporal interconnectedness in history. In terms of the process-outcome 
interrelationship assumption, three dimensions as outcome—composed by common 
elements of the lifecycle perspective and IT outsourcing configuration—provide both 
cross-sectional and longitudinal focal points to lead an analytical comparative study. 
Simultaneously, the outcome can be linked with prior processes in a recursive manner. 
On the other hand, with the structurational perception of social reality, the 
exhaustiveness of this multidimensional framework supports the holistic approach and 
contextualised understanding of human practices and structure, which were presented as 
the third and fourth guiding assumptions of processual analysis.   
 
In any event, this framework implies that IT outsourcing configuration should be 
considered on the basis of the reflexive interrelationships among strategy, contract 
structure, and organisation construction. The employment of specific components of 
relevant literature is as follows. All original configuration attributes belong to the 
content area, together with two newly established attributes for this thesis, defined 
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above, because those were developed as the result of decisions. In addition, employing 
IT governance provides certain types and reasons of decisions; on the other hand, the 
lifecycle perspective of the sourcing process supplies a phasic approach to this analysis. 
Involved attributes and phases belonging to each dimension are illustrated in Figure 4-2. 
 
Figure 4-2: Components involved in multidimensional configuration framework 
 
 
The above figure is interpreted as follows. The definitions of each component follow 
those presented in Tables 4-1, 4-2 and 4-4, in addition to the newly added two from this 
section. Phenomena regarding IT outsourcing and organisational change need to be 
comprehensively analysed in terms of strategy, contract structure and organisation 
construction. Among these, strategy is formed by four decisions: scope grouping, 
financial scale, resource ownership and commercial relationship. Strategy building is 
observed to take place in the architect phase. On the other hand, contract structure is 
determined by three decisions: supplier grouping, pricing framework and contract 
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duration. Contract structuring is mainly involved in the engage phase. Finally, 
organisation construction refers to the decisions of organisation arrangements and 
processes and activities. This is conceptualised as occurring in the operate phase. All of 
these choices are fed back within a contract term, or at the end of the term, as activities 
in the regenerate phase.  
 
On the other hand, relevant IT governance concerns as contexts of specific decisions are 
derived from the pilot study of this thesis, as displayed in Figure 4-2. For example, two 
organisational construction-related decisions can be explained by all IT governance 
concerns, whereas resource ownership decision is strongly associated with control and 
accountability concerns. All IT governance concerns may be understood to have 
explanatory powers on all decisions. In this term, presented links are based on relative 
strength. Accordingly, these associations do not mean to rule out other IT governance 
concerns from the exploration of specific decisions.    
 
The specific application of this framework will appear in the case study sections in 
Chapters Five and Six; and the comparison of the findings from the two case studies in 
Chapter Seven will also follow the focal points indicated in this framework.   
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter describes the development of the conceptual framework of this thesis 
which will give direction to further theoretical and empirical investigation. On the one 
hand, the structuration theory-informed formal organisation perspective was presented 
as a theoretical perspective; on the other hand, the processual analysis-informed 
multidimensional IT outsourcing configuration framework was reinvented as an 
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analytical framework. This conceptual framework structure is illustrated in Figure 4-3.  
 
Figure 4-3: Conceptual framework structure 
 
 
As detailed above, all perspectives in this structure have been made consistent with each 
other. Structuration theory strengthens the formal organisation perspective‘s 
institutional and dynamic aspects of structures and human behaviours in a contextual 
manner. A common understanding of social processes and knowledge acquisition 
between structuration theory and processual analysis were also demonstrated. The 
processual analysis method empowers the contextual approach within originally cross-
sectional and functional frameworks of IT outsourcing configuration, IT governance 
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and the lifecycle perspective of sourcing.  
 
This framework is the intellectual product of a literature examination and an initial pilot 
study of a single case. In particular, the use of single case study as a pilot study was 
recommended by Pettigrew (1997) as stated in the methodology chapter. In addition, 
various elements within the relevant literature were collected from the results of rich 
multiple-case studies. For example, the numbers of investigated cases are 49 in IT 
outsourcing configuration cases, and 100 in lifecycle perspectives of sourcing cases, all 
of which came primarily from European, American and Australian firms after the mid-
1990s. This does not imply the generalisability of the thesis findings, but it can at least 
justify the relevance of the employed elements.   
 
Consequently, while maintaining theoretical consistency, the processual analysis-
informed multidimensional IT outsourcing configuration framework will facilitate the 
longitudinal comparative case studies of this thesis; furthermore, the structuration 
theory-informed formal organisation perspective will be used to interpret findings and 
to better understand social reality.    
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5 CASI: E-GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT SYSTEM OUTSOURCING IN 
KOREA 
CHAPTER FIVE  
CASE I: E-GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT SYSTEM 
OUTSOURCING IN KOREA 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter describes the first empirical case study of the thesis. This is an e-GP 
system outsourcing case in the PPS of the South Korean government. This chapter is 
followed by a chapter describing a British case study; these two studies, while 
constituting the comparative study of the thesis, will be discussed in a combined 
analysis in Chapter Seven.       
 
This case informs the thesis with its empirical demonstration of a client‘s diverse 
strategies in relationship to its IT outsourcing concerns. Phenomenal significance is 
inferred from the finding that strategy, contract structure and client organisation 
construction are mutually interrelated. The multidimensional IT outsourcing 
configuration framework of this thesis provides an appropriate analytical tool for this 
case analysis. ‗What‘, ‗why‘ and ‗how‘ questions will be explored as decision points, 
underlying context and process components, respectively. The concepts involved will 
be briefly introduced again for the reader‘s convenience.  
 
To make the context clear, it should be noted in advance that the significance of 
procurement in PPS differs from that of other organisations. Procurement is normally 
 129 
referred to as a back office function that supports a main business; however, it is a front 
office service in PPS, since PPS is a specialised procurement organisation, and its main 
mission is the provision of procurement services to other public organisations. In 
addition, the case study focuses on the change—in terms of strategy, contract structure 
and organisational change—brought about by a critical alteration of outsourcing 
strategy in 2004 and 2005. PPS e-GP history goes back to 1997, and this entire e-GP 
account will be explored to explain the context of relevant phenomena. However, a 
meaningful outsourcing arrangement was first made in 2003; accordingly, this study 
concentrates on the change in 2004-05 in contrast with the previous outsourcing 
arrangement in 2003. 
 
Regarding the presentation of this thesis, the exploration will follow the analytical 
framework presented in the previous chapter. However, the application of an 
argumentation analysis is implicitly embedded within the framework‘s descriptions. (A 
presentation employing Toulmin‘s argument structure—see Figure 3-2 in Chapter 
Three—is attached separately as Appendix 2). This is for the following reasons: first, 
argumentation analyses contain holistic explorations of phenomena throughout all 
components of a multidimensional IT outsourcing configuration framework; second, it 
is hard to address the findings coherently when presenting them requires pursuing the 
individual and atomistic arguments that are observed in the related phenomena.  
 
5.2 Background 
 
5.2.1 Case overview  
 
PPS, founded in 1949 and currently with 913 staff members, is the central procurement 
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organisation of the Korean government and performs the role of procuring goods and 
services at optimal prices, thereby saving the government money. Its five functions are 
domestic and foreign procurement for public organisations, contracts for the 
government‘s major construction projects, government stockpiling and supply of major 
raw material commodities, efficient management of government goods and property, 
and management and operation of the government-wide e-procurement system (PPS 
2009); however, its fundamental roles have been recognised as the first two functions.  
 
Beyond this original mission of contractor, PPS developed a nationwide e-GP system—
called Korea Online E-Procurement System (KONEPS)—in September 2002 as an 
application service and integrated e-GP portal for all public organisations, from central 
and local governments to state-owned enterprises; thus the function of management and 
operation of the government-wide e-procurement system was newly established. 
KONEPS was one of 11 nationwide e-government initiatives implemented since 2001 
in pursuit of a citizen-centred e-government in Korea (Lee, Tan and Trimi 2005). It is 
renowned in the international world as a successful case of innovation in the field of e-
GP (Lee 2007; Lee et al. 2007; Seong and Lee 2004; OECD 2004; UN 2004; World 
Bank 2006). 
 
As the central procurement organisation, PPS itself is the largest procurement entity, 
with a turnover of £16.1 billion
4
 in 2008—that is, 27.9% of total public procurement in 
Korea. Within the central procurement system, every public organisation is encouraged 
to request PPS to make contracts with suppliers on their behalf, in particular, over a 
specific threshold of scales. On the other hand, KONEPS‘s annual transaction volume 
                                               
4
 Currency exchange rate in this thesis is GBP 1 for KRW 1,800. 
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reached £35 billion in the same year, involving 39,000 public organisations and 150,000 
suppliers with 200,000 daily users of its Web site. The number of tender notices 
published through KONEPS was 330,000 in 2008 (PPS 2009). Regarding figures, the 
volume of KONEPS is distinct from that of central procurement. The former includes 
transactions between other public organisations and suppliers using KONEPS 
application services without the intervention of PPS as a contractor. 
 
PPS started an e-GP for centralised procurement in 1997 with commencement of an 
electronic document interchange (EDI) among public organisations, private companies, 
and PPS. Until 1999, as few as 21 in-house IT experts were able to manage this EDI 
system with the support of a small number of external operators. At that time there were 
only 13 servers and about 300 users within the PPS and 20 other public organisations. 
The EDI system had very limited function for supporting PPS businesses; however, by 
2005 there were 77 much larger servers and hundreds of thousands of users, engaging in 
crucial activities such as electronic bidding (e-bidding), contracting (e-contracting), and 
payment (e-payment) across all public procurement beyond PPS. On the other hand, as 
is common in government, the number of in-house experts was not increased; in fact, 
there were only 24 staff members in 2005. Increasing the number of in-house staff was 
not allowed in the government because it was regarded as opposed to the NPM trend 
characterised by downsizing and privatisation (Cheong 2008; Song 2004).  
 
Tentatively speaking, PPS began large-scale outsourcing in 2003 in that a significant 
share of IT budget was consumed for e-GP outsourcing contracts. The main outsourcing 
supplier was Samsung SDS (SDS), one of the affiliate companies of Samsung Group, a 
globally renowned conglomerate and the largest IT service company in Korea, with 
annual turnover of £1.4 billion in 2008. The total number of employees was about 9,750 
 132 
as of 2009 (SDS 2009; 2010). SDS had been charged with the development of PPS e-
GP systems since its beginning. SDS was awarded the contract to these tenders for more 
than ten consecutive major projects though separate competitive bidding processes; 
however, these system development outsourcing projects were not included in the 
research scope of this thesis, as indicated in Chapter One. The main focus is the 
outsourcing of existing IS operations and service delivery by using those IS (referred to 
as IT service outsourcing, hereafter).  
 
A critical period for this thesis was during 2004 and 2005, when a sourcing strategy 
transformation was implemented. In order to understand the total structure of PPS IT 
background at that time, the PPS IT budget needs to be briefly introduced here. As of 
2005, the total IT budget was £5.46 million, and annual IT service outsourcing 
expenditure was £1.77 million (32.4% of total IT budget), with variable number of 
outsourcing staff at between 50 and 60. This outsourcing contract has been continuously 
awarded to SDS as a prime contractor. Besides this, another £0.51 million (9.3%) and 
£1.44 million (26.4%) were spent on application development and hardware acquisition, 
respectively. These two items were also used in outsourcing arrangements for PPS‘s e-
GP systems development and expansion projects, most of which were outsourced to 
SDS. In addition, £0.73 million (13.4%), £0.94 million (17.2%), and £0.07 million 
(1.3%) were consumed for hardware lease fee, facility and utility fees, and other 
administrative costs in turn.  
 
In order to understand the phenomena observed in the case, the reasons for IT 
outsourcing in the Korean public sector need to be broadly introduced. According to 
NIA (2001), the reasons and their response ratios were: lack of in-house technology and 
expertise (42.9%), cost reduction (25.9%), time pressure (13.3%), public confidence 
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(10.1%), and other (7.9%). Against this background, the three features of PPS that 
emerge from the present research, and which underpin the entire context, were as 
follows.  
 
First, it is important to note that KONEPS was not welcomed by everyone at first. This 
feature explains why KONEPS-related business has been isolated within PPS. IT 
divisions in PPS played a dominant role in operating and developing e-GP, not only in 
technological aspects, but also in business aspects. In fact, the centralised procurement 
system had been challenged by a decentralised one for more than 30 years in terms of 
the autonomy of each organisation. The opponents of the centralised system urged the 
abrogation of PPS, and PPS struggled for survival. In these circumstances, the 
traditional strategy of PPS e-GP was to differentiate developed centralised procurement 
from the underdeveloped systems of decentralised procurement. On this point, an 
application service to support decentralised procurement could be regarded, in part, as a 
conflicting mission. Consequently, other parts of PPS except for IT divisions gave a 
wide berth to KONEPS, particularly in the beginning.  
 
Second, e-GP related capabilities were recognised as a core business of PPS while it 
pursued a specialised central procurement organisation, and PPS was very keen on 
developing its e-GP capabilities in this respect. We see evidence that PPS was very 
eager to retain in-house capabilities to manage the e-GP service. PPS IT-relative 
outsourcing had been divided into four domains: application, hardware/network 
operation, desktop and local area network (LAN) operation, and call centre. Among 
these, application and hardware/network operation for e-GP service were regarded as its 
core competency and became the target of innovation to develop organisational 
capabilities. On the contrary, desktop and LAN operations were considered non-core 
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functions. PPS outsourced these to a specialised small and medium enterprise, and an IT 
division has played only an administrative support role since the late 1990s. The 
expenditure on this outsourcing contract is very small, amounting to £83,000 in 2005.    
 
More dramatic evidence of core/non-core disputes was found in its call centre 
outsourcing. Started in 1998 as a technical helpdesk embedded in an IT division, the 
call centre initially comprised three external staff members answering questions about 
how to use the system, later expanding to eleven in 2001. This was a contractual 
arrangement with a small and medium-sized company. They sat alongside in-house IT 
experts and supported them with in-house management. With the start of KONEPS, the 
call centre was outsourced to SDS as part of the whole e-GP IT service outsourcing 
contract and numbered 34 at that time. They started work in an independent space in a 
PPS office building; however, it was backsourced in 2004, i.e. brought back in-house, 
and moved from an IT division to a customer support team (CST) on the organisational 
chart. Consultants were individually contracted by PPS, although they were not 
government officials. In this respect, this was distinct from a contract with a third party 
supplier. Two reasons have been identified for backsourcing the call centre. The more 
complex functions of the new system made it impossible to separate functional and 
business queries, with most questions requiring business answers as well as technical 
support, so PPS decided to deploy seven business staff members to the call centre to 
deliver one-stop service to enquirers. Further, call centre activities were perceived to be 
a core business of a communication channel to collect customer feedback and find room 
for business improvement (PPS 2004a; 2006).  
 
The third feature of the PPS case is the very dynamic nature of involved IS functions 
and the management of IT service. The PPS e-GP system was undergoing changes 
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though their depth and scope varied with each development stage. The system itself has 
continually expanded, and endless user requests for more convenience had to be dealt 
with. In addition, PPS IT divisions have been pressured to provide new functions by the 
organisation‘s leadership, ever since e-GP became the symbol by which PPS could 
demonstrate its constant drive for innovation. Related business regulations that should 
be supported by the e-GP system were also frequently revised. This characteristic is 
revealed well by the data automatically collected from an IS management system. 
During 2006, the total number of completed service requests accompanying application 
modification amounted to 1,765, which means 147.1 cases in monthly base. This figure 
maintained 146.1 a month, during the first eight months of 2007. According to other 
data from the same system, as presented in Table 5-1, only 26% of applications were 
not changed during March 2007. Among 17,879 application units managed by SDS then, 
61.1% were changed up to five times. Forty-eight applications were changed more than 
40 times in a month then. This may reflect the low-stability of the system in part. 
However, it shows well, anyway, the dynamism of the PPS IT environment.    
 
Table 5-1: The frequency of application change in PPS e-GP system (March 2007) 
Number of 
changes 
0 1~5 6~10 11~20 21~30 31~40 41~ Total 
Number of 
applications 
(Ratio) 
4,650 
(26.0%) 
10,931 
(61.1%) 
1,399 
(7.8%) 
720 
(4.0%) 
93 
(0.5%) 
38 
(0.2%) 
48 
(0.3%) 
17,879 
(100%) 
* Data source: PPS IT service management system 
 
At the same time, many different types of governance arrangements have existed within 
PPS e-GP service management. This complicated situation is well summarised in the 
following statement by a PPS staff member:  
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Strictly speaking, there was no operation outsourcing project to maintain 
fixed systems then. There were only ongoing development projects. It was 
PPS‘s rapid IT innovation era, and every function was upgraded every day. 
It was not easy even to identify which functions were under modification or 
construction by which team and for whom. It frequently happened that the 
same source code was being handled by different teams. For example, a 
system development outsourcing project team was embarrassed if they 
found a change in version of an existing application when they were about 
to deploy another new version of it that had been modified by themselves 
based on a previous version as of five days ago. It transpired that an in-
house managed team had done it two days ago. Each team had its own test 
server and separate management process, including authorisation of client. 
Well-organised communication and integration channels were strongly 
required among an in-house operation team, in-house contract management 
team, in-house managed external operation team, and external outsourcing 
suppliers, but it was not easy then. We were concentrating more on the 
development of new systems than on developing a stable management 
system for existing services.    
 
5.2.2 Distinction between outsourcing and buy-in as insourcing 
 
To understand the complexity caused by the dynamics of the IT environment, the 
complicated governance structure of PPS needs to be explained in detail. This is critical 
not only for understanding phenomena but also for grasping key arguments occurring in 
the PPS context. Two contrasting suggestions for PPS‘s IT outsourcing history can be 
described as follows: 
Suggestion 1: PPS has never adopted outsourcing. Although third-party 
suppliers have always been involved, those external resources work under 
in-house management control. In-house IT experts, if required, can still 
maintain information systems technologically because they have learned 
how to do it by participating in the development and operation of it. PPS‘s 
responsibilities to citizens could not be avoided even if they were totally 
outsourced. If any problem came up, it would not be third-party suppliers 
 137 
but PPS who would be blamed for it. More specifically, IT divisions, in 
particular IT experts recognised as the operators of the e-GP system by 
internal management, would be victims.  
Suggestion 2: The e-GP system was already outsourced in practice. In-house 
experts no longer control the system; instead, it is outsourcing suppliers 
whom they control. PPS has to admit that PPS is unable to run its systems 
without outsourcing suppliers; furthermore, PPS is getting to depend more 
and more on external suppliers when decisions are made. PPS‘s technology-
based management leadership in this environment is apt to be formalised; 
even worse, it looks as though it would not be a help to enhance in-house 
capabilities and managerial efficiency. Accountability of the system should 
stay within PPS, but contractual responsibility can be transferred to external 
suppliers.   
 
According to a categorisation by Willcocks and Lacity (2009a) based on the type of 
governing IT outsourcing relationship, three IT sourcing contract types can be 
identified: fee-for-service, strategic alliance/partnership, and buy-in contracts. There is 
no doubt that the first two are options of outsourcing. On the other hand, buy-in contract 
is described as ―A customer buys in vendor resources to supplement in-house 
capabilities, but the vendor resources are managed by in-house business and IT 
management‖ (Willcocks and Lacity 2009a, p. 8); these authors consistently label this 
as insourcing in that the clients manage IT activity and vendor resources internally 
(Lacity and Willcocks 2006a; Willcocks and Lacity 2009a). Regardless of the range of 
inclusiveness of the term outsourcing, it is clear that a criterion is in practice whether in-
house management operates in sourcing arrangements or not. Following this logic, 
Suggestion 1 above can be supported as a form of buy-in contract.   
 
This case study finds, however, that the distinguishing criteria of buy-in and 
outsourcing are not only a question of ‗whether in-house management exists or not‘; but 
 138 
also that of ‗how much practically in-house management involves‘. In this respect, as 
inferred by the Suggestion 2 above, the case of PPS has significant implications for the 
choice of sourcing types and its social/organisational impact intertwined with 
organisational context, organisation and contract structure, and human behaviour.     
 
A large-scale Web-based system appeared in 2000 and, as provisionally indicated 
earlier, IT service outsourcing commenced in 2003. Who ran the PPS e-GP system 
during the gap between 2000 and 2002? Three sourcing arrangements were concurrently 
operating, as follows: insourcing; in-house–managed buy-in contracts for existing 
systems operation and maintenance; and outsourcing for new systems development. In 
particular, the in-house IT experts of PPS suggested that the e-GP system was being run 
by in-house staff members though there were some external assistants. IT experts 
declared that they could do it without those external helpers if enough staff members 
were provided. This was investigated as a common view among government IT experts 
in Korea (Song 2004). According to the author, government IT experts preferred 
insourcing to outsourcing for operation and maintenance of IS but accepted that 
outsourcing was unavoidable for system planning and development considering the lack 
of technology. In addition, it was true that there were still small independent modules 
maintained by in-house experts alone. This was, however, an arguable assertion, as 
implied by Suggestions 1 and 2 above. The relatively invisible roles of outsourcing 
suppliers were becoming larger. 
 
There was also a small buy-in contract for external assistants to run existing systems. 
External programmers and operators were supplied by a third-party service provider, 
and the total number of its staff was only around ten. They were literally assigned to in-
house IT experts by the criteria of sub-systems in each in-house staff member‘s 
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assignment. Each external member sat beside his or her allotted in-house staff in the 
same room. In this contract, the deal was the provision of an agreed number of IT 
experts. There was no assignment of specific functions or achievement of a certain level 
of service performance. There was no service level agreement (SLA). In any event, this 
view was consistent with the rationale of labelling buy-in contracts as insourcing 
(Willcocks and Lacity 2009a).    
 
Third, PPS had conducted ongoing large development projects and from 40 to 300 
external experts and specialised IT management were involved at any one time from 
third-party suppliers. These were complete outsourcing arrangements rather than buy-
ins. In-house management was involved as procurer and contract manager, contributing 
cooperation and administrative support. Although in-house management occasionally 
compelled a supplier to make specific decisions, the supplier bore final responsibility 
for performance of the contract. The largest project was KONEPS, from July 2001 to 
December 2002. The scope of this project well represents the complexity of PPS‘s IT 
environment. This project included prior consulting including business process 
reengineering (BPR) and information strategy planning (ISP); development of new 
KONEPS application service based on existing PPS central procurement system; 
expansion of hardware capacity for both existing and new systems; development of 
shared and linking service between KONEPS and existing central procurement system; 
and development of many new or refined functions of the existing central procurement 
system.     
 
Compared with the view of IT experts that in-house management took the lead, this 
thesis author observed that the role of system management was then carried out more by 
an external supplier except for some project management-related leadership as a 
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procurer. This was consistent with the views of many non-IT experts and internal 
managers; in fact, they complained that they were unable to recognise the original work 
of in-house IT experts except for general contract management. There were some 
grounds for this suggestion.  
 
First, system development projects overwhelmed operations until completion of the 
KONEPS project in 2002. It was well represented by its contract scale. For example, the 
KONEPS project was a £14 million deal and 33 times larger than the operation buy-in 
contract, £0.42 million, in 2002. In addition, all PPS IS were monolithically integrated 
into an e-GP system; therefore, the nature of all development projects was related to the 
modification and expansion of active e-GP systems. For example, the EDI system was 
upgraded to a Web-based system while it was running; sometimes, both systems 
coexisted. Furthermore, similar systems were expanded to other business domains in an 
integrated manner, for instance, from domestic goods to construction work applications 
based on the same platform or a shared architecture. Consequently, it was difficult to 
discern the roles and responsibilities of existing systems operation and new system 
development. Some new functions were planed to operate, replacing old ones, in 
advance, in the middle of the development outsourcing project contract term; in this 
case, the system development project included operation of these new functions until 
the end of that contract. In accordance with this, a development project team could not 
help being deeply involved with the operation of existing services.    
 
Second, information was centred on development outsourcing projects. All systems 
were so integrated that nobody could manage it without overall knowledge, from 
hardware to applications and active to under-developing functions. Because of this 
complexity, it became impossible to retain complete responsibility within a specific 
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sub-system. Accordingly, expertise on entire systems and information about the 
progress of each project needed to be shared. In this phase, the external system 
development outsourcing supplier became the primary source of information during 
2000 and 2002. These suppliers retained both technological expertise in current and 
under-developing systems because they had to analyse the current system as well as 
develop and expand related functions.  
 
In-house IT experts were filling the role of project manager in their areas in these 
projects. It was hard for them to learn how to operate these developed systems by 
themselves, as understaffed in-house IT experts had to prepare for the next development 
projects when a project was completed. Normally, an in-house IT expert was 
simultaneously responsible for development project managers and operators (with the 
assistance of external programmers) within a sub-system given to him. They used to 
give priority to the development project because it seemed more attractive than 
maintenance work. It was not easy to gain recognition from senior managers for 
routinised maintenance work. In these circumstances, operation and maintenance work 
was inherited by the next development project or in-house managed buy-in project. 
How was it possible? The answer is the third reason for strong involvement of external 
suppliers.   
 
Third, it was a favourable environment for transferring risks to a third-party supplier 
because SDS took over both the buy-in contract and development outsourcing projects. 
If any problems occurred even in existing systems, two external project managers 
representing systems development and operations tended to fix them together. In 
actuality, the causes of troubles were ambiguous in many cases because there were too 
many functions or the system environment that were manipulated simultaneously by 
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both parties. Although the two contracts were separate and the system operation project 
was recognised as managed by in-house staff, PPS tended to transfer the risk of system 
operations to SDS in the background. The following request was investigated as a 
common approach taken by PPS.   
I don‘t know what caused this trouble. Anyway, solve it as soon as possible. 
We don‘t care who fixes this. You [project managers of operation and 
development side] are in the same SDS, and this was developed by your 
company. Who can solve this but SDS?   
In a nutshell, the operation project team was asked to contribute to the development 
project by providing in-depth knowledge of active systems and service by PPS and 
development project teams; simultaneously, the development project teams were forced 
to participate in trouble-shooting of the existing system by PPS.  
 
Within SDS, the initiative drifted from development outsourcing projects to IT service 
outsourcing projects after 2003 because the service scope and technological architecture 
of the mainstream e-GP system, consisting of KONEPS and PPS‘s centralised 
procurement system, had been established, and relevant knowledge was centred on the 
IT service outsourcing team. In addition, the size of the IT service outsourcing deal was 
enlarged and the nature of subsequent development projects became supplementary, 
compared with mainstream functions of e-GP service, such as disaster recovery, 
customer relationship management (CRM) and data warehouse.  
 
However, enduring challenges were encountered in terms of operation/maintenance and 
development. On one hand, some in-house staff members and development projects 
members complained that the IT service outsourcing team did not fully support them in 
spite of their abundant expertise in the system; on the other hand, other in-house staff 
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members and IT service outsourcing teams blamed development projects arguing that 
those projects ignored the importance of stable service delivery and shifted their risks 
onto IT service outsourcing. From the viewpoint of PPS, it was an argument between 
the two different priorities of secured service and continuous upgrade. 
 
Fourth, the lack of in-house human resources to retain sufficient capability supports the 
observations of the thesis author. In actuality, it depends on the definition of capabilities. 
To return to two arguments presented at the beginning of this section, the first 
suggestion is based on the belief that in-house IT experts can maintain IS without 
external resources. On the contrary, the second suggestion pursues different capabilities 
not founded on technology itself because it seems no longer possible. Until the mid-
1990s, in-house IT experts had maintained and developed previous small-scale 
applications based on 3rd-Generation Programming Language (3GL) like COBOL or 
PL/SQL; however, the fundamental platform of new systems development was changed 
to object-oriented Java and 4GL like Power Builder that was appropriate for a Web-
based system. Nonetheless, there was no suitable training programme for incumbent 
staff or significant recruitment of highly skilled experts, as is common in government. If 
we define required skills or capabilities as abilities in these kinds of application 
development, it was obvious that PPS did not have them. With the beginning of e-GP in 
1997, the role of IT experts shifted from programmers to project managers or business 
analysts to control or support development projects. Even though retention of 
programming capability might have been helpful to avoid risk of being captured by 
external suppliers, human resources were seriously limited. 
              
As can be seen, many managerial issues arose among in-house system operation 
function, in-house contract management function, development outsourcing projects, 
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and the in-house managed buy-in project between 2000 and 2002. Even after 2003 
when IT service outsourcing began, these conflicts continued among interested parties. 
This complex situation formed the background of IT outsourcing innovation starting in 
2004.    
 
To summarise, there was no alternative but to operate the e-GP service with some 
degree of external suppliers‘ involvement. Distinctive stages after 2000 can be 
described in terms of buy-in insourcing and outsourcing. Within PPS, it is difficult to 
distinguish each of these by the objective criterion of ‗whether in-house management 
operated or not‘ implied by Willcocks and Lacity (2009a). This thesis suggests that the 
quality of in-house management should be considered, while dividing PPS‘s sourcing 
history into three stages. In terms of contractual arrangement and governing relationship, 
the stages have few differences; that is, in-house management always existed in some 
depth.  
 
The first was the ‗pseudo buy-in‘ stage, from 2000 to 2002, characterised by prevalent 
development projects. In the weak distinction between operation and development 
projects, strong in-house management was observed. In-house management played the 
overall role of collecting, defining, and coordinating business requirements and even 
technological specifications for new systems despite final responsibility being vested in 
a private contractor; however, against the rationale of the buy-in approach, in-house 
management did not work strongly in the area of existing system operation buy-in 
contracts.  
 
The second stage was ‗pseudo IT outsourcing‘, from 2003 to 2004, featuring an IT 
service outsourcing-centred operation. In-house staff started to pay attention to the 
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existing system operation; however, there was no agreed performance indicator of the 
IT service outsourcing contract. Furthermore, the control mechanism was the same as 
that of the old buy-in system; hence, the supplier‘s roles and responsibilities were 
described as the provision of skilled experts, and they were classified and assigned to a 
specific in-house management category. Compared with the prior stage, IT service 
outsourcing, that is, the operation side, started being recognised as a key function; but 
internal management became looser in terms of IS technology.  
 
The last stage is labelled ‗IT outsourcing‘. Diverse innovation was pursued, including 
the introduction of SLA, to be explored in detail in the next section. These three stages 
are summarised in Table 5-2. Exploration presented from the next section focuses on 
the transition to IT outsourcing compared with prior pseudo IT outsourcing, which was 
the result of IT outsourcing innovation in 2005.   
 
Table 5-2: Stages of PPS sourcing arrangements 
Stage Contractual arrangement 
Overall in-house 
management 
Note 
Pseudo 
Buy-in 
(2000-02) 
Large development projects 
and a small operation buy-in 
project 
Strong Development 
project-centred 
operation 
Pseudo IT 
outsourcing 
(2003-04) 
A central IT service 
outsourcing and other large 
development projects 
Medium IT service 
outsourcing-centred 
operation 
IT 
outsourcing 
(2005-) 
A central and complicated IT 
service outsourcing and small 
development projects 
Weak Introduction of SLA 
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5.3 Strategy dimension 
 
5.3.1 Decision points and underlying context  
 
This section explores why and how PPS transformed its organisation and outsourcing 
contracts and relative decisions with respect to strategy building. This strategy was 
formalised as an official document of an IT outsourcing innovation plan (PPS 2004b).  
 
5.3.1.1 Commercial relationship 
 
5.3.1.1.1 Decision points 
 
‗Commercial relationship‘ is fundamental to the strategy for transformation of IT 
outsourcing. It means the relationship structure between client and supplier. There are 
four options of ‗arms-length‘, ‗value-added‘, ‗co-sourced‘ and ‗equity‘. There was no 
room for the value-added and equity options in the PPS case because PPS and any 
potential contractor had no prior relationship in terms of ownership or similar, and no 
shared business initiatives were crafted in contracts. PPS‘s initial choice since 2000 was 
co-sourced, describing the mixed provision of labour and assets and integrated 
accountability. In accordance with the benefit of a buy-in contract, this was understood 
as the most useful way for clients to learn high-technology and service operation from 
external suppliers (Willcocks and Lacity 2009a). However, e-GP system was too huge 
to be run by understaffed and less skilled internal experts. In fact, PPS had intended to 
build in-house capabilities through defining roles and responsibilities separate from 
those of outsourcing. For example, business analyses were assigned mainly to in-house 
staff, whereas outsourcing suppliers were expected to support them with technological 
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examinations. In this way, PPS attempted to maintain its knowledge as a core capability 
 
However, there was only undefined and disorganised cooperation between PPS, 
development outsourcing project suppliers, and IT service outsourcing suppliers until 
2004. Accordingly, the more mature the system implemented by PPS, the more 
advanced the contract and management skills required. This was particularly important 
since confusion is always possible where, in general, a government holds the dominant 
position in a contract with a private company; such a possibility was amplified in 
Korean culture, as will be described in the next section, about underlying context.   
 
Consequently, PPS aimed to transform its option from co-sourced to arms-length, which 
would mean exclusive accountabilities. How did PPS try to achieve this transformation 
of its commercial relationship? The overall direction was to concentrate on performance 
evaluation activities, with less intervention by in-house IT experts into day-to-day 
operations, and severance of direct organisational connections between staff of the two 
parties. This aspect had a great influence on the reconstruction of other components. 
Transformation advocates insisted that core capabilities could be built on the basis only 
of the selection and concentration principle, that performance matters, and that the 
paradigm of system management should change from application and hardware 
operation to process-based IT service management.  
 
However, opponents suggested that the core capability of the IT divisions is 
technological knowledge based on business processes; opportunistic behaviours would 
occur if PPS ceased to intervene in detailed activities of suppliers. IT experts were 
concerned about losing their identity as specialists. The key capabilities emerging 
during these disputes were system analysis and design ability. Advocates of the 
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transformation felt it impossible for those to be retained because of lack of in-house 
resources and the technological characteristics of large integrated system architecture. 
They urged in-house IT experts to concentrate on new capabilities of performance 
management, strategic planning, cost assessment, and so on. On the contrary, opponents 
suggested that they would not like to abandon it because future expansion of the IT 
division might be the best solution. Consequently, some compromises were made, as 
will be explained later.  
 
5.3.1.1.2 Underlying contexts 
 
From these developments, the underlying IT governance concerns became disclosed as 
‗strategic alignment‘, ‗performance management‘ and ‗control and accountability‘. This 
decision summarised issues raised in the overall transformation processes and had a 
great influence on the decisions of other components.  
 
Regarding concerns over strategic alignment, this commercial relationship 
transformation revealed a characteristic of the PPS context. PPS pursued in-house 
capability building within the e-GP service by transforming the traditional co-sourced 
option to arms-length relations. According to a buy-in custom prevalent in PPS sourcing 
strategy, it was still believed that in-house management should overlap the individual 
activities of outsourcing suppliers during 2003 and 2004, though a large-scale 
outsourcing was adopted.  
 
Reflecting on the result of this approach, transformation advocates concluded that the 
old managerial system had failed to link the expertise in the e-GP system (representing 
IT) with that in e-GP service management (representing business). PPS had believed 
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that greater knowledge of the e-GP system would guarantee more effective and 
accountable e-GP service management, which was accepted as a core of business by 
PPS. However, in spite of some disagreement, the consensus was that assigned in-house 
staff members were likely to be generalists rather than competitive experts under those 
conditions. Prominent in-house staff had a tendency to pass their work on to 
outsourcing in the background. For example, the activities of analysing and defining 
business requirements for the established e-GP system were laid on external suppliers, 
though those had originally been designed as an in-house mission in pursuit of 
capability retention. It meant that the e-GP system was moving gradually further away 
from PPS core business.   
 
Korean public management culture is one of the explanations for this phenomenon. 
Public service and relationships with citizens and businesses in Korea have been 
dominated by the government side. The reasons that have been given include: long-
lasting authoritarian regime and centralised government structure, patriarchal 
Confucianism, and more recently, government-led economic development since 1960s 
(Park 2004). Against this cultural background, PPS and SDS had not been equal in their 
relations. In this respect, moving to an arms-length from a co-sourced option was a 
strategy to overcome the disadvantage of undisciplined cooperation by exploitation of 
original and explicit roles of in-house IT experts.  
 
Performance management and control and accountability concerns provided the 
rationale of an alternative way to govern suppliers and e-GP services against the view of 
the traditional co-sourced approach. Performance-based control and increased 
accountability because of it were declared a new paradigm of outsourcing management. 
This kind of principle must literally be too obvious to be disputed in most outsourcing 
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cases; however, it was not easy for PPS to employ. There was a sense within PPS that 
external suppliers should be under the tight supervision of in-house managers act by act, 
but the ideal was different from the real. The following statement by a PPS IT expert 
describes this situation: 
We became government officials as IT experts and have done technological 
work in IS for a long time; however, in an unavoidable IT outsourcing 
environment from the late 1990s, we were tormented by doubts about our 
identities as technicians. It was an identity crisis. We had initially tried to 
undertake all the operations work of the developed system, but it soon 
became clear that understaffed IT divisions were unable to do it. We began 
controlling outsourcing suppliers based on technological knowledge, but it 
again became obvious that they did not need technological advice from us. 
So our work turned to general contract management such as head counting, 
report review, and so on. We pretended to be IT experts over external 
suppliers but it was hard to follow because of the complexity of the 
integrated system and advanced technology. Some were satisfied with such 
a superior position, but others were embarrassed by the fact that we did not 
know the system well. The problem was more critical for junior members in 
that they did not have the opportunities to be involved with development 
work that we did.     
After all this, PPS began applying SLA and process-based control schemes to develop 
distinct accountabilities from those of SDS. 
 
5.3.1.2 Scope grouping 
 
5.3.1.2.1 Decision points 
 
The second decision point in this dimension is ‗scope grouping‘, describing the contract 
scope in terms of service, recipient and geography facets. Each facet consists of two 
options: ‗service scope‘ with ‗entire service option‘ or ‗selected scope option‘; 
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‗recipient scope‘ with ‗all business units option‘ or ‗business unit self-select option‘; 
and ‗geographic scope‘ with ‗all geographies option‘ or ‗geography self-select option‘. 
Since 2000, PPS‘s choices have been the entire service scope, all business units, and all 
geographies options. The transformation in 2005 caused no change in the options of 
recipient and geographic scope. Web-based e-GP service has been delivered to all users 
(all business units), and the workplace and data centre was in PPS Headquarters in spite 
of 11 regional PPS and 5 overseas procurement officers (all geographies). However, in 
the service scope—that is, functional service bundles—structural changes occurred 
within the same entire service scope option.    
 
The author of the thesis considers e-GP service outsourcing to have commenced in 2003. 
What made this deal distinct from the prior PPS centralised procurement system 
outsourcing previously described as a small-scale operation buy-in project? In terms of 
the contract, there was little difference. There was no SLA, and the contract was still 
founded on labour provision. In actuality, many staff members regarded the new 
contract as another buy-in and denied the concept of outsourcing based on their 
perception of in-house management involvement, as discussed concerning the 
commercial relationship decision. This was consistent with the traditional view that the 
authority of e-GP should be retained within PPS, with in-house staff members 
participating in day-to-day operations in order to learn and control the management of 
e-GP.    
 
In a consideration of functional elements, the contract scope of e-GP system 
outsourcing since 2003 can be described as application maintenance, systems operations, 
telecommunications management and maintenance, and end-user support among six 
types of IT functions. Regarding this classification, this thesis follows the criteria given 
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by Grover, Cheon and Teng (1996), who give two additional typical functions of 
application development and systems planning and management. Although these 
authors‘ original categorisation identified application development and maintenance as 
an integrated element, the nature of IT service operation— representing maintenance—
is quite different from that of an IS development project—representing development, as 
was discussed in Chapter One in detail.  
 
Outsourcing contracts in 2003 and 2004 comprised two deals in application outsourcing 
and hardware/network maintenance. In terms of IT function types, the application deal 
focused on application maintenance, development, and end-user support, whereas the 
hardware/network deal involved systems operations and telecommunications 
management and maintenance. A major difference between the outsourcing and 
maintenance deals was the provision of an onsite workforce. In the case of the hardware 
maintenance deal, the contractor‘s only responsibility was non-resident technical 
support and troubleshooting in emergencies. No resident operators were included in the 
hardware maintenance contract; on the contrary, they were included in the application 
outsourcing deal. Preparing for innovation, PPS was not interested in the 
hardware/network contract, since those were to be transferred to a newly established 
government agency beginning in 2006
5
. PPS transferred only hardware/network 
operators to the hardware deal in order to completely separate roles and responsibilities 
of application and hardware contracts. On the other hand, systems planning and 
management were left out because they included activities such as project management, 
personnel management, and administrative support, which were recognised by PPS as 
                                               
5
 Korea created the National Computing and Information Agency in 2006, which is a 
government body operating as the Internet Data Centre for government information 
resources. All IT resources such as servers were moved to this organisation from 
independent government organisations, including PPS.    
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core in-house capabilities. PPS sought to retain those functions in-house though they 
were supported by external suppliers.  
 
Figure 5-1 shows structural change in the service scope option in 2005. PPS again first 
divided the application and service outsourcing parts into external KONEPS and 
internal central procurement. The latter includes certain specialised modules for PPS 
centralised procurement work used only by PPS.  
 
Figure 5-1: Structural change in outsourcing service scope in 2005 
 << 2003-2004 >> 
⇒ 
<< 2005- >> 
[KONEPS & PPS central 
procurement service outsourcing] 
 Application maintenance 
 Application development 
 End-user support 
 System operations (operators) 
[KONEPS service operation outsourcing] 
 Application maintenance 
 End-user support 
[KONEPS contingent application 
development outsourcing] 
 Application development 
[PPS central procurement system buy-in] 
 Application maintenance 
 Application development 
 End-user support 
[KONEPS & PPS central 
procurement system maintenance] 
 System operations 
 Telecommunication management 
and maintenance 
[KONEPS & PPS central procurement 
system outsourcing] 
 System operations including operators 
 Telecommunication management and m
aintenance 
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Furthermore, PPS separated the KONEPS service outsourcing contract into two parts, 
again with one contractor: service operation and contingent application development. 
The former included the activities of maintenance and the technology support helpdesk, 
whereas the latter contained minor development work. This was the trial to clarify the 
criteria of out-of-scope work normally argued between clients and suppliers. As 
previously presented, the e-GP service environment was a dynamic one; for example, 
there were ongoing contingent requests for system modification responding to 
regulation changes, new business establishment, and functional improvements for a 
more user-friendly interface—none of which can be anticipated in advance. As a result, 
PPS came to recognise these facets as normal application operations. Before 2005, those 
were negotiated between PPS and outsourcing suppliers on a case-by-case basis; 
however, beginning in 2005, PPS started reserving 20% of the relative budget—
estimated by analysis of outsourcing activities, as described later in Table 5-3—for this 
purpose and consuming it by the criteria of fee for service.  
 
5.3.1.2.2 Underlying context 
 
First, the contexts of two unchanged options should be briefly explained, those of the 
recipient and geographic scope options. Because of the standardised business processes 
and Web-based technological characteristics, there was no requirement for 
differentiated services in terms of service recipients or physical locations of service 
delivery. Approximately 190,000 external users were making use of KONEPS for their 
own businesses through Web browsers, and the same was true of PPS staff. These 
internal members had no choice but to use KONEPS and the centralised procurement 
system delivered by PPS IT divisions and SDS in an integrated manner. Consequently, 
all business units option of recipient scope and all geographies options of geographic 
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scope remained.    
 
With respect to the transformation of the service scope option, the underlying context is 
explored by the criteria of relative IT governance concerns of ‗strategic alignment‘, 
‗delivery of business value through IT‘, ‗risk management‘ and ‗control and 
accountability‘. From the concern of strategic alignment, the entire service scope option 
had been adopted in 2003 considering the lack of in-house resources. As revealed in the 
PPS history given in the background section of this chapter, PPS strategically 
recognised the e-GP service as its core business, and KONEPS was a totally new 
function in terms of both IS and business; however, there was no possibility of 
insourcing because the expansion of workforces was not allowed.  
 
On the other hand, restructuring its entire service scope in 2004, PPS divided the prior 
application outsourcing contract into three parts. This could be discussed later as a 
component of supplier grouping in the contract structure component; however, it is 
more appropriate to explore it here because it was significant for scope grouping as well. 
PPS did it strategically in order to build and retain in-house capabilities. The separation 
was fundamentally difficult because every function was integrated. For example, if 
some functions of the e-bid system failed, the causes might not have been only in the e-
bid system itself but also in the document transaction system, overall security system, 
system configuration, middleware to link applications and hardware, and so on.  
 
While PPS managed the contract, it became more obvious that in-house experts were 
have a hard time governing such a huge system in a technological manner. 
Technological manner, here, means activities such as business analysis, system 
architecture and application design, application source code examination and step-by-
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step authorisation, application development for an emergency, etc. These were beyond 
the capabilities of in-house staff. Besides the limit to in-house expertise, an IT expert in 
the field was assigned the work of 5–6 external staff members, on average, owing to the 
lack of workforce; in addition, they had to assume the role of contract manager. There 
were no more development projects of the mainstream system that had existed before 
2003 to share responsibility with them.  
  
After its one-year experience in outsourcing, PPS decided to change its structural 
attributes in service scope. The aim of reconstruction was to set up ‗the juxtaposition of 
do-it-yourself better and outsource-others more systematically‘, which resulted in the 
transformation of PPS central procurement system buy-in for internal services and 
KONEPS outsourcing for external services, respectively (PPS 2006). This is a good 
illustration of the comprehensive approach of IT outsourcing innovation in PPS. On one 
hand, this was a trial to enhance in-house capabilities by applying an appropriate 
management technique for each area, considering the business and technical 
characteristics and the skills of in-house resources. The internal system was relatively 
small scale and less advanced in technology. The users and their impacts were restricted 
to PPS. On the other hand, this was one of the solutions for securing the commercial 
relationship shift, mentioned previously as the movement to arms-length from co-
sourced option. By removing the co-sourced approach in the outsourcing area, PPS 
intended to distinguish the roles and responsibilities of client and supplier. Eventually, 
more in-house staff members were assigned to internal services in order to offer more 
technology-based management from source code maintenance. The decreased number 
of in-house staff for external services began to apply new management concepts, which 
will be discussed in detail later. They formally abandoned routine maintenance work.  
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At the same time, this change was the result of political struggles. The initiator of this 
transformation initially suggested adopting new management over the entire contract, 
which was characterised by performance management and process control. However, 
this was understood as being on the opposite side of traditional direct control over 
external workforce and their activities; therefore, most IT experts expressed antipathy 
towards this outsourcing innovation for reasons like the need for control, the fact that 
process management was recognised as being less technological, and even that it could 
be conducted by non-IT experts. After three months of dispute, a compromise was 
reached by separating application contracts and applying different management tools to 
each. This amounted to a soft landing for all interested parties. Opponents succeeded in 
preserving an area of appropriate size for in-sourced IS management based on a buy-in 
contract, whereas advocates reserved a key business area that could be systematically 
outsourced. On this point, this transformation represented PPS‘s response to the concern 
for strategic alignment in terms of both retention of the traditional capability of system 
management and development of new management skills in IT outsourcing.     
 
The background of this transformation is also seen in three other IT governance 
concerns. The conventional understanding of delivery of business value through IT 
concern is about the relationship between the e-GP system and procurement works of 
PPS or individual procuring organisations. However, in the PPS case, another important 
business of PPS was recognised as management of e-GP. In this sense, the 
reconstruction of service scope and intended management paradigm shift should be 
understood as pursuing business value through IT outsourcing innovation.    
 
In terms of concerns about risk management and control and accountability, PPS 
pursued this innovation to enhance accountability without losing knowledge or control 
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of the service. Aside from argumentation on core knowledge or the nature of control, 
the PPS case reveals well what a client organisation does in responding to risk 
originating from an unavoidable IT outsourcing environment.     
 
5.3.1.3 Financial scale 
 
5.3.1.3.1 Decision points 
 
The third decision point is ‗financial scale‘. This was depicted as the financial value in 
relative and absolute dimensions. Table 5-3 displays the composition of PPS‘s budget 
from fiscal year 2000 to 2007
6
. In the composition of expenditures, the figures for 
application outsourcing mean the budget for contracting of application maintenance and 
routinised development, including end-user support, whereas system operation indicates 
the budget for systems operation in Figure 5-1. Except for lease fee and facility/utility 
fees (e.g., network and electricity), which were directly paid by PPS, all other 
expenditures were used for sourcing contracts (buy-in or outsourcing). 
 
Table 5-3 summarises the PPS IT history explained earlier. Before 2003, the 
overwhelming importance of the IS development project—68.6% to 84.6% of total IT 
budget—was reflected in the PPS budget. The reason for large IS development 
investment in 2003 after the completion of KONEPS project was the disaster recovery 
backup centre and CRM building for KONEPS. Considering that these are outside 
mainstream functions, PPS perceived that the e-GP system entered a state of 
                                               
6
 Besides the PPS general budget, investment by the E-government Special Fund 
administered by another ministry was included in this budget. It amounted to £31 
million for IS development during 2000 and 2004, about 92% of the entire IS 
development budget during the same period. 
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stabilisation from 2003, as implied by figures representing changes in proportion of 
budget for stabilisation (application outsourcing, system operation, and relevant fees) 
and fluctuation (IS development). Budget for maintenance and stabilisation comprised 
an average 25.6% of total IT budget before 2003; this increased to 86.4% between 2004 
and 2007. In contrast, the share of IS development budget decreased from 74.4% to 
13.6% on average during the same period. 
 
Table 5-3: PPS annual budget from 2000 to 2007 (£1000) 
Budget\FY 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Total (A) 70,969 53,349 76,414 71,757 64,411 61,333 80,886 85,180  
Total IT (B) 4,404 5,944 16,589 15,425 5,593 5,458 7,106  7,617 
(B/A) (%) 6.2 11.1 21.7 21.5 8.7 8.9 8.8 8.9 
Application 
outsourcing
1
 
(C) 
161 313 475 1,514 1,931 1,767 2,012 2,276 
(C/B) (%) 3.7 5.3 2.9 9.8 34.5 32.4 28.3 29.9 
System opera-
tion
2
 (D) 
194 206 257 724 1,000 1,443 1,505 1,489 
(D/B) (%) 4.4 3.5 1.6 4.7 17.9 26.4 21.2 19.6 
IS develop-
ment 
3
 (E) 
3,033 4,042 14,041 11,757 881 508 1,305 838 
(E/B) (%) 68.9 68.0 84.6 76.2 15.8 9.3 18.4 11.0 
Lease fee, etc. 
4
 (F) 
1,015 1,383 1,816  1,430 1,781 1,739 2,283 3,014 
(F/B) (%) 23.0 23.3 10.9 9.3 31.8 31.9 32.1 39.6 
* Source: PPS Budget 
1. Budget for application maintenance outsourcing/buy-in contract 
2. Budget for hardware/network facility acquisition and maintenance contract 
3. Budget for IS development outsourcing contract, including application development 
and hardware acquisition 
4. Budget for hardware lease fee, facility and utility fees, etc. 
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The qualitative change in outsourcing in 2005 did not affect this; the ratio of application 
outsourcing to the IT budget slightly decreased from 34.5% to 32.4%. Compared to this, 
the ratio necessarily increased sharply in 2003 when large-scale outsourcing was 
adopted. If funds transferred for e-government (see Footnote 6 in p. 158) that account 
for IS development are removed, the ratio increased from 9.0% (2000) to 10.6% (2001) 
to 16.6% (2002) to 34.3% (2003) within PPS‘s own budget. A similar ratio has been 
maintained since then. On the other hand, the increase in absolute scale reflects 
expansion of the target system to be outsourced and general price rises.  
 
5.3.1.3.2 Underlying context 
 
The independent context underpinning the financial scale decision would be meaningful 
only if there were any constraints in financial terms. In the case of PPS, financial figures 
were externally determined by the scope of outsourced systems and functions, 
represented by the scope grouping option. In this sense, the context of financial scale 
can be understood as the same as that of the scope grouping option. On the other hand, 
there were necessarily disputes about cost assessing and separating, but these were 
matters of pricing methods and supplier grouping, as will be discussed later.  
 
5.3.1.4 Resource ownership 
 
5.3.1.4.1 Decision points 
 
The last decision point in the strategy dimension is ‗resource ownership‘. This reflects 
the constitution of control and ownership in terms of assets, facilities and assets. There 
are seven options: ‗infrastructure‘, ‗onsite‘, ‗service and facility‘, ‗asset buy-in‘, 
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‗facility host‘, ‗labour buy-in‘ and ‗total ownership‘. The long-standing choice of PPS 
had been the labour buy-in option—which meant its assets (e.g., hardware, software) 
and facilities (e.g., office site, data centre) were owned and controlled by the clients, 
whereas labour was contracted and provided by suppliers. All assets and facilities were 
owned and provided by PPS except for the personal devices of external suppliers‘ staff 
members, such as PCs and office supply.  
 
On the other hand, as the developer (Cullen, Seddon and Willcocks 2005) of this 
concept suggested, the term ownership is not literal. The authors clarify that the control 
of assets is more important than legal ownership. This view has a long intellectual 
tradition in management studies under the banner of ‗separation of ownership and 
control‘ (Martinelli 1994). Lee, Miranda, and Kim (2004) applied this perspective in IT 
outsourcing. The authors conceptualised ownership and control as decision scope and 
contract type in an IT outsourcing contract, respectively. The former was defined as 
―the proportion of the IT function in- or out-sourced‖, whereas the latter referred to 
―who retains control over processes that are not contractually stipulated‖ (p. 113). The 
case of PPS provides empirical practice for this discussion. Very straightforwardly, 
ownership of a developed system goes to the client organisation under Korean 
government regulation; but control in practice is another matter.  
 
This thesis argues that the labour buy-in option of resource ownership component was 
maintained until 2004, before the adoption of IT service outsourcing, though there was 
some doubt that in-house management maintained appropriate control of client-owned 
assets. During that period, in-house IT experts had the right to access the system, and 
they held prominent positions over outsourcing suppliers; however, within the IT 
service outsourcing for external services, the change to the onsite option occurred in the 
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IT outsourcing innovation plan in 2004 (PPS 2004b; 2006). The onsite option is 
featured by supplier-owned/controlled assets/labour and client-provided facilities. From 
2005, in-house staff members were no longer allowed access to the outsourced system 
with the rearranged roles and responsibilities. In-house management came to be in 
charge only of process management. This is the basis for the suggestion that the option 
was transformed from buy-in to onsite. 
  
In addition, resource ownership-related discussions up to now were limited to the aspect 
of technological management. If we broaden it to the entire service management, it 
might become a more complex issue regarding the strength of in-house management. It 
seems almost impossible to classify complicated outsourcing phenomena in a 
monolithic criterion of the existence of in-house management, as discussed earlier in 
making the distinction between buy-in and outsourcing.   
 
5.3.1.4.2 Underlying context 
 
The underlying context of the transformation from labour buy-in to onsite option can be 
analysed by control and accountability concerns. As mentioned above, all ownership of 
developed e-government systems belongs to the government in the Korean legal system. 
However, PPS chose to develop a new management method based on process control 
and performance assessment instead of system management in a technological manner; 
accordingly, the labour buy-in option accompanying stronger involvement of client was 
transformed to onsite. This change sought to reinforce supplier accountability and the 
client‘s concentration on process management replacing incumbent assets control 
beyond PPS‘s power.  
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Consequently, PPS‘s resource ownership decision can be epitomised as reallocation of 
assets control authority. As implied by Lee, Miranda, and Kim (2004), this kind of 
allocation of control was hard to specify in advance in the contract; on the contrary, it 
was constructed during the operation. For example, the restriction of in-house experts‘ 
access to the system was only vaguely declared in the contract document; hence, the 
removal of old in-house authorities was neglected and those survived after 2005, though 
in-house experts did nothing with those. However, with increasing concerns about 
security and stability, SDS was empowered and even encouraged to block access of the 
PPS IT experts and delete their accounts from the system. There was a clear opportunity 
for this. In late 2005, the Korean prosecutor‘s office launched an investigation into PPS 
against suspicion of e-bid system management-related corruption. Although the 
prosecution cleared the suspect of suspicion, PPS decided to clarify the authority of 
system management. Considering the imbalance of power between client and supplier 
and nostalgia felt by in-house IT experts, it would have taken longer if it had not been 
for this case. 
 
On the other hand, this transformation was interrelated with other decisions. For 
example, the commercial relationship option change from co-sourced to arms-length 
can be supported by the resource ownership transformation in terms of exclusive 
accountabilities. If key assets were controlled by PPS, it would have been difficult to 
distinguish the responsibilities of PPS and SDS. Similarly, the division of application 
outsourcing contracts in the service scope option allowed for different and specialised 
in-house management within specific parts of e-GP management. In particular, process-
based control and performance assessment emerged as the solution against control and 
accountability concerns. These aspects will be explored in detail in the dimensions of 
contract structure and organisation construction below.  
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5.3.2 Process of strategy building  
 
Regarding ‗how‘ questions, the strategy building process is consistent with the architect 
and regenerate phases of the lifecycle perspective on sourcing processes. These 
processes were repeated every year; however, the distinction between architect and 
regenerate phase is not easily made because there was no clear stage of adopting 
outsourcing. For example, activities during the architect phase could have been 
identified if PPS had experienced a prior insourcing period; but, as introduced in the 
background section, complex sourcing arrangements existed from the beginning of e-
GP in 1997. Accordingly, the IT outsourcing innovation pursued by PPS in 2004 was 
derived from evaluation of prior sourcing strategies and performance in practice. 
Mechanistically speaking, this innovation can be understood as taking place only in the 
regenerate phase in this sense.     
 
Nonetheless, it is still useful to employ the concept of the architect phase to explore and 
explicate phenomena in strategy building. This approach can be justified in that the 
contents of transformation were so radical as to represent new IT outsourcing adoption. 
Consequently, this section describes phenomena observed at PPS after the IT service 
outsourcing contract in 2003 through a different ordering of the sourcing lifecycle 
perspective. A brief explanation using the regenerate phase concept will be followed by 
a more detailed exploration of architecting IT outsourcing innovation.   
 
5.3.2.1 Regenerate phase   
 
The regenerate phase refers to the period of preparation for the next contract based on 
an assessment of the existing contract. This was presented in the original model as the 
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refresh building block (Cullen, Seddon and Willcocks 2006). There were two manifest 
regenerate phases when two one-year contracts of 2003 and 2004 were made.  
 
A consistent concern of outsourcing deals in PPS was confusion between buy-in and 
outsourcing, creating the issue of in-house capabilities development. Large-scale 
outsourcing in 2003 was simply an expansion of scale compared with prior buy-in 
contracts for operations based on the provision of external experts. PPS had no 
experience with such big outsourcing deals before. This was the first outsourcing 
contract in the entire e-GP system, including KONEPS that had been built the previous 
year. In addition, there was no serious assessment of the capabilities issues once more, 
mainly because of the lack of time when preparing for the 2004 contract. Through 2003, 
PPS IT divisions and SDS were very busy stabilising the new e-GP system and 
developing a disaster recovery system, CRM, and a data warehouse. For the advocates 
of IT outsourcing innovation, it was already clear that existing sourcing strategy should 
be changed. Notwithstanding this, they lacked sufficient data for the analyses of the IT 
service outsourcing operation. In addition, diverse practices by other agencies and 
private companies were required to achieve a benchmark. In practice the only strategy 
crafted at the end of 2003 was gaining time without the loss of effort. A consistent basis 
for obtaining information on IT service operations was also needed.  
 
PPS finally decided to outsource again with SDS without competitive bidding 
processes; accordingly, a private contract was made. The macro-level plan for IT 
outsourcing innovation—including the introduction of a long-term contract flowing 
from the next contract was prepared only at that moment. This plan was approved by 
the PPS Administrator, together with the project plan of a private contract with SDS. A 
PPS IT division staff member explained that situation as follows: 
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Most of us have doubts about the existing outsourcing arrangements; 
however, one year was not long enough to obtain data and plan a new way 
to manage contracts and services. It was the first year of IT service 
outsourcing. We agreed that another year would be very helpful for analysis 
and innovation of the contract. But contracting in a non-competitive way 
was allowed exceptionally in Korean procurement regulations, so we 
convinced leadership to authorise it with a blueprint for further innovation 
in 2005. The contract for 2004 was an extension of the 2003 contract by one 
year in practice though it was made in the form of a new one-year contract.  
The regenerate phase of the contract in 2005 was linked directly to the architect phase 
of IT outsourcing innovation. 
 
5.3.2.2 Architect phase   
 
Activities during the architect phase are presented in the published model as investigate, 
target, strategise and design. The architect phase occurred in 2004. In the investigate 
building block, PPS attempted to benchmark other practices and obtain some grounds 
for innovation. The most obvious result of this benchmarking was the prevalent 
multiple-year contract duration. Even though a one-year term was applied to all 
government deals without exception, three- or five-year contracts were found to be the 
dominant types in the Korean private sector. Because of the instability of short-term 
contracts and possible inefficiencies caused by repetitive bidding processes, this was 
accepted relatively easily except for its legal aspects. This will be explained in detail in 
the contract structure dimension.        
 
On the other hand, the most important activity of the investigate building block was an 
analysis of outsourcing supplier‘s activities to support a new contract structure. PPS 
started to investigate prior outsourced activities of SDS for the purpose of activity 
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categorisation and pre-assessment of costs. For instance, the workload of IT outsourcing 
for applications in the first half of 2004 was analysed, as shown in Table 5-4. Thanks to 
this analysis, the nature of IT outsourcing activities was revealed and reflected in the 
innovation plan, which became an action plan for bidding processes and organisational 
reconstruction. 
 
Table 5-4: Workload of application outsourcing activities during the first half of 2004 
Activity Description Ratio (%) 
Application alteration Maintaining, modifying, and developing applications, 
20% of which were analysed as out-of-scope in terms 
of maintenance work 
29.7 
Technology 
supporting helpdesk 
Troubleshooting for users who failed to be satisfied by 
the call centre 
26.0 
User request analysis Technological/business analyses to review user 
requests 
15.9 
Documentation Reporting of technological/business analyses, 
statistics, etc. 
7.9 
Application 
monitoring 
Routinised service and system monitoring to protect 
against service failure 
6.4 
Assistance for 
hardware maintenance 
Assisting everyday work or testing applications after a 
change in hardware configuration 
6.4 
User training User training on demand 2.6 
Business meetings Meetings with interested parties 2.5 
Assistance for other 
applications 
Assisting integrated testing of connected external 
applications 
1.1 
Service failure 
treatment 
Recovering from service failures 1.0 
Administrative work Administrative work 0.5 
Total  100.0 
* Source: PPS (2006) 
 
This analysis provided significant data, particularly for the separation of KONEPS 
service operation outsourcing—representing maintenance and end-user support—and 
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KONEPS contingent application development outsourcing—representing minor but 
contingent development—shown in Figure 5-1. Assessing the share of application 
development workload, 20% of the budget was allocated to the latter.  
 
During the target building block, PPS decided to apply different sourcing strategies to 
separate parts resulting from restructuring of the service scope option in the scope 
grouping component. IT service outsourcing was selected as a core innovation in the 
area of external service application outsourcing and is the main research scope of this 
thesis.  
 
Regarding the strategise building block, the acrid disputes presented up to now were 
vivid social processes for constructing structures intertwined with institutionalised 
human behaviours. More technically, the IT division held an internal workshop in 
February 2004 to introduce new IT service management skills such as ITIL
7
, and SLA. 
Meanwhile, there were serious debates within one IT division. PPS has two IT 
divisions: the information planning division and the information management division 
(IMD). IMD is in charge of the development and operation of e-GP services, including 
outsourcing contract management. Except for two staff members, one of whom is the 
director, the other 15 constituents were IT experts. A director and a few IT experts 
demanded more radical transformations based on a performance assessment and ITIL-
based process control, whereas most IT experts insisted on incremental changes that 
maintained direct control over outsourcing suppliers.    
 
In addition, an interesting aspect of the PPS strategy building process is the 
                                               
7 
 ITIL is a set of best practice guidance for IT service management, focusing on people, 
processes, and technology issues (See section 5.5.1.2).  
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considerable effort placed in promoting its practice to other organisations. PPS did so 
not only to maintain its good reputation as a leading agency in the e-government field 
but also to gain justification for its new outsourcing management system. Many 
modules of its transformation were new to the Korean government and against the 
conservative nature of sourcing/procurement stakeholders; finally, dozens of other 
public organisations benchmarked PPS in 2005 and some of them adopted similar 
structures. Accordingly, most relevant constituents felt safe about this procurement 
issue and were satisfied with the result of strategising. This effort was finally rewarded 
later in 2009. Policy-related government ministries set up a guideline, entitled Manual 
of IT Outsourcing Management: Focusing on Software Operation and Maintenance, as 
a specific regulation for public sector IT outsourcing contracting and management based 
on the PPS case (MOPAS, MOSF, MKE, and NIA 2009).      
 
In the last building block of design, PPS constructed a contract structure for a three-year 
IT outsourcing contract from 2005 to 2007 and provided an organisational design, 
which will be explored in detail later. All these decisions were concretised in the Plan 
for PPS e-Procurement System Outsourcing Innovation at the end of 2004 (PPS 2004b). 
Finally, bidding processes for the next contract followed this plan.  
   
On the other hand, it is noteworthy that this transformation strategy was a concern 
mainly of the IT division alone, which was interested in finding new roles and 
responsibilities for its IT experts in an outsourcing environment. The key division was 
IMD in charge of e-GP system management by whom the transformation was initiated 
and implemented. In fact, senior officials showed little concern about this, since the 
problems had not been revealed to them. Moreover, senior officials were not interested 
in such technical work. Their decisions terminated at the stages of ‗outsourcing or not‘ 
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and ‗how much?‘  
 
5.4 Contract structure dimension 
 
This dimension approaches covers conventional issues of contract structuring during the 
transformation stage of PPS outsourcing. As discussed earlier, contract structure must 
be viewed through the interrelationship amongst the other dimensions of strategy and 
organisation construction.  
 
5.4.1 Decision points and underlying context   
  
5.4.1.1 Supplier grouping   
 
5.4.1.1.1 Decision points 
 
The first decision point is ‗supplier grouping‘, described mainly as the number of 
suppliers. This is classified in the original model into four options: ‗sole supplier‘, 
‗prime contractor‘, ‗best-of-breed‘ and ‗panel‘. In general, PPS had selected the best-of-
breed option with a sole contractor or a prime contractor for each deal. The best-of-
breed option implies multiple contracts with multiple vendors. There used to be an 
unofficial head contractor. On the other hand, a prime contractor meant consortium with 
a head contractor, whereas the sole supplier option was a contract with a single 
contractor. For example, during 2003 and 2004, PPS maintained two contracts with 
SDS for application outsourcing and one with another specialised small company for 
hardware/network maintenance. As an onsite outsourcing contractor, SDS held an 
unofficial head contractor position. Because of the characteristics of temporal contracts 
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in system operation described in the section on scope grouping, PPS focused only on the 
application part hereafter.  
 
The decision on supplier grouping in 2005 was strongly related to that of scope 
grouping. PPS made a change in the number of suppliers according to the newly 
structured service scope option. As illustrated in Figure 5-1, PPS divided application 
outsourcing into the two areas of external service outsourcing and internal service buy-
in contract. If the scope of discussion is restricted to the application part only, the option 
can be understood as being transformed from prime contractor to the best-of-breed 
option, because there was a single prime contractor on the application side before 2004. 
To summarise, as shown in Figure 5-1, there were two contractors in application and 
system maintenance before 2004; the number increased to three in charge of external 
application outsourcing, internal application buy-in, and hardware/network maintenance 
buy-in contracts.  
 
Finally, it is noteworthy that the decisions announced in the tender notice by PPS were 
the sole supplier or prime contractor option under the best-of-breed option. The 
distinction of these two options was less interesting to PPS because both had the same 
rationale of sole accountability. In external application service outsourcing, SDS chose 
to participate as a prime contractor. This decision was not made by PPS but by SDS. On 
the other hand, the contractor for internal application buy-in was a sole supplier.     
 
5.4.1.1.2 Underlying context 
 
The common reason the best-of-breed option was chosen was that it was known to take 
advantage of the specialised expertises of different suppliers. This is true in the case of 
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the division into application and system in 2003. The application part was outsourced to 
a developer, SDS, whereas the hardware/network side contract was made with a 
specialised hardware vendor. It was possible to contract system operation to SDS as a 
prime contractor; however, PPS did not do so, in order to maintain a buy-in approach 
characterised by direct in-house management of a vendor. In addition, the distinction 
between hardware and application seemed relatively possible though it was difficult to 
separate as well because of system integration.    
 
Interestingly, the separation of the application side and application of the best-of-breed 
option cannot be justified by the existing rationale of the best-of-breed option. There 
was no room for another specialised company in internal applications because it was 
also developed by SDS. Under this circumstance, the reason was the strategic decision 
to increase in-house capabilities. The separation was the result of a service scope option 
change in the scope grouping component. As was explained, PPS did this in order to 
apply different management skills that were understood as technology based. PPS made 
a contract for internal service buy-in with a small and medium company instead of with 
SDS. In-house IT experts were forced to manage the system by themselves with the 
support of less-developed external programmers. This was advocated as the buy-in 
option to sustain the traditional technology-based capabilities of the in-house IT experts. 
Internal members of staff were unable to protest this policy because they stubbornly 
stood by that position, insisting on direct control of the contractor. This was consistent 
with explanations given for other components such as commercial relationship, scope 
grouping and resource ownership.       
 
Consequently, the underlying contexts of this decision were control and accountability 
and risk management concerns. Consistency in accountability and control authority over 
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awarded service scope was strengthened. By separating application outsourcing 
contracts, PPS made room for the increased internal accountability in the buy-in section. 
In addition, PPS took the risk of switching vendors in its internal service area to build 
in-house capabilities. PPS had intended to enhance/build in-house capabilities by 
forcing them to lead inexperienced external programmers.  
 
5.4.1.2 Pricing framework   
 
5.4.1.2.1 Decision points 
 
‗Pricing framework‘ involves the method of cost calculation. There are three main 
options: ‗lump-sum fixed price‘, ‗unit pricing‘ and ‗cost-based pricing‘. In 2005, the 
PPS adopted a mixture of these options in place of the prior lump-sum fixed framework. 
The lump-sum fixed option remained in the areas of internal application buy-in contract 
and external service operation outsourcing; however, the cost-based pricing option was 
selected in the remaining contract for contingent application development. This was 
appraised as the introduction of meritocracy in an outsourcing deal.  
 
On the other hand, a more important rationale for this transformation was to systematise 
contract management. As explained in the service scope option change, this was done to 
clarify the criteria for out-of-scope work, about which it had been argued whether or not 
this should be included in outsourcing activities. Before that, the boundary of 
outsourcing was vaguely understood as ability to be completed by the fixed number of 
workers in the contract, which was decided by case-by-case negotiations. By the 
adoption of this pricing system, all development work was basically separated from the 
maintenance scope—here defined as ordinary error-fixing-like activities. About 20% of 
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the budget for external application outsourcing was allotted to it, using a ‗pay as you 
go‘ method. In 2005, contracts for external service operation outsourcing amounted to 
£1.2 million; whereas those for contingent application development were set at £0.3 
million maximum. Payment due for contingent application development was paid to the 
supplier quarterly after completion and inspection of the development.   
 
In addition, the rationale for cost assessment was altered from labour cost to the number 
of function points (FP) based on the unit of business functionalities in every application 
outsourcing deal. Overall, costs of application outsourcing were generally calculated as 
10–15% of development cost in Korea. Four traditional pricing methods are used for 
application development: man-month, source lines of code, the number of application 
units, and FP (MIC 2006). These represent pricing by volume of employed workforce, 
by length of programme source code, by number of programmes constituting a system, 
and by unit of business functionalities, respectively. PPS‘s prior labour cost pricing 
used the man-month method, and this was the dominant one in outsourcing contracting; 
however, the first three had a common weakness of focusing on the supply side. As a 
simple example, the same functions required by a client can be developed by different 
numbers of programmers, lines of source code, and number of programme units. In 
spite of the advantages of simplicity, the results can vary depending on the skill, 
expertise and efficiency of developers. On the contrary, the FP counting method is 
based on a sizing measure of clear business significance. There is a global standard for 
this developed by the International Function Point Users Group (IFPUG). This is 
recognised as customer-centred and being relatively objectified.     
 
However, this policy change to FP had great significance in the PPS case. What it meant 
was a philosophical change from workforce control to task/performance control. Under 
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labour cost pricing, in-house contract managers had a tendency to control the volume of 
workforce that might not be linked with performance. In addition, this allowed in-house 
staff members to intervene in the activities of individual staff members. By removing 
this, contract structure flexibility increased, and it worked as an incentive for suppliers 
to raise productivity by managing human resources more efficiently. The number of 
workers was removed from all contract documents, since it might cause a problem with 
flexibility in the new structure.      
 
In any event, instead of control of the number of workers, PPS introduced an SLA for 
the first time in an IT service outsourcing contract. PPS assumed it was an advanced 
control mechanism based on service performance. On the other hand, IMD had 
established standardised criteria of developed functions and the rate of price applied to 
specific cases. For example, a very small-scale job under certain FP change per task is 
regarded as error-fixing and no payment is given. There were many concrete criteria—
in terms of scale, relative difficulty, and so on—stipulated in advance. It is much more 
important in the management of a contingent application development contract in that 
the cost was calculated afterwards in accordance with this pricing guideline.  
 
5.4.1.2.2 Underlying context 
 
The context of the pricing framework decision can be understood in terms of 
‗performance management‘, ‗risk management‘ and ‗control and accountability‘ 
concerns. In particular, the introduction of a cost-based pricing option as part of 
outsourcing arrangements was regarded as commencement of performance-based 
management utilising a pricing method. The old lump-sum fixed price was criticised as 
having no influence on motivating suppliers. Although the same total amount was 
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maintained at that time, the new cost-based pricing option left room for a supplier to get 
paid for the work done. PPS was very keen not to exceed the total amount of previous 
year‘s contracts in the new system because PPS did not want to give rise to unnecessary 
disputes such as waste of money caused by the innovation. In any event, it expected that 
this transformation would be understood as a trial restructuring of IT outsourcing 
arrangements for higher performance and to begin the building of more sophisticated in-
house management capability.  
 
However, PPS took the risk of a complex pricing environment in terms of risk 
management. Lump-sum fixed cost can be the simplest approach in contract 
management; however, PPS decided that a more sophisticated cost assessment scheme 
would be another opportunity to build in-house capability. For example, calculating FP 
seemed attractive because it required in-depth knowledge of related business and system 
analysis, which was regarded as a core IT-related capability. In this respect, control and 
accountability concerns were involved in this decision. Complete verification of 
complicated pricing results needed to be guaranteed to avoid suspicion of overpayment. 
This was the most important control mechanism in this transformation. Based on this 
rationale, PPS trained a certified function point specialist (CFPS
8
) in advance from 
among in-house IT experts to avoid lack of consistency in cost evaluation and to gain 
credibility from stakeholders. It was the first time such a specialist was retained within 
the Korean government, and PPS considered it a core resource to sustain this contract 
structure. One more CFPS was produced in 2006. These specialists were in charge of 
supporting pricing works over IT divisions and wholly responsible for the examination 
of FP proposed by the supplier of the contingent application development contract on a 
                                               
8
 CFPS is the title for international qualification given to a specialist in evaluating 
function points by IFPUG. 
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quarterly basis.      
 
As a final point, there was synergy between other components and the introduction of 
FP-based pricing and cost-based pricing though it was not the main reason for this 
transformation. For instance, the replacement of labour-cost pricing with FP-based 
pricing secured the exclusive roles and responsibilities of client and supplier, which was 
pursued by the commercial relationship transformation. SDS was given a free hand to 
manage its human resources without the intervention of PPS. In addition, the separation 
of the contingent application development contract and involved cost-based pricing 
prevented in-house individuals from arbitrarily negotiating the scope of development 
works within any outsourcing contract.  
 
5.4.1.3 Contract duration   
 
5.4.1.3.1 Decision points 
 
The last component in the contract structure dimension is ‗contract duration‘, referring 
to the length of a contract term. Its options are ‗single term‘, ‗evergreen‘ and ‗rollover‘. 
In this instance, there was no choice, since government contract law allows only single-
term contracts in Korea. However, PPS extended the term from one to three years; not 
only was there a lack of stability among trained programmers but also inefficiency as a 
result of the unvalued annual competitive bidding process. There had been no long-term 
IT outsourcing contract with the Korean government before, since officials understood 
those to be allowed exceptionally for multi-year projects such as social overhead capital.  
 
After acrimonious discussion, the move to a long-term contract was introduced by PPS. 
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Though the contract was too short to be considered a ‗long-term‘ contract compared 
with US or European practices
9
, the reasons supporting this multiple-year contract were 
deemed convincing and persuasive. Except for this one question of legitimacy, the need 
for a long-term contract was not denied by anyone. Long-term contracts were readily 
agreed upon by senior managers compared with other complicated transformations 
represented by the separation of contingent application development contracts, the 
introduction of cost-based pricing and FP pricing methods, and SLA.   
 
5.4.1.3.2 Underlying context 
 
PPS had transformed its one-year contract to three-year contracts. This applied to all 
outsourcing arrangements within PPS, including internal service buy-in and desktop and 
LAN operation outsourcing contracts. The only exception was system operation 
outsourcing, which was planned to be transferred to another government organisation in 
2006. The conventional rationale in contract duration disputes is as follows. On the one 
hand, long-term contracts are expected to enhance the supplier‘s capability and to build 
mutual trust between the client and supplier (Klepper and Jones 1998; Lee, Miranda and 
Kim 2004; as cited in Cullen, Seddon and Willcocks 2005, p. 371). On the other hand, 
Willcocks and Lacity (2009a) suggested that short-term contracts, described as typically 
three to five years, achieve more success due to stronger vendor motivation, quick 
response to the market, greater opportunities to review and improve the existing 
contract, and so on.  
 
Related IT governance concerns were ‗risk management‘ and ‗performance 
                                               
9
 For example, Willcocks and Lacity (2009a) give the title ‗long-term‘ to contracts with 
a minimum eight-year term.  
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management‘. The risk management concern was to increase the stability of suppliers 
and constituents, which served as the context of this decision. In addition, a three-year 
contract provided a good opportunity for suppliers to present annual business 
improvement plans based on achievements the previous year.  
 
5.4.2 Process of contract structuring: engage phase 
 
The contract structure was created under the phase of engagement in the lifecycle 
perspective of sourcing processes. As a government organisation, PPS had to follow the 
strict procurement regulations of Government Contract Act, - Enforcement Ordinance, - 
Enforcement Regulation and other regulations relative to the application of laws. The 
general method of selecting a contractor is open competition; the criterion for assessing 
a bid in this kind of IT sourcing is a mixture of project proposal and price evaluation. In 
the Korean system, there is little room for further negotiation after selection. 
Negotiation occurred during the early part of the operation phase, with its lack of 
obvious specifications.   
 
After the selection stage, an incumbent supplier, SDS—a developer and the largest IT 
service company in Korea—became a prime contractor for external application 
outsourcing. Despite competitive bidding, the advantages of the know-how gained 
during the development and service operation stages did not allow the entry of other 
participants. In actuality, there was no significant competitor, not only in this deal but 
also in previous deals of e-GP outsourcing. The main background of this under-
competitiveness can be found in the characteristics of the e-GP system. It was not 
packaged software like ERP; it was developed in accordance with the specific business 
requirements of a government procurement system—that is, it was not developed for the 
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commercial market. Accordingly, any new participant company lacked the opportunity 
to access expertise to replace SDS. If the PPS e-GP system were a market-oriented IS 
used in other public organisations or private companies, more serious competition might 
have taken place.    
 
From the PPS perspective, even though they emphasised process-related fairness as a 
public procurer, facilitating the new supplier participation did not seem important 
because PPS had recognised the competitiveness of SDS as a developer and long-term 
partner since the late 1990s. This is the reason PPS made more of an effort in innovation 
on outsourcing management from the strategy-building stage rather than switching out 
of an incumbent supplier. Since 2004, both parties had shared the effort to analyse 
existing contract structure and invent a new contract, such as the separation of 
continuous operation and contingent application development.  
 
On the other hand, a new medium size company was selected as the supplier of internal 
application buy-in based on the proposed price and after a basic examination of its 
financial status. There was no project proposal evaluation. This criterion was justified in 
that the purpose of the contract was only provision of certain skilled workers. The 
amount of the contract was £250,000, only 17% of the costs of external service 
outsourcing, including contingent development, with SDS.  
 
As a final talking point, Lee, Miranda, and Kim (2004) suggested little competition 
exists in the IT outsourcing market in Korea because of the affiliated conglomerate 
known as Chaebol. They found that a company outsourced IT to their partnered IT 
provider within the same Chaebol. This might well be the case in the private sector; 
however, it is not the case in the public sector. Strong competition exists in the public 
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sector, especially at the initial stages, because government is not affiliated with any 
company and there are very strong needs for transparency to citizens in public 
procurement. Weak competition in the PPS case can be explained by the fact that the 
developer company and incumbent IT outsourcing supplier are more competitive thanks 
to their accumulated expertise, as discussed above. This is very common in the specific 
and monopolistic public service–related e-government system but hardly experienced in 
the private sector or in other government organisations. Examples are IS projects in the 
businesses of customs, defence, property rights, tax, national identity, and local 
government public administration.       
  
5.5 Organisation construction dimension  
 
This dimension involves PPS‘s bureaucratic organisational changes intertwined with 
strategy and contract structure. Decision points in the analysis of the previous two 
dimensions were based on the results of multiple-case research devising the original IT 
outsourcing configuration framework (Cullen, Seddon and Willcocks 2005). However, 
this dimension is uses that framework but also develops it through the results of an 
empirical investigation into PPS that highlights substantive elements of organisational 
change, as presented in the section on the conceptual framework in Chapter Four.  
 
The investigation here focuses on the e-GP system and IT outsourcing contract 
management rather than on e-GP services and related businesses supported by the 
system and the outsourcing contract. The first e-GP system had begun supporting 
businesses in 1997, so paper-based work increasingly disappeared during the next ten 
years. Of course, some changes in business were made. For example, the importance of 
diversification of suppliers was noted as a result of expansion of the Internet shopping 
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mall in PPS‘s e-GP system; accordingly, related business areas were extended. However, 
the research interest of this thesis is not the impact of e-GP on PPS business, but the 
significance of IT outsourcing transformation from the viewpoints of PPS IT divisions, 
e-GP management and PPS‘s core IT-related capabilities.    
 
5.5.1 Decision points and underlying context  
 
5.5.1.1  Organisation arrangements 
 
5.5.1.1.1 Decision points 
 
The first component is organisation arrangements. ‗Organisation arrangements‘ is 
described as formal organisational arrangement setting. Organisation arrangements of 
structural form and staffing compose the bureaucratic nature of the government body. 
According to the established strategy, more in-house IT experts were distributed to 
internal applications, and they began conducting more technology-based management. 
Before 2005, six and nine staff members were allocated to internal and external 
application operations, respectively; five were moved to the internal service area from 
external at the end of 2004 to offer more workforce-intensive management from source 
code maintenance. They worked together with 11 external programmers of a new small 
and medium supplier; it is correct to call it buy-in rather than outsourcing because 
external programmers were directly controlled by in-house management. In addition, 
there was no SLA either. On the contrary, the decreased number of in-house staff for 
external application services was redistributed to the new tasks of more complex 
contract management, performance evaluation, and cost assessment. The following 
analysis explores external application outsourcing only.    
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Within the external application outsourcing area, the rationale of the organisation form 
was changed from the business domain-based sub-system (e.g., e-bidding, Internet 
shopping mall) to the ITIL-based process unit (e.g., service desk, incident management, 
problem management). Before 2005, e-GP service operation within IMD had followed a 
hierarchical bureaucracy that was copied again to outsourcing suppliers; however, it was 
transformed to a horizontally arranged ITIL process-based bureaucracy
10
. In-house staff 
members were allocated to each area as process managers in charge of final 
responsibility. Instead of vertical responsibility within a business domain from the 
collection of user requests to the test of released functions, process managers are in 
charge of specific processes across all business domains.  
 
PPS pursued this transformation, representing the breakup of traditional bureaucracy, in 
order to build an appropriate organisational structure that is required for better e-GP and 
outsourcing contract management strategised by it. This is not only for the in-house 
capability building that is specific to IT service management processes, but IMD also 
minimised the direct and informal relationships between the staff of each party. This is 
referred to as the decomposition and recomposition of bureaucracy, which made the 
arms-length commercial relationship more concrete by severing the direct involvement 
between the client and the outsourcing staff. For example, in the previous system, the 
outsourcing project manager was limited in controlling the staff when they were tied 
intensively to a client‘s staff. Communications are designed to occur at a higher level 
and through official procedures within ITIL; it was originally regarded as 
inappropriately sectionalised and against the nature of the integrated e-GP system. 
Before this time, each PPS staff member put his/her application ahead of overall system 
                                               
10
 This aspect will be explained in the next section regarding processes and activities. 
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priorities. As a result of transformation, the entire system stability was declared to be 
top-priority and was technologically handled by SDS. 
 
The transformation also decreased duplicate work and the confusion caused by 
undefined roles and responsibilities between PPS and SDS. For example, SDS staff 
members should have obtained duplicate step-by-step approvals of their every activity 
from both party managers hierarchically. However, in the new system, if they obtained 
approval within the SDS outsourcing team, the approval was processed automatically in 
the ITSM system where ITIL processes then kicked in. In-house staff—now process 
managers—came to have authority to control during the final stage of each process. 
Before that, they could get involved in every activity if they wanted to. This was 
possible because their missions had been defined as controlling outsourcing staff 
members. This transformation is illustrated by comparing Figures 5-2 and 5-3. Cost 
assessment and SLM units were also created  
 
Figure 5-2: Sub-system (business) domain–based bureaucracy (up to 2004) 
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Figure 5-3: ITIL processes based bureaucracy (2005-2007) 
 
 
An interesting point was that the director of IMD—the initiator of this transformation—
now led his staff members in ignoring specific business requirements. The following 
lengthy statements describe this well.  
I persuaded my staff members not to be interested in each business 
requirement. For example, here is a process manager in charge of incident 
management among ITIL procedures. If there is a repetitive request for 
creation of specific parameters for bid qualification evaluation, in-house 
experts had a tendency to ask someone whether it is really required. In more 
serious cases, he would like to examine the application source codes to 
check that it can be easily added. But, my suggestion was that it was not his 
job. He had to analyse it based on the pattern of that request and decide 
whether it should be handed over to problem management. If yes, it would 
be processed as a task for problem management; if no, it would be returned 
to the service desk with a routine answer. The old management system 
depended on business and the IT-related expertise of each member of staff. 
They were distributed by a set of business domains. They were expected to 
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be specialised in business and IS in charge. However, it was too big and 
complex to be appropriately managed by a staff. I had a different idea. If it 
were not already achievable, in-house management would do better 
concentrating on something else. In-house management should operate 
somewhere within the streamline of IT service management from service 
request to release of that function. Business requirements can be examined 
in the process of problem management. What does the problem manager 
do? He cannot judge the requirement because he cannot be an expert for all 
business domains. His role was designed as a referee between external staff 
and in-house business staff. 
 
Reviewing the supplier‘s side, one can see a big difference, as well. Before 2005, 
members of staff were working on all kinds of work within their applications. Assuming 
a staff member was in charge of a specific application, he had to answer user enquiries, 
fix programme errors and tune in, and simultaneously develop new functions. However, 
SDS divided itself into three parts: service desk, application maintenance, and 
application development as shown in Figure 5-3. The old application maintenance team 
structure remained because its nature did not change; however, the service desk in 
charge of technological user support was newly constructed. In addition to that, a 
special development team was established to respond to the contingent application 
development project. The application maintenance team were operating and monitoring 
applications in charge and supporting the service desk when more in-depth 
technological understanding was required. Furthermore, they occasionally used to be 
asked to participate in the development work with their expertise. SDS staff members 
were rotated among these teams to gain diverse experience and synergy effect.  
 
However, a reverse organisational change occurred in 2008. A hierarchical bureaucracy 
was re-established, although in-house staff simultaneously retained the process 
managers‘ position. Managing workflow through the ITSM system also survived. The 
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result was that the activities of a process manager became formalised. This final form is 
displayed in Figure 5-4. The reasons for this change are shown in the interrelationship 
among institutionalised behaviours, structures and context.  
 
Figure 5-4: Re-establishment of traditional organisation form (2008) 
 
 
It is worthwhile to note how the linking organisation was constructed between IT and 
the business. There was no significant change in this respect, except for the creation of a 
large call centre. In 2003, the PPS established the call centre that was outsourced to 
SDS and incorporated with the entire outsourcing contract; accordingly, its management 
was assigned to an IT division in charge of outsourcing contract management. However, 
as previously mentioned, it was finally backsourced one year later, and in 2004, 
authority was moved to the CST. The purpose of this move was one-stop customer 
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service and in-house capability retention under the circumstances that were presented in 
the background section. CST was the amalgamation of the call centre and PPS civic 
centre. Due to the emerging importance of e-procurement, CST was established in the 
E-procurement Service Bureau rather than the Planning and Coordination Bureau as in 
the old civic centre function. From then on, seven in-house business experts, not IT 
experts, were assigned to CST call centre to answer questions and instruct consultants. 
CST consisted of eleven in-house officials and approximately forty-five private 
consultants in 2008. Only four officials were assigned to the traditional work of the 
civic centre, such as company registration for bids. CST was expected to play the role of 
coordinator among business divisions, IT divisions, and outsourcing supplier; however, 
this is not likely to have happened. This will be explained again in the section on 
processes and activities.  
 
5.5.1.1.2 Underlying context 
 
All IT governance concerns were involved in this organisational arrangements 
component as context. A consistent stream of outsourcing transformation can be 
expressed as the movement to performance management and process control. For 
example, an arms-length commercial relationship option can be secured by the onsite 
resource ownership option that describes exclusive accountabilities of control. 
Simultaneously, an FP-based pricing framework was adopted to remove labour cost 
aspects from the contract. Although there were some political struggles, the appropriate 
scope for outsourcing was decided by restructuring the entire service scope option. 
 
Organisational arrangements can be explained by the same logic. ITIL-based process 
management was one of the methods separating the application maintenance work of 
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SDS and the process management work of PPS. The organisational format was 
restructured to consolidate these changes. In addition, personnel management followed 
this policy. In-house IT experts were redistributed and assigned new roles and 
responsibilities. The old regime of in-house direct control was severed by the 
rearrangement of internal staff by process criteria in terms of organisational structure.  
 
In this respect, organisational arrangements were structured consistent with the 
components of processes and activities in the next section. PPS considered those first 
and designed the organisational format and staffing in response to those. More 
specifically, the organisational format was redesigned to concentrate on process 
management; by doing so, PPS pursued new in-house capabilities of IT service 
management. This can be interpreted as a response to strategic alignment concerns 
about the system itself and linked in-house management as a core business. PPS also 
sought new business value—that is, to be the leading e-government organisation—in 
terms of delivery of business value through IT. Furthermore, the specialised SLM unit 
was created (performance management) and a new process-based control scheme was 
established (control and accountability).  
 
It is important to explore why this organisational arrangement was restored. The first 
reason was identified as the emerging failure to maintain consistency in the performance 
evaluation system between the traditional and new bureaucracies. After a director of 
IMD who had initiated this transformation left in mid-2006, no successor recognised the 
process management activities. For example, top priority used to be business-specific 
knowledge, and an official again came to be in charge of each business domain as 
contact points with business divisions. One of these senior staff who had no IT 
experience before suggested as follows: 
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I was surprised when I found the team members did not take charge of 
specific business functions. As IT was outsourced to SDS, in-house 
members should have become business experts very good at IT. My 
members must answer any question in their areas of business expertise. And 
users in business divisions need their contact points within PPS. For 
example, the official in charge of a construction service contract must be 
given an in-house IT expert who is responsible for it. 
 
Secondly, from the IT experts‘ point of view, the business domain–based structure 
seemed more advantageous for their reputation because it allowed a direct relationship 
with business staff, which is important in bureaucratic structures.  
 
As a final reason, initial staffing placed some limitations on the development of a new 
management scheme. As will be explained in the next section, ITIL in PPS then consists 
of 11 processes, but insufficient staff were allotted to them. All process managers held 
additional duties outside external application operation, or they took responsibility for 
more than two processes. This became an excuse for in-house staff to neglect the new 
ITIL structure, in part. Process managers‘ roles would be inappropriately transferred 
again to SDS in the background together with their user accounts and passwords. 
 
Right from the initial stage, there were serious disputes about this staffing. One manager 
urged that in-house staff should concentrate on business-related core processes such as 
incident management and problem management; they felt the supplier could play roles 
in other processes. However, most opposed this because they felt that in-house staff had 
to retain a role in all activities against future requirements, even though it might be just 
a formality at that moment in time. In any event, mainstream ITIL workflow was settled, 
and an arms-length relationship became firm.    
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5.5.1.2 Processes and activities 
 
5.5.1.2.1 Decision points 
 
Another decision point here is ‗processes and activities‘. This means a set of authority 
allocation and implementing procedures and activities for resource management. As an 
application service provider, PPS paid attention to ITIL because it is a set of proper 
processes and activities for IT service management. In actuality, in spite of the growing 
importance of IT service management in contemporary organisations, there is very little 
academic research on this issue (Cater-Steel 2009). In particular, the author suggested 
that ITIL-based ITSM should be taken into account for mature IT governance and 
IT/business alignment. The Office of Government Commerce (OGC), the developer of 
ITIL, defined ITIL as ―a set of best practice guidance for ITSM‖ and ITSM as ―a top-
down, business-driven approach to the management of IT that specifically addresses the 
strategic business value generated by the IT organisation and the need to deliver a high-
quality IT service. ITSM is designed to focus on the people, processes and technology 
issues that IT organisations face‖ (OGC 2006a, p. 21). The latest version of ITIL (v.3) 
describes the scope of ITSM in a life-cycle perspective on service strategy, design, 
transition, operation, and continuous improvement (Winniford, Conger and Erickson-
Harris 2009).  
 
According to a study (Wüllenweber et al. 2008), process standardisation not only has 
direct effects—reduction of process errors followed by cost reduction and performance 
improvement—but also mediating effects—greater transparency and better monitoring 
possibilities—on business process outsourcing success. These effects are consistent 
with PPS‘s intentions to adopt ITIL. The version adopted by PPS in 2004 was ITIL 
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version 2. The novel aspect of PPS in introducing ITIL was a trial to distribute relevant 
activities between client and outsourcing supplier. ITIL describes two domains and 11 
processes of IT service management with a hierarchical structure of roles and 
responsibilities provided within each process: service support domain (service desk, 
incident management, problem management, configuration management, change 
management, and release management) and service delivery domain (service-level 
management, capacity management, IT service continuity management, availability 
management, and financial management for IT services) (TSO 2005). The description 
of each process is given in Table 5-5.  
 
ITIL processes came to underpin the whole workflow of PPS‘s IMD and SDS 
outsourcing team. Before 2005, all work was done through a hierarchical bureaucracy. 
For example, in principle, user requests were delivered to the IMD as official 
documents and assigned to each sub-unit. Relevant in-house staff then reviewed the user 
requests and, if required, officially asked SDS for the solution. Because of the 
technological characteristics of IS, however, in many cases these processes were not 
clearly revealed. Many decisions were made or left in a black box within each sub-unit 
or with an assigned official.  
 
Under these critiques, IMD restructured the organisational processes in line with ITIL. 
For example, every user request or error report must first be received by the service 
desk and should be directly responded to or assigned to the incident or problem 
management process. If an application change is required, the altered application would 
be deployed through the processes of configuration management, change management 
and release management. In-house staff members were appointed as non-hierarchical 
process managers. 
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Table 5-5: ITIL processes description 
Processes Description 
Service Support How customers and users can get access to the appropriate 
services to support their activities and the business, and how 
those services are supported 
- Service desk The initial point of contact with the IT organisation for users 
- Incident 
management 
Activities to resolve the incident and restore the provision of 
services quickly, by whatever means possible; whereby, incident 
means any event which is not part of the standard operation of a 
service and which causes, or may cause, and interruption to, or a 
reduction in the quality of that service 
- Problem 
management 
Adding to incident records, activities to identify the root cause of 
incidents and problems and eliminate them 
- Configuration 
management 
The control of changing IT infrastructure (standardisation and 
status monitoring); identifying all significant components within 
the infrastructure; collecting, recording and managing details 
about the components; and providing information about them to 
all other processes 
- Change 
management 
The approval and controlled implementation of changes to the IT 
infrastructure 
- Release 
management 
A set of configuration items that are tested and introduced into 
the live environment together to ensure the successful rollout of 
releases, including integration, testing and storage 
Service Delivery The services to support customer‘s business, and what is needed 
to provide these services 
- Service level 
management 
The process of negotiating, defining, measuring, managing and 
improving the quality of IT services at an acceptable cost 
- Capacity 
management 
The process of optimising the cost, timing of acquisition, and 
deployment of IT resources, to support the agreements made with 
the customer 
- Continuity 
management  
Ensuring the and IT services can be restored within specified time 
limits after a disaster 
- Availability 
management 
The process of ensuring the appropriate deployment of resources, 
methods and techniques, to support the availability of IT services 
agreed with the customer 
- Financial 
management 
The prudent provision of IT services in financial terms 
represented by the cost/benefit analysis 
* Source: TSO (2005) 
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SDS staff members were not assigned to each process manager; instead, they were 
controlled by in-house management by process to process. This in-house involvement 
was necessarily considered when SDS‘s performance was evaluated. For example, any 
delay of service would be condoned if the cause of it were investigated as being in the 
PPS‘s side. All participants in these processes—users, in-house IT experts and 
outsourcing suppliers—are mutually interrelated within the ITSM system, as shown in 
Figure 5-3.  
 
Regarding the workflow between business and IT, the role of call centre of CST needs 
to be explored. After the settlement of CST with call centre in 2004, IMD had tried to 
let CST take over the leadership of business analysis and legislation works which were 
mainly carried out by IT divisions before. The IMD staff, most of whom are IT experts, 
wished that they could concentrate more on business analyses for programme-building 
rather than drawing consensus between business parts, examining legal frameworks, 
analysing expected benefits, and so on. From the point of view of the IMD staff, if the 
business-oriented officers in CST led the process improvements and establishment of 
legal frameworks, they could do it more efficiently than the IT experts. On the one hand, 
these are their areas of expertise; on the other hand, the business staff would feel more 
comfortable talking with contract officers in CST.  
 
In this respect, IMD proposed a weekly customer satisfaction meeting in 2005 between 
CST, IMD, and SDS outsourcing team on the pretext of creating a comprehensive 
customer satisfaction plan. The leadership of the weekly meeting originally performed 
by the director of IMD, but was taken over by the director of CST eight months later; 
this was only possible after a new proactive director of CST accepted the position. Now, 
finding measures for the enhancement of user satisfaction and collecting opinions from 
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interested parties have become the official missions of CST, although the roles of IMD 
are still too widespread; IMD encouraged the SDS outsourcing team to play a key role 
on behalf of IMD, which would to not be involved in specific business requirements.  
 
In addition, there were two other meetings to be held for contract or IT service 
management. A monthly meeting, chaired by the director of IMD, is held to review 
performance evaluation and other administrative issues. However, more important 
issues were dealt with in the more occasional change advisory board (CAB), which was 
also led by the director of IMD, within the change management process of ITIL. Most 
of the related IT experts from IMD and SDS also participated in the meeting. Any 
technology-based decisions and prioritisations were made in this meeting. 
 
5.5.1.2.2 Underlying context 
 
All IT governance concerns are part of the underlying context of this dimension. For 
example, strategic alignment necessarily informed the decisions on organisation 
construction in terms of core capability. Delivery of business value through IT shed 
light on these considerations because this was an effort to rearrange in-house resources 
to secure new business value for IMD. Newly established functions and processes of 
performance evaluation responded to concerns for performance management. Risk 
management concerns were involved in that the most significant risk recognised by PPS 
was the loss of contractual position throughout the IT service delivery cycle. Finally, 
control and accountability concerns underlay overall organisation-constructing 
rationales by improving transparency and the distribution of roles and responsibilities. 
 
Interestingly, phenomena during the settlement of this system provide good examples of 
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the way people, structures and technology issues become mutually interrelated. When 
ITIL was first introduced at the beginning of 2005, there was little understanding of it 
among stakeholders. In particular, the ITSM system did not exist until March 2006; 
therefore, all processes were carried out on paper. Under these circumstances, it took 
time for all participants to adapt. Other reasons, such as understaffing, as mentioned, 
were identified; however, the most significant background was institutionalised human 
behaviour, using Giddens‘s terminology. In spite of officially redistributed organisation 
and authority, in-house IT experts did not give up direct control, and SDS was not sure 
what a proper relationship with clients amounted to. Only after beginning the use of the 
ITSM system in 2006 did ITIL procedures become more and more settled. The new 
environment was characterised by new IT enforcing staff members to follow the official 
procedures. An opposite observation was made when the old organisational format was 
partly restored in 2008. In spite of the recovered organisational structure, the newly 
institutionalised human behaviour within ITIL did not turn back. 
 
5.5.2 Process of organisation construction: operation phase    
 
In essence, all practices, including the implementation of outsourcing contracts and 
organisation construction, took place during the operation phase. This is more critical in 
the area of organisation construction because constructing an organisation is a dynamic 
and ongoing process affected by the results of previous actions, whereas contract 
regeneration can basically occur only in the next term once a contract is in place. 
 
Organisational arrangements were redistributed throughout the second half of 2004 to 
prepare for implementation of a new contract in January 2005. Process transformation 
was sustained by the acquisition of ‗BS15000‘ of the British Standard Institution based 
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on the ITIL of OGC in November 2004 and strengthened by ITSM system building in 
March 2006. Moreover, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
established ‗ISO/IEC 20000‘ as the official specification of international standards for 
IT service management in 2005, which succeeded ‗BS15000‘ (ISO 2005). 
 
Regarding ISO/IEC 20000, it was strategically established in the outsourcing innovation 
plan in 2004. Global certification is normally attractive because it can be recognised as 
a quality benchmark. The international standard became a powerful driving force in 
these circumstances for obtaining political and financial support from leadership. PPS 
was the first government organisation to be qualified by BS15000. PPS played a role as 
a leading government agency in the field of ITSM, and many other public organisations 
followed PPS afterwards. As a final talking point, to secure this organisational construct, 
PPS constrained suppliers to accept this management scheme by advertising it in its 
request for proposals for the outsourcing bid in advance. 
  
5.6 Conclusion  
  
PPS aimed to develop in-house capabilities through organisation and outsourcing 
contract transformation in 2004 and 2005. As a result, both seemed to succeed in 
innovation because the structures were transformed as strategised, and became 
stabilised and imbedded within PPS. These transformations are summarised in Table 5-
6, using the criteria of this thesis‘s multidimensional IT outsourcing configuration 
framework. The Customer Satisfaction Index for 2006, which was calculated by an 
independent institution with more than 2,000 users, showed a rise of 7.8% over the 2004 
level (Research Lab. Inc., 2004; 2005; 2006). If the purpose of this innovation had been 
service quality improvement and a more flexible contract structure—which seems very 
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important in contingent application development outsourcing—there would have been 
no doubt about its success. Even former opponents of this transformation admitted that 
the new system achieved much greater transparency and accuracy in monitoring and 
tracing suppliers‘ activities. Regarding cost reduction, it is impossible to establish a 
comparison because the calculation of application development prior to 2004 cannot be 
quantified. As explained, contingent application development contract operated within 
the incremental basis range of total expenditure for outsourcing; hence, cost savings did 
not receive detailed attention.     
 
However, in terms of capability building, most participants did not perceive the changes 
as a success. For example, the client organisation was restored to its original 
bureaucracy, and actual control of outsourced activities became dependent on an 
informal relationship again—in many cases, because ITSM-based control as process 
managers became a formality. According to the evaluation of participants, two reasons 
relating to structure and human behaviour explain this result. First, there were some 
structural problems. IMD should have concentrated on more important procedures to 
obtain a tangible accomplishment, considering the limitations of in-house resources. In 
addition, IMD neglected to build up a new performance evaluation system of the 
activities of in-house IT-expert process managers, so members failed to persuade new 
directors to recognise new management skills as important.   
 
The human behaviour-related reasons involve a more intrinsic aspect of bureaucracy 
and institutionalised context, as suggested by structuration theory. Most IT experts in 
IMD had more than 10 years experience; in practice this seemed to translate into them 
tending not to change their way of working. There were institutionalised behaviours and 
beliefs about how to manage IS and suppliers. One of the incentives for organisational 
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reversal (in 2008) was that IMD experts wanted to restore a direct relationship with 
business staff according to the various business domains. Instantiated process-based 
workflow was isolated from the entire existing bureaucratic structure. Perhaps this 
points to sustainable organisational change needing to occur through harmonisation 
with the more traditional institutions in the specific circumstances prevailing in a 
particular organisational set-up.  
 
In summary, there was a substantial change in organisation and contract structure and 
less direct intervention of in-house staff. In addition, outsourcing supplier informants 
reported that system management and the performance evaluation system totally 
changed after 2005. From the viewpoint of technological IS management, ITIL-based 
procedures were completely implemented. As implied by structuration theory, if a 
system once settles, it will not change again easily, and it can be more sustainable with 
the use of IS, like the ITSM system, as an enabler; for example, many client informants 
admitted that ITIL processes might survive because there was an ITSM system.     
 
More technically, as verified by the conceptual multidimensional IT outsourcing 
configuration framework and its application in this research, if change is to stick, one 
would expect the whole contracting and configuration structure to be modified to fit 
with other organisational changes. As the simplest example, if an organisation 
outsources something, it will at least develop a contract management function. There 
were many instances of this within PPS practice. The separation of a contingent 
application development contract would not be possible without the consideration of 
relevant functions like CFPS in client organisations. Moreover, all decisions were 
interrelated. A contingent application development contract among the scope of 
grouping options cannot be set up without adopting a cost-based pricing option, and the 
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restriction of in-house staff access to authority in the resource ownership component 
was the result of the arms-length commercial relationship shift. This commercial 
relationship change underlay all relevant decisions on organisational construction and 
contract structure transformation.  
 
Consequently, any organisation pursuing contract structure change should consider the 
related context and internal client organisation from its structure, staffing and capability 
building. We could see in this case that innovation in IT outsourcing practice was 
implemented only by this interrelationship among diverse dimensions of organisation, 
configuration, and outsourcing contracting.  
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Table 5-6: Framework-based PPS e-GP outsourcing transformation summary (comparison between 2004 and 2005)  
D
im
e-
n
si
o
n 
What? Why? How? 
Decision point 
Options 
change 
Description Context Process 
S
tr
at
eg
y
 
Commercial 
relationship 
Co-sourced 
→ Arms-
length 
Disorganised 
cooperation → Distinct 
accountabilities  
 Seeking for the original roles of in-house IT experts 
based on exclusive accountabilities 
 Selection and concentration under limited in-house 
resource 
cf. Strategic alignment, control and accountability, and 
performance management concerns 
Regenerate 
 Reflecting on the 
limit of existing 
structure in terms 
of capability 
development 
 
Architect 
 In-depth analysis 
of existing 
outsourcing 
activities 
 Internal workshop 
for forming a 
consensus 
 Proactive PR to 
obtain supports and 
self-justification 
Scope 
grouping 
Entire 
service 
scope 
Structural change to 
partition an previously 
integrated scope 
 Juxtaposition of do-it-yourself better and outsource-
others more systematically  
 Applying different management tools to divided area 
 Political struggle and a compromise 
cf. Strategic alignment, delivery of business value 
through IT, risk management, and control and 
accountability  
All business 
units 
No change 
All 
geographies 
No change 
Financial 
scale 
Large 
relative  
No change 
(34.5%→32.4%) 
 Result of transforming service scope option 
cf. Same concerns with above scope grouping 
Large 
absolute  
No change 
(£1.93m→£1.77 per 
annum) 
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Resource 
ownership 
Labour buy-
in → Onsite 
Transfer of control 
authority of assets to 
supplier 
 Pursuing the consistent between responsibilities in 
contract and in practice 
cf. Control and accountability concern 
C
o
n
tr
ac
t 
st
ru
ct
u
re
 
Supplier 
grouping 
Sole 
supplier or 
Prime 
contractor 
→ Best-of-
Breed 
 Multiple suppliers of 
outsourcing partition 
 Sole or prime 
contractor in each 
part 
 Making room for a buy-in contract under in-house 
management 
 Consistency with the service scope restructuring 
cf. Control and accountability, and risk management 
concerns 
Engage 
 Competitive 
bidding 
procedures, but 
limited competition 
due to the 
technological 
characteristic 
 Selecting small and 
medium company 
intentionally in 
internal service 
buy-in 
Pricing 
framework 
Lump-sum 
fixed price 
→ Hybrid of 
lump-sum 
fixed and 
cost-based 
pricing 
 Introduction of cost-
based pricing  
 FP based pricing 
replacing labour cost 
base 
 Performance-based management 
 Developing core capabilities of IT expertise on cost 
assessment 
cf. Control and accountability, performance management, 
and risk management concerns 
Contract 
duration 
Single term Structural change 
(1-year→3-year) 
 Stretching the meaning of government regulation 
 Taking advantage of long-term contract 
cf. Performance management, and risk management 
concerns 
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O
rg
an
is
at
io
n
 c
o
n
st
ru
ct
io
n
 
Organisation 
arrangements 
Hierarchical 
bureaucracy 
→ 
Horizontal 
bureaucracy 
Recomposing a 
horizontally process-
based organisation 
format instead of 
hierarchically business 
domain-based format 
 Capability building in process control and 
performance management 
 Supporting strategy in terms of organisation 
arrangements 
cf. All IT governance concerns 
Operate 
 Having time for 
preparation from 
2004 
 Qualified by global 
certification of 
ITSM  
 
Processes 
and 
activities 
Hierarchical 
bureaucracy 
→ ITIL 
process-
based ITSM 
Recomposing a 
process-based 
workflow supported by 
ITSM system, instead 
of prior hierarchical 
one 
 Capability building in process control and 
performance management 
 Supporting strategy in terms of organisation 
arrangements 
cf. All IT governance concerns 
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6 CASE II: TEACHERS’ PENSION ADMINISTRATION OUTSOURCING IN 
THE UK 
CHAPTER SIX  
CASE II: TEACHERS’ PENSION SCHEME ADMINISTRATION 
OUTSOURCING IN THE UK 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents an in-depth empirical investigation of the second case study 
explored in this thesis. This case involves the TPS administration outsourcing delivered 
by Capita Hartshead on behalf of the DCSF in the UK government.  
 
In contrast with the previous Korean case, this case is distinct in that its outsourcing 
arrangement is not categorised as IT outsourcing, but as a BPO. This case can also be 
compared and contrasted with the PPS case by the following criteria. First, TPS is 
regarded as performing non-core functions of DCSF, whereas e-GP is a core business of 
PPS. Second, the nature of pensions administration makes it something like a 
commodity in the market. Other IS solutions and experienced service providers exist, 
but on the other hand, the PPS e-GP system was developed for public procurement, 
peculiar to Korean public organisations. The developer, SDS, was the only competent 
provider of this service. Third, in terms of IT systems, the degree of dynamism in the 
underlying business is important. Thus the PPS e-GP system was very frequently asked 
to be changed, whereas, TPS has been relatively static. Fourth, the TPS case shows a 
more radical outsourcing policy in that about 500 government officials were 
systematically transferred to a private company. PPS did not do that, and indeed it 
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would be very rare for Korean government business to undertake such an approach. In 
South Korea, the two processes of resignation from government and recruitment of 
service providers are treated as different things, even where there are unofficial terms 
and conditions of outsourcing contracts in the background. There is no related legal 
system to secure this process. This emerged as one of the distinctive differences 
between how the UK and South Korean public sectors operated. 
 
Reserving the comparative cross-case analysis to Chapter Seven, the empirical findings 
and the analyses of this case are presented here. Phenomena observed in this case are 
provided and analysed by the use of the multidimensional IT outsourcing configuration 
framework outlined in Chapter Three. ‗What‘, ‗why‘ and ‗how‘ questions will be 
answered by decision points, underlying context, and process components of the 
framework, respectively, following  same format used in the first case study.     
 
To remind readers of the concepts involved, the relevant components of our analytical 
framework will be introduced again briefly. However, some re-interpretation will be 
carried out in order to allow the specialised concepts in IT outsourcing to be applied to 
this BPO case. As in the previous case, interview quotations will be cited, especially in 
the context exploration sections. These quotations are useful in addressing background 
history without making any adjustments. As a final note, supplier side organisational 
change will be treated as another important factor in this case. This is a significant 
difference between the UK case and the previously discussed Korean case, which 
focused primarily on the client side. The reason is that, as a BPO case, the main body of 
the service delivery organisation was wholly transferred from a client to a supplier. In 
this sense, it is vital to investigate the change of this transferred organisation for a better 
understanding of phenomena that are interrelated with outsourcing.  
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6.2 Case Overview 
 
Outsourcing of TPS administration is managed by DCSF, which deals with child and 
family services and education. This organisation was created in 2007 and, together with 
the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills (currently, the Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills) took over the responsibilities of the former Department 
for Education and Skills (DfES). The number of DCSF staff members was 
approximately 2,700 as of 2008 (TSO 2009a). TPS was among the responsibilities 
transferred from the DfES to DCSF; however, the move caused no significant changes 
to TPS businesses. Therefore, to avoid confusion, this thesis will consistently use DCSF 
as the title of the client organisation managing this case.    
 
The TPS is a statutory contributory scheme that was established in 1925. Next to the 
National Health Service (NHS) pension, it is currently (2010) the second largest public 
sector pension scheme in England and Wales, which provides pension services to 
teachers from local authorities, independent schools, diverse forms of higher 
educational institutions, and even from football clubs. The total number of employers 
amounted to almost 2,359 as of 2009, and this number consists of 172 local authorities, 
413 further education institutions, 90 higher education institutions, and 1,684 
independent establishments (TSO 2009b). In the 2007-08 fiscal year, TPS‘s total 
expenditure was £10,698 million, which, if excluding the newly launched Dedicated 
School Grants (DSG), continuously represents 35% to 40% of the DCSF‘s total 
spending. DSG funds the School‘s Budget, which, prior to 2006, was generated and 
distributed by local government finance systems (DCSF 2006; TSO 2009a).  
 
The TPS was managed and administered by an agency of the DCSF between 1992 and 
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1996. This responsibility was then contracted out to Capita, a private company, in 1996. 
Capita is one of the UK‘s largest outsourcing companies. It is, in particular, the biggest 
BPO provider in the UK, with 25.5% of the market share; Capita is also a main provider 
of BPO and professional support services to the public sector in the UK (Capita 2009a; 
OVUM 2008). Its annual turnover is £2.4 billion, and the company employed 
approximately 36,000 individuals in 2008 (Capita 2009b). The actual service provider 
managing the TPS is Capita Hartshead, the pensions operating division of Capita 
Business Services Limited, which is in turn owned by Capita Group Plc. Capita 
Hartshead was created when Capita acquired Hartshead Solway, a pensions-specialised 
company, in 1997. It administers pension schemes for over 550 clients, with a collective 
client base of more than 3.4 million throughout the UK. In 2008, it was staffed by 
around 1,500 employees across 15 locations in the UK and Ireland (Capita 2009b; 
Capita Hartshead 2009).  
 
As of 2008, Capita Hartshead‘s administration of the TPS involved the financial control 
of £5.5 billion in scheme expenditure and £4.2 billion in scheme income. The daily 
payroll value that year was between £7.5 million and £12.5 million. There are 1.5 
million members of the TPS, comprised of approximately 480,000 pensioners, 650,000 
in-service members, and 380,000 deferred members. Deferred members are those who 
have left civil service employment, but who are not yet old enough to take their 
pensions. With respect to customer communication, Capita Hartshead handles 450,000 
calls and 100,000 written and emailed enquiries per year (Capita Hartshead 2009). 
Capita Hartshead‘s management of the TPS appears to have been deemed successful. 
This thesis finds internal evidence to support this perspective; as one external indicator, 
the outsourcing arrangement received the ‗Best Administration‘ award at the 2008 Pensions 
and Investment UK Scheme Awards, run by Pensions Management magazine (TP 2008).  
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The outsourcing of the TPS is a typical BPO in containing necessary IT components. 
The target business in this case is DCSF‘s teachers‘ pension administration. Among the 
IT systems utilised is HartLink, an integrated, extensible application platform developed 
by Capita Hartshead to support multi-clients‘ pension businesses, including case control, 
document management, and payroll. More specifically, TPS services are delivered by 
Capita Hartshead‘s Teachers‘ Pensions (TP), located in DCSF‘s government office 
building in Darlington. However, Capita Hartshead manages the HartLink platform 
from its Sheffield base, 100 miles from Darlington. In addition, the IT infrastructure for 
HartLink is run by Capita‘s data centre in Kent.    
 
TPS administration outsourcing was first awarded to Capita in January and 
implemented in October 1996 as a seven-year contract. The company was then re-
awarded the contract following competitive tender in 2003, with a further one-year 
extension added in 2008, taking its contract to September 2011. The initial contract had 
a budget of £17 million for the first year, but the cost was reduced to £8.9 million in 
2003. The second term contract was worth £62 million over the seven-year period, 
which means £8.86 million per annum (Capita 2003a). This dramatic cost saving was 
achieved by the staff reduction, which was mainly enabled by IT innovation under 
Capita Hartshead. Through Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) 
Regulations (TUPE)
11
 arrangements, there were 479 staff transfers from the DCSF to 
Capita in 1996; however, the number of staff members decreased to 250 for the 
following contract (Capita 2008). The remaining individuals are still working for other 
pensions-related contracts that were brought into the same Darlington site by Capita 
Hartshead.   
                                               
11
 TUPE is an important part of UK labour law which ―preserve employees' terms and 
conditions when a business or undertaking, or part of one, is transferred to a new 
employer.‖ (BIS 2009) 
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Problems with TPS administration prior to outsourcing are revealed in the following 
commercial statement by Capita Hartshead, and confirmed by interviews with DCSF 
staff (Capita 2008, p. 2): 
Before Capita took over the running of the Teachers Pensions Scheme, the 
operation was labour-intensive and inefficient. Member query response 
times were measured in weeks rather than days and member files could 
easily be misplaced, leading to low productivity while staff conducted a 
thorough search. The Department‘s objective for outsourcing the scheme‘s 
administration was to ensure wide-scale customer service improvements in a 
cost effective and efficient manner.  
However, the driving forces behind this BPO deal were the privatisation policy of UK 
public management in the 1990s and the arguable decision that TPS administration was 
not the core policy-related business of DCSF. According to proactive participants of 
that outsourcing decision, they were asked to select something to be outsourced in 
pursuance of  government policy; at the same time, they were confronted with many 
difficulties with legacy IT systems that processed TPS administration. For example, 
they needed to budget for IT to solve the Y2K problem. However, from the first stage, 
DCSF did not regard this deal as an outsourcing of IT functions. Instead, it decided to 
outsource entire business processes to a third party supplier. Consequently, it was felt in 
1996 that there should be a transfer of most agency staff to the third party supplier. 
 
The strong evidence is that TPS administration has improved over the past decade. 
However, aside from this accomplishment, there is growing concern regarding the 
construction of in-house capabilities within DCSF. An overall evaluation of this 
outsourcing practice is well described by a DCSF respondent, as follows: 
There‘s no doubt in financial terms our value for money has increased over 
the life of both contracts [two consecutive outsourcing deals between DCSF 
and Capita]. The level of service that is available to members has improved 
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very considerably… In terms of have we lost anything? I mean over the 
years that has, that has decreased year on year? And of course, if there is a 
concern, it‘s that as some of us get older in the tooth and move on, the 
actual expertise within the department on pension‘s issues will diminish. 
 
6.3 Strategy Dimension 
 
This section explains what (decision points), why (underlying context), and how 
(process) DCSF pursued the outsourcing of TPS administration in terms of strategy 
building.   
 
6.3.1 Decision points and underlying context 
 
Decision points of this dimension consist of four components: ‗scope grouping‘, 
‗financial scale‘, ‗resource ownership‘ and ‗commercial relationship‘.   
 
6.3.1.1 Scope grouping   
 
6.3.1.1.1 Decision points 
 
‗Scope grouping‘ means ‗what services are provided to whom, and where‘. This 
component again consists of three facets, each of which is composed of two options, as 
follows: ‗service scope‘ with the ‗entire service scope‘ or ‗selected scope‘ option; 
‗recipient scope‘ with ‗all business units‘ or ‗business unit self select‘ option; and 
‗geographic scope‘ with ‗all geographies‘ or ‗geography self select‘ options. To state 
the conclusions first, DCSF‘s choices were entirely service scope, all business units and 
all geographies options.  
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As described by many research studies, IT outsourcing transactions vary and evolve in 
many ways (Hirschheim and Dibbern 2009, Willcocks and Lacity 2009a). In order to 
understand these diverse modes of IT outsourcing, Cullen, Seddon and Willcocks 
(2005) developed the IT outsourcing configuration framework, upon which the 
analytical framework of this thesis is based. Under these circumstances, can this 
framework also be applied to this BPO case of TPS? On this point, the applied 
analytical framework must be revisited to prove the appropriateness for BPO beyond IT 
outsourcing.  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, service scope can be categorised in outsourced 
functions, such as application maintenance and systems operations. It is meaningful to 
distinguish those functions in IT outsourcing because it reveals the qualitative degree of 
the outsourcing deal. For example, even if two client organisations select the same total 
outsourcing strategy—which means over 80% of their IT budgets consumption for an 
outsourcing deal (Lacity and Willcocks 1998)—those can differ in degree from each 
other. On the one hand, an organisation that does not outsource a systems planning and 
management function must place much more importance on in-house IT capability 
compared with an organisation that outsources all related functions. On the other hand, 
some may concentrate on application components, and others have a greater interest in 
systems and infrastructure operations, according to the characteristics of the 
organisation in question and its services.    
 
However, where IT components fundamentally deliver consigned business processes, 
these discussions concerning degree of outsourcing need to be modified. All related 
functions are necessarily provided by external suppliers, not just IT. There is no notable 
in-house component left in the client organisation. The suppliers carry out a complete 
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business function, and they can choose any implementation method independently, 
whereas clients receive only the results (Wüllenweber et al. 2008).  
 
Conceptually speaking, BPO might only concentrate on specific procedures within a 
whole business process; furthermore, there can also be multiple-supplier BPO cases, 
which split a business process into many sub-processes, each of which are assigned to 
multiple vendors. Most empirical studies describe BPO as an outsourcing deal involving 
a business function or process with a sole supplier (e.g., Gewald and Dibbern 2009; 
Lacity, Shaji and Willcocks 2009; Mani, Barua and Whinston 2006; Penter and Pervan 
2009; Yang et al. 2007). One such typical definition of BPO is given by Gewald and 
Dibbern (2009, p. 249), as follows:  
Business process outsourcing (BPO) involves the delegation of an entire 
business process to a third party provider, including its supporting services. 
Business processes in which IT plays an important role have become prime 
candidates for BPO.  
Accordingly, in terms of service scope option, the option taken in the TPS BPO deal can 
be referred to as the entire service scope. All business functions involved with TPS were 
transferred to Capita Hartshead with the first contract in 1996. Transferred resources are 
not only IT assets, like IT experts, but also all business staff administering the scheme. 
The number of staff transferred was 479, among which only ten individuals were IT 
experts. Furthermore, approximately ten staff members (the number varied over the 
1996-2010 period) remained within DCSF in the areas of policy and outsourcing 
contract management. With respect to IT assets, DCSF transferred a legacy system to a 
new administrator though Capita Hartshead, which hardly used it after the contract.  
In accordance with the full service scope approach, the recipient scope option was all 
business units. In the strict sense of word, it is inappropriate to refer to this as all 
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business units because most IT service recipients, who are the users of the IT system in 
TP, came to belong to Capita Hartshead instead of DCSF after the transfer. However, if 
we conceptualise the whole TPS administration service as the target service of the 
contract, just as IT services in an IT outsourcing contract, all TPS-related groups—such 
as the TPS policy unit in DCSF—can be referred to as recipients of those services. 
From the viewpoint of TP staff, whether they were transferred or not, they had no other 
choice but to use the IT service provided by the IT department of Capita Hartshead. In 
this respect, the chosen option by DCSF in terms of recipient scope is the all business 
units option.  
 
As the last facet of service scope, the ‗all geographies‘ option was chosen by DCSF. All 
TPS-related divisions are located in Darlington, and even TP works in the same 
building. 
 
The analytical framework of the multidimensional outsourcing configuration framework 
shows some limits to be applied to the BPO case, as the foundation put forth by Cullen, 
Seddon and Willcocks (2005) was developed as a taxonomy for diverse IT outsourcing 
phenomena. It reveals some discrepancies among concepts, when applied to BPO. 
Nonetheless, the above analyses based on that framework coherently address the case‘s 
structural features. It is evident that all business processes were delivered to the relevant 
recipient groups by Capita Hartshead from a single workplace in Darlington.   
 
6.3.1.1.2 Underlying context 
 
Among the three facets of scope grouping, service scope most deserves further 
exploration in the DCSF context. The geographic scope was decided independently 
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based on a DCSF‘s physical location. In addition, the recipient scope simply follows the 
choice made regarding the service scope option; for example, if a decision were only the 
outsourcing of finance system management for teachers‘ pensions, recipient groups 
could be restricted to financial accounting staffs. Thus, the underlying context behind 
the decision of service scope is worth a more intensive examination in order to shed 
more insight into the case.      
 
However, a similar re-interpretation of the analytical framework is required for BPO. 
The given descriptions of IT governance concerns presume issues between business and 
IT. The following is a definition of strategic planning, as an example (ITGI 2007, p. 6): 
Focusing on ensuring the linkage of business and IT plans; on defining, 
maintaining and validating the IT value proposition; and on aligning IT 
operations with enterprise operations 
This can be literally applied to IT outsourcing, as explored in the previous chapter‘s 
Korean case, but a broader conceptualisation is requisite in BPO. This thesis diversifies 
the understanding of IT aspects in IT governance as a BPO arrangement with strong IT 
components. If organisation executives are concerned with IT, their concerns should 
also address related BPO components pertaining to IT.      
 
Returning to DCSF‘s underlying context for making the service scope decision, the four 
primary concerns involved are ‗strategic alignment‘, ‗delivery of business value through 
IT‘, ‗risk management‘ and ‗control and accountability‘, as conceptually predicted in 
the analytical framework. Concerning strategic alignment, the entire service scope 
outsourcing decision was made ostensibly to seek more value. In actuality, the decision 
stemmed from the NPM reform wave, characterised by more extensive private sector 
involvement and cost-effective government, during the early 1990s (Dunleavy et al. 
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2006; Flynn 2007; White and Korosec 2005). Before then, all TPS administration 
functions had been located alongside all policy functions. In 1992, DCSF created the 
Teachers‘ Pensions Agency within the department in pursuit of a small policy 
department. TPS administration seemed to be a convincing candidate, in that it took up 
a very substantial part of the overall running costs of the department with more than 300 
staff. During this time, DCSF attempted to eliminate all delivery aspects from the 
intended policy-centred department. TPS administration was already categorised as a 
routine and technical mission and had the potential to be transferred to external 
suppliers.  
 
It is not clear whether the innovation of moving to becoming an Agency was successful. 
According to statements by respondents, at least, it seems to have become more target-
driven than before. During those days, DCSF developed 11 performance indicators to 
measure its accomplishment. This view was more strongly supported by senior level 
staff members, as revealed in the following statements:  
What we‘d seen in the move from, being integrated into the Department for 
Education and then comparing that to the way things changed when we 
were with the agency, was that we were more target driven. Having been 
non-target driven previously, there were a number of performance targets 
that were introduced. 
I suppose, I don‘t want to get too carried away, cause we did have the 
agency before that and the agency had done some of this under their own 
steam. 
However, many working-level respondents consistently described the agency as similar 
to that of the old civil servant system, rather than the current private company style. It is 
vividly explained by a Capita Hartshead staff member‘s statement:  
I think we‘re more target driven now and I think we‘re more aware of the 
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targets we have to achieve now and I think that is definitely from every 
point of view. And I think there was a very slightly more pressure on 
everybody because of the targets [in the agency]. But again, I don't know 
whether it‘s because when we were in 1996, targets didn‘t really bother us. 
Whereas now, targets do bother us and we have to achieve them and I 
personally feel that we are achieving targets. 
 
Consequently, the reasons why outsourcing was adopted in 1996 cannot be directly 
drawn from an evaluation of the Agency operation.  However, it is an obvious fact that 
IT was one reason for the subsequent outsourcing. DCSF previously harboured its own 
legacy IT system to process TPS administration. However, it was difficult to invest in 
IT in-house as a government office, in spite of the Agency‘s somewhat significant 
achievement. This is well described by the following DCSF senior manager‘s statement:  
And it was then decided that, although there had been a number of 
efficiencies and improvements resulting from the creation of the Teachers‘ 
Pensions Agency, there was a lot more to be done and there was also quite a 
significant need for capital investment in IT infrastructure and such like, a 
lot of scope for efficiencies. Working practices had been long embedded 
and hadn‘t changed much over perhaps some decades. So the decision was 
taken in I don't know ‘94, ‘95, something like that, that the agency would be 
put out to the market and the administration of the pensions scheme would 
be given to a private sector contractor. 
While operating the Agency, DCSF tested markets for TPS businesses. For example, the 
Agency itself tested the market for many detailed processes, such as payroll and finance. 
In the meantime, pensions administration was found to be a market-oriented task that 
could be transferred to some competitive private companies. Finally, DCSF introduced 
BPO in the area of TPS administration entirely.  
 
Judging from a strategic alignment viewpoint, outsourcing determinants can be 
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explained as follows. First, DCSF regarded TPS administration as a non-core business 
component characterised by its delivery aspect. Furthermore, high cost-reduction was 
expected because it was not yet, as an Agency, satisfactorily developed in terms of IT. It 
was very labour-intensive work at that time. Second, TPS administration was evaluated 
as having great potential for privatisation. DCSF found that many businesses were in 
the private pensions area, though DCSF was wary of the large size of TPS, given the 
relatively small scale of the private sector. Some candidate private companies were 
identified according to the results of market testing. Third, DCSF placed a low priority 
on capital investment in IT, which seemed essential for the development of business. 
This perception was necessarily connected with the first recognition that TPS 
administration is outside of the core business, along with large parts of the IT base.    
 
However, the greatest impetus for outsourcing was found in political judgements, as 
suggested by most respondents. The privatisation movement in NPM-based 
governmental policy encouraged DCSF to adopt that strategy. Under this context, DCSF 
identified TPS administration as a strong candidate for outsourcing. This aspect is 
evident in its choice of BPO instead of IT outsourcing. Although it is understood that IT 
matters, one option could be the outsourcing of IT functions alone. DCSF might 
outsource the development of a new administration system and its maintenance; 
alternatively, DCSF could transfer only IT divisions to an external supplier, together 
with a development project. In reality, DCSF chose these options for other outsourcing 
deals, such as finance, human resources and so on. No detailed justification could be 
found for the TPS decisions, and the present research could only really find them in 
political factors. Neither a systematic benefit-cost analysis report nor an evaluation of 
the Agency‘s prior performance was provided. Two key participants described this 
process in brief as follows: 
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I think the agenda for privatisation was as I said, politically driven and I 
think when the department looked at itself internally to see which was 
probably the most appropriate area for privatisation, the pensions business 
consisted of 479 people at the time at the point of transfer. So you know, it 
was a large body of people. It was non-policy and the department sees itself 
primarily as a policy making department. This was the general view from, 
from staff and just putting the sort of political consideration around the 
decision. 
Really I think the IT, from what I remember, the IT came in quite late on 
that. That wasn‘t always necessarily part of it. 
 
The second IT governance concern in the framework is the delivery of business value 
through IT, which is re-interpreted to be applied to this BPO case below: 
Executing the value proposition through the delivery of the cycle, ensuring 
that BPO delivers the promised benefits against the strategy, concentrating 
on optimising costs and proving the intrinsic value of BPO 
When the first contract was made, three substantial requirements were presented by 
DCSF. The first was service improvement, as DCSF recognised that IT provided by a 
private specialised company could achieve this. Through outsourcing, DCSF expected 
to transfer the risk of in-house IT investment. The second was cost-reduction, 
symbolised by value for money. The first year budget was set with amounts similar to 
those of the prior agency; however, the budget decreased each subsequent year 
throughout the entire contract term. The last requirement is relatively uncommon. DCSF 
requested that a supplier contribute to the site development of Darlington as a town. 
This request was most likely linked with the protection of staff members transferred 
from DCSF. In accordance with this policy, Capita Hartshead was allowed to bring 
other outsourcing arrangements to the Darlington site. 
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The above policies represent the value pursued by DCSF when it outsourced TPS 
administration. The first two requirements can be regarded as common driving forces of 
every outsourcing deal. However, the last requirement represents the characteristics of 
TPS outsourcing as a BPO accompanied by a large-scale transfer of staff; it also shows 
the public interest in local area development and a safeguard against the possible 
unemployment of local staff transferred from the public to the private sector. DCSF had 
to allow staff reductions in order to save on costs, but it needed to support Capita 
Hartshead to abide by the TUPE, by redeploying former DCSF staff to other contracts 
administered in Darlington.  
 
As stated earlier, the deal is generally recognised as a successful case in terms of service 
quality and cost. With respect to the third requirement, Capita Hartshead carried out 
many pensions-related contracts in the Darlington base, and many staff members who 
transferred from DCSF were involved there—that is, outside of TPS administration. As 
an example figure, the number of transferred staff members was 479 in 1996; this 
number was reduced to 250 in 2003. However, the total number of Capita Hartshead 
staff at Darlington in 2009 was 650. Approximately 230 of the transferred staff 
members were redeployed to new missions, while 170 were newly employed for other 
outsourcing arrangements by Capita Hartshead. As evident from the above, priority 
upon the delivery of business value through IT (BPO here) justified related decisions.   
 
The third IT governance concern involved in the framework is risk management. A 
more conventional discussion of IT governance took place in this case. There was no 
evidence found to explain the BPO preference for IT outsourcing, but every participant 
agrees that concerns regarding IT investment led to this outsourcing decision:   
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I suppose there was the view taken that actually what we were doing here 
was transferring a lot of risk over to this sort of contractor to take as I say, 
some of the risks on of the sort of staffing and IT investment that would be 
needed to take the service forward. 
There was then just a programme of predominantly around a much greater 
IT investment which we didn‘t have within the Civil Service, of looking at 
providing more streamlined processes based on system automation. 
They [Capita] were thinking about the improvements, the efficiencies and 
there was an investment and I recall at the time, it was something in excess 
of a million pound which, which the public sector probably wouldn‘t have 
invested but Capita did. 
Previous research studies suggests that IT must always be a significant factor for 
consideration in BPO, though it did not seem to be an indispensable element in the TPS 
outsourcing decision, as discussed above.  
 
On the other hand, another rationale behind this outsourcing decision was the lack of IT 
expertise within DCSF. The number of transferred IT experts—that is, prior DCSF IT 
experts involved—was only about ten then, meaning that there were no resources to 
develop a sophisticated and large information systems in-house. The department faced 
serious problems with regard to upgrading legacy systems. Thus, outsourcing the IT 
component was the only solution for that issue. As repeatedly discussed, DCSF‘s choice 
was BPO beyond IT outsourcing. Before 1996, there was also the movement to 
outsource more components of IT, but it did not disappear entirely because in fact 
initially in-house bids won. The first IT that disappeared from the department was TPS-
related IT; subsequently, additional components of the department‘s IT were transferred 
to different companies. No in-house bidding was being allowed for TPS outsourcing. In 
reality, there was no in-house resource to argue in favour of this. If DCSF had sought 
in-house involvement, it would have taken on more risk, in terms of both cost and 
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staffing. On the contrary, DCSF acknowledged the existence of similar solutions and 
resources in the private sector, relating to the pensions area, after inspection of the 
market. This enabled DCSF to feel more comfortable mitigating and transferring risk by 
outsourcing.     
 
The final IT governance concerns in the framework underpinning scope grouping 
decisions were control and accountability. The matter was whether or not DCSF could 
maintain control to deliver the service to TPS members after outsourcing. Two positive 
rationales were identified. First, DCSF maintained the authoritative power to determine 
policy regarding TPS. There was no doubt about this because TPS is a government 
scheme for teachers, most of whom are civil servants. Second, DCSF was confident 
about retaining governing power after outsourcing due to its accumulated knowledge, 
not only in policy, but also in the administration of the scheme. The following 
respondent‘s answer to the question, ―Are you happy that your in-house capability is 
good enough to be able to manage this contract in a successful way?‖ reveals how this 
decision was justified.  
The answer has been yes for all that time for two reasons. One is that we not 
only have very good and very experienced people on the pension side of the 
house, but we deliberately took a decision to keep the contract management 
side of the operation sitting alongside the pensions technical side of it as 
well. So their contract managers are also very knowledgeable on pensions 
issues and they have certain pension related responsibilities themselves 
anyway just to make sure they keep their hand in. 
 
However, it is worthwhile to note that this view depends entirely on the human 
resources aspect. All interviewees who had worked for TPS in DCSF before 
outsourcing, in particular in the case of upper- to middle-level officers, are concerned 
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about the dilution of in-house knowledge. With respect to this view, there is no 
difference found between current DCSF staff and TP staff transferred from DCSF. This 
was confirmed by an overall evaluation of this deal, which was presented at the end of 
the case overview section. 
 
This concern is based on an argument against the view that TPS administration is not a 
core business of the department. If it were regarded as non-core, the loss of 
administrative knowledge would not be a problem. Two rationales supporting this 
concern were found. First, TPS is critical to personnel management of teachers from 
recruitment to retirement, who are keen to be involved in educational or children‘s 
services. Thus, TPS cannot be isolated from the policy issues of DCSF. Second, policy 
and administration works should be handled as closely connected missions. Knowledge 
gained from the operation of the scheme may provide a solid foundation or motivation 
for policy-making; on the other hand, to administer TPS, TP must fully understand the 
application and implication of a policy.  
I mean the department is about or was very much at that time about 
educational policies. Now it‘s talk more about children‘s policy now but 
something like teachers pensions, you know, the whole legislation, the 
whole drive behind teachers pensions is almost in a world of its own, quite 
separate to education. You know, it‘s not the fact that they‘re teachers; its 
what‘s the link. But in terms of any other link to education, I mean you 
know, I‘m almost sort of saying this in a negative way. 
I still believe there are still some people in the client team who are 
philosophically opposed to the privatisation of this work, which is why I 
think sometimes they follow the line of detailed questioning and probing. 
The above statements provide insight into the client side‘s concerns. In this regard, 
control and accountability became a new serious concern for DCSF, and contract 
management emerged as a new core competency.    
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To summarise the section, the entire service scope, all business units and all 
geographies options, were presented as the choices for DCSF within scope grouping 
decisions. Among these, the entire service scope option was revealed as the most 
important decision affecting other areas. Four underlying concerns affecting context 
were examined: strategic alignment, delivery of business value through IT, risk 
management, and control and accountability. Strategic alignment lent structure to the 
comprehensive view of this BPO motivation, determined to be political. Aside from this, 
the adoption of BPO could not be explained. Despite the suggested belief that in-house 
capability to control and monitor contracts was adequate, based on experienced human 
resources, existing control and accountability concerns were revealed. In  line with what 
Willcocks et al. (2004) suggested, these concerns might be amplified in BPO deals, in 
that knowledge implications are greater than IT outsourcing because the former is closer 
to the business compared with the latter. 
 
6.3.1.2 Financial scale   
 
6.3.1.2.1 Decision points 
 
‗Financial scale‘ describes ‗the financial value to a client organisation using relative and 
absolute dimensions‘. The relative scale of the TPS outsourcing deal is small on any 
criterion of the composition of DCSF expenditure, as displayed in Table 6-1. 
 
Since fiscal year (FY) 2003-04, the total expenditure of TPS has been between £6,344 
million (FY 2004-05) and £10,914 million (FY 2008-09). In the meantime, the average 
annual cost of the second contract (£8.86 million) accounted for only from 0.08% to 
0.14% of those TPS expenditures. In contrast to total administration costs of DCSF, 
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defined as the ―day-to-day costs incurred in administering the Department‘s business‖ 
(TSO 2009a, p. 257), the cost of TPS administration outsourcing accounts for 5% of the 
total.  
 
Table 6-1: Annual expenditure of DCSF (£ million) 
Expenditure\FY 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 
Total (A) 18,272 18,681 22,100 23,917
1)
 27,346
1)
 28,614
1)
 
TPS (B) 6,575 6,344 8,037 8,599 10,698 10,914 
(B/A) (%) 36.0 34.0 36.4 36.0 39.1 38.1 
Total administration 
costs (C) 
193 209 193 196 182 189 
TPS administration 
outsourcing (D) 
8.86 8.86 8.86 8.86 8.86  8.86 
(D/B) (%) 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.08 
(D/C) (%) 4.59 4.24 4.59 4.52 4.87 4.69 
* Source: DCSF total departmental spending, 2003-04 to 2008-09 (TSO 2009a) 
1) Newly transferred DSG expenditure has been deducted from total expenditure since 
2006-07 to maintain consistency. 
 
These figures partially show the characteristic of this contract in the DCSF context. The 
exceptionally low ratio of contract amount to entire TPS expenditure is mainly 
explained by the fact that a pensions business requires much more significant financial 
funds to manage the scheme‘s income and expenditure beyond administrative purposes. 
In addition, with respect to the relative value of outsourcing scale to total administration 
costs, one cannot clearly identify the strategic importance of TPS administration 
outsourcing with those figures. However, considering the decision that TPS 
administration is a non-core business of DCSF, the low ratio of 5% to departmental total 
administration costs is additional evidence of this low priority, especially when 
compared with the high expenditure share of the TPS programme.     
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On the other hand, the relative scale could be 100% if the scope of business were 
confined to TPS only. As a BPO case, most administration costs, including human 
resources and IT, were outsourced. Accordingly, the relative financial scale can be 
referred to as small at the gross level, but as large in the related business domain. In 
addition to this relative scale, there must also be a large absolute scale option, in that 
TPS is a very large public pensions scheme. In practice, this deal attracted many 
suppliers during its procurement processes.     
 
This analysis, however, does not conform to the purpose of the original IT outsourcing 
configuration model proposed by Cullen, Seddon and Willcocks (2005), upon which the 
analysis presented in this thesis is based. These authors developed this component in 
order to explore the depth of IT outsourcing in terms of client organisations‘ IT budgets; 
therefore, this framework does not completely fit the TPS case, as this is a BPO, rather 
than IT outsourcing. Any IT budget was unable to be identified. When DCSF decided to 
outsource TPS administration first, participants never recognised the target activities or 
assets as IT components. Although one of the reasons for outsourcing was their limits 
upon improving a legacy system, decision-makers understood that this was the 
outsourcing of the Teachers‘ Pensions Agency that had carried out TPS business since 
1992. Given this scenario, the original description of financial scale is not applicable to 
this case. Notwithstanding this inconsistency, the same analytical framework remains 
relevant in this BPO case analysis because this component is useful to the overall 
understanding of the relative business weight to TPS administration, given by DCSF.   
 
Although the figure of total IT expenditure of DCSF is not disclosed in this study, there 
are certainly no other IT functions or independent IT budgets within TPS business 
because all administration works have been totally outsourced to Capita Hartshead since 
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1996. Since then, other parts of IT assets and functions in DCSF were subsequently 
contracted out, so there is very little left in terms of in-house IT functions and related 
network issues.  
 
6.3.1.2.2 Underlying context 
 
With respect to the underlying context issue of financial scale, no independent concern 
was identified. The decision of financial scale can be understood as the consequence of 
the service scope decision; therefore, relevant IT governance concerns would like to be 
regarded as the same as those of scope grouping. No restrictions were set by financial 
factors alone. DCSF had sufficient financial resources already being consumed to run 
the Agency. Moreover, the cost was expected to be reduced as a result of outsourcing.   
 
When Cullen, Seddon and Willcocks (2005) discussed the financial scale attribute in 
their work, the significance of this attribute was the perception of risk comparing total 
and selective outsourcing. For example, total outsourcing is commonly acknowledged 
as riskier as an ‗all-or-nothing‘ strategy (Willcocks and Lacity 2009a). However, this 
needs to be qualified in the case of BPO as discussed above under scope grouping.      
 
6.3.1.3 Resource ownership 
 
6.3.1.3.1 Decision points 
 
‗Resource ownership‘ refers to ‗which party controls and/or owns the various service 
delivery resources that were classified by the criteria of assets, facilities and labour‘. 
This consists of the following six options: ‗infrastructure‘, ‗onsite‘, ‗service & facility‘, 
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‗asset buy-in‘, ‗facility host‘, ‗labour buy-in‘ and ‗total ownership‘. Among these, 
DCSF‘s decision was total ownership, which means that the external supplier provides 
all related resources of assets (e.g., hardware, software), facilities (e.g., office site, data 
centre), and labour (direct and/or management). Although the TP site is located in the 
government building of DCSF, TP pays rent to DCSF. Resource ownership, in practice, 
is not only a matter of which party is the owner of specific resources. In addition, 
operational accessibility and control mechanism should be examined. Those elements 
tend to be combined in complex outsourcing deals; hence, it is not easy to standardise 
them (Cullen, Seddon and Willcocks 2005).  
 
The option chosen by DCSF can be categorised as total ownership, as presented above. 
At first glance, it seems to be a necessary option for most BPO arrangements, 
considering the nature of BPO to outsource the entire set of service delivery measures; 
in actuality, the present case was not so straightforward. In 1996, DCSF delegated the 
operation of its own legacy system to Capita Hartshead. Based on this fact, this case 
might be regarded as a service & facility option characterised by client-owned assets 
and supplier-owned facilities and labour. However, as was presented by the developers 
of the original model and as was demonstrated in the PPS case, the matter is not legal 
ownership, but control in practice. Furthermore, the transferred legacy system came to 
be used in a very restricted manner by TP, which employed primarily data within that 
system. Capita Hartshead began replacing this old system with its own systems as soon 
as the first-term contract commenced. Some of those were newly developed by Capita 
Hartshead. Finally, all data were completely migrated to Capita Hartshead‘s HartLink 
system in the initial phase of the second-term contract in 2004. Since then, even data in 
the old system have become obsolete.  
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The total ownership option seems to be a dominant choice in BPO arrangements, but 
some exceptions can exist. Assuming that there is a rather competitive IT system for a 
specific business, client organisations can choose the service & facility option. In other 
words, a client can outsource only facilities and/or relative IT and business staff 
members to deliver services, under the condition of continuous use of the existing IT 
system. However, it remains ambivalent whether this type of deal is consistent with the 
concept of BPO. As another example, we may conclude that at least infrastructure, asset 
buy-in and facility host options, which are characterised by client-owned labour, do not 
suit BPO, in that the delegation of labour supply must be an indispensable attribute of it. 
However, this becomes less convincing if a BPO supplier has full management 
authority over client-side labour. To reiterate, there may well be too many varied 
phenomena and activities in outsourcing arrangements for them to be standardised 
accurately and easily. 
 
6.3.1.3.2 Underlying context 
 
Under the analytical framework of this thesis, control and accountability concerns must 
be examined in order to explore the background of resource ownership decisions. As 
revealed in the description of resource ownership, its determinant must be related to 
concern for control. In practice, resource ownership options are higher-level decisions 
in BPO. However, diverse rationales behind detailed decisions can be found. 
 
In the present case a relevant asset prior to outsourcing was a character-based legacy 
system called Puma. Puma had been mainly used to manage members‘ records, and it 
was unable to support entire processes. As mentioned previously, this issue was 
eliminated when the database was migrated and integrated into Capita Hartshead‘s 
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HartLink system in May 2004. When DCSF strategically decided to adopt the BPO 
approach, Puma maintenance was necessarily delegated to Capita Hartshead, given its 
users and operators. When Capita Hartshead took over, this company introduced and 
developed many new systems for process automation, including calculation, payroll, 
and electronic document management (EDM). Even though the holistic integration of 
these systems was achieved in late 2004, Capita Hartshead did not depend significantly 
on Puma once it was charged with Puma‘s operation. Only pensions data within Puma 
were used and updated for new systems in day-to-day operations. As at 2010, Puma is 
still formally owned by DCSF; Capita Hartshead continues to maintain Puma, including 
the synchronisation of data with its HartLink system.    
 
DCSF was not concerned about Puma. Puma has suffered from many problems, and its 
functions were very limited compared with many other modernised systems. 
Outsourcing was DCSF‘s solution to resolving these problems. DCSF‘s complaints 
about legacy systems were apparent, as indicated in the following two statements:  
And they [old legacy systems] needed to be moved on to a more modern 
platform. So that was one of the key things, to have a much better IS system 
underpinning the administration which would allow for a much wider range 
of um, functionality and particularly to support web-based functionality. We 
were very keen on getting individual scheme members and employers, able 
to have much easier access to the system, to their records, to have online 
benefit statements and online transaction processing and those sorts of 
things as well. 
What we used to have was a database which held all the member records. 
When we did calculations on legacy systems, we used have to take extracts 
of that onto another system to do those calculations. 
Apparently, under these circumstances, DCSF did not intend to own or to control 
related information systems in-house anymore. 
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This standpoint was also disclosed in the bidding process. IT was neither seriously nor 
independently evaluated when DCSF selected a supplier. Furthermore, the same 
tendency is revealed in its contract document. Reviewing the Statement of Service 
Requirements (SOSR) 2003, part of the second-term contract document, only 25 
sporadic clauses among a total of 319 clauses under 11 sections were found to describe 
IT-related issues explicitly (Capita 2003b). Many of those involved only information 
security and data recovery issues, except for five clauses. These related clauses are as 
follows: DCSF staff‘s accessibility to the database (2.18, 11.18); system continuity 
(2.27); electronic document management system standardisation (3.5); the provision of 
on-line service (7.7); and information security and data recovery (10.2, 10.9 and 10.25-
42). As further evidence, no IT-related KPI operated among the 51 indicators used for 
service level measurement. If this were an IT outsourcing arrangement, such indicators 
as request time and system downtime would be included. This analysis does not aim to 
criticise DCSF‘s ignorance of IT in the TPS case; on the contrary, the character of this 
arrangement as BPO is clearly demonstrated. To DCSF, the matter pertained to business, 
rather than IT. Consequently, it is obvious that DCSF certainly did not have any 
intention to control IT directly.   
 
In addition, such facilities as the data centre and office/supply building have been 
provided by Capita Hartshead since 1996. It is worthwhile noting that every respondent 
emphasised the co-location of the client and supplier in terms of strong relationship 
building and knowledge sharing. Most TP staff members were formerly DCSF officials 
working in the DCSF building. There was no need for a change in location. Finally, 
there was nothing specific to describe about the context of labour ownership. Most 
transferred staff members assumed that the deal would result in the privatisation of the 
entire Teachers‘ Pensions Agency for which they worked.   
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6.3.1.4 Commercial relationship 
 
6.3.1.4.1 Decision point 
 
‗Commercial relationship‘ summarises, according to the configuration framework, ‗the 
high-level organisation to organisation nature of relationship structure‘. Four possible 
options of this structure are ‗arms-length‘, ‗value-added‘, ‗co-sourced‘ and ‗equity‘. 
Only the arms-length option, which refers to the distinct accountabilities of both parties, 
was applicable to DCSF in this kind of BPO. The co-sourced option, characterised by 
the mixed provision of labour and assets, was untenable because there were no 
resources left within DCSF. The equity option can be selected only between associated 
organisations in terms of equity shares. Finally, there was no shared business initiative, 
which refers to the quality of value-added options found, such as the put-back of the 
supplier‘s revenue. Two consecutive contracts between DCSF and Capita formed a 
conventional commercial relationship with the arms-length option. The two parties are 
wholly unrelated and have mutually exclusive accountabilities.  
 
This observation is obviously supported by the fact that each party operates in separate 
areas of TPS policy and administration. DCSF and TP advance their own processes 
only; hence, there is no shared process that could possibly cause mutual intervention. 
Policy and administration works are necessarily related, but the interrelation structurally 
occurs between results, rather than between processes. For instance, DCSF makes use of 
information provided by TP, whereas TP follows the policy determined by DCSF. This 
is a formal and structural aspect of interaction, through the recognition of certain 
informal relations beyond this channel. 
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6.3.1.4.2 Underlying context 
 
DCSF had no other alternative to the arms-length option, as explained above. Two 
concerns that provided the context for the commercial relationship decision emerged 
from this: control and accountability, and performance management. Permitting 
exclusive accountability as established in the contract, DCSF attempted to properly 
control and monitor the activities of Capita Hartshead. The first choice was in-depth 
involvement in day-to-day operations. One of DCSF‘s contract management tasks was 
casework aimed to inspect Capita Hartshead‘s actions and to validate and double-check 
the company‘s work. A respondent stated that this was done in a significant number of 
samples.  
 
That function seems to have weakened quickly, for two identifiable reasons. Over time, 
Capita Hartshead became more rigorously trained, while experienced staff in DCSF 
disappeared due to personnel moves or retirement. Another reason was the lack of 
resources in DCSF, as represented by the unbalanced capacity in the number of staff 
members of each party. Initially, there were 479 transferred staff members in Capita 
Hartshead, whereas only four staff members in a contract management team of DCSF. 
Some respondents suggested that the direct involvement function remains in operation, 
but it appears to be formalised. The existing control and monitoring mechanism is much 
more dependent on the audit system. These recent trends are aptly described in the 
following statements by a key participant in DCSF: 
So there is still some limited retained function [validating and double-
checking] but it is much less than what we started with in terms of what I‘d 
call the case checking and validation of teachers pensions day to day work 
that they, you know, we let them get on with it. […] There was a much 
stronger audit function. The department kept a closer eye on them, whereas 
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you may have picked up now that Capita run their own audit … Because, 
over time, we‘ve got more confident that Capita are doing it right. 
TPS administration works have been removed from DCSF‘s responsibilities for more 
than 10 years, meaning that the operational knowledge accumulated by Capita 
Hartshead may surpass that of DCSF. In all probability it is the BPO strategy adopted 
that has produced this, probably unintended outcome. The audit work mentioned by the 
respondent above is different from the original intentions of the contract management 
team. According to other interviewees, DCSF is not auditing the tasks, but reviewing 
Capita Hartshead self-audit results. If they chose, for example, the co-sourced option, 
and if DCSF were more deeply involved with operation work, this loss of knowledge 
might be mitigated. However, it was DCSF‘s strategy to select ‗total‘ BPO, in the light 
of the restricted resources it had to run alternative options.   
 
The second choice to control and monitor the contract was in the area of performance 
evaluation, which is related to performance management concerns. Eleven KPIs had 
already been established during the early 1990s era of the Teachers Pensions‘ Agency. 
Due to this experience, DCSF were relatively familiar with performance-based contract 
management. This KPI number increased to 21 when the first contract was brokered, 
and finally, DCSF and Capita Hartshead increased the number of KPI up to 51 as of 
early 2010.    
 
Under the arms-length commercial relationship, DCSF pursued control and 
accountability and performance management to manage Capita Hartshead. A senior 
officer in DCSF answered a question regarding how DCSF maintained service quality 
during the early stage of outsourcing, as follows:   
I suppose those were the two key things and the staffing and the 
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performance indicators to make sure that the level of service [was good]. 
The expertise of the transferred staff members and the KPI-enabled control experience 
were identified as key to maintaining service quality at the outsourcing introduction 
stage. The intended process-based case involvement had disappeared rapidly, so the two 
missions of the contracting parties became more distinct.  
 
6.3.2 Process of strategy building 
 
Strategy building-related phenomena appear in the architect and regenerate phases of 
the lifecycle framework.   
 
6.3.2.1 Architect phase 
 
Cullen, Seddon and Willcocks (2006) subdivide the architect phase into four building 
blocks: investigate, target, strategise and design. Most key activities in the architect 
phase are found in the history of TPS outsourcing strategy building. DCSF had already 
gone down the outsourcing route since the early 1990s. It created an agency within the 
department and applied market-driven innovation, incorporating performance evaluation. 
Although it is doubtful that DCSF had a plan to finally outsource TPS administration to 
a private company, the Agency continued performing market tests and inspecting 
market and technology in the private sector of the pensions industry. The statement 
below describes the process of market testing and the concern about possible suppliers.   
So we‘d lots of expressions of interest from all sorts of people, and one of 
our main concerns was the extent to which bidders would be able to take on 
an organisation which was so much bigger than themselves. 
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To describe DCSF activities in the order of the four building blocks, the goal—
outsourcing—was formed under the governmental policy of privatisation in the 
investigation building block; then, it was concretised as cost-reduction and service 
improvement through the use of outsourcing. DCSF found that there was expertise in 
the private sector pensions industry that could be applied to TPS. Then, DCSF decided 
to outsource all business processes in the target building block, based on the perception 
that TPS was not suitable for the policy-centred, small department philosophy.  
 
In the strategise building block, DCSF drafted the contract and organisational structure; 
simultaneously, it persuaded internal and external stakeholders to support this 
outsourcing policy. There was extensive dissent expressed by internal staff, the 
teachers‘ union and TPS member groups. Internal staff members were concerned about 
losing their positions as civil servants, while external groups questioned whether there 
would be deterioration of service. Internal staff members who would be transferred felt 
secure when it became clear that civil servants‘ rights would be protected. In addition, 
external staffs were satisfied that DCSF secured a strong and open communication 
channel with them. In fact, DCSF established a requirement of periodic meeting in the 
contract to discuss services and users‘ requests between DCSF, teachers‘ unions, TPS 
members, and Capita Hartshead. However, none of our respondents stated that there 
were severe protests against the outsourcing policy. It seemed to be fairly readily 
accepted under the then trend in governmental policy.         
 
Finally, specific plans for contract and bidding processes were crafted in the design 
building block. For example, the baseline service level was formulated, based upon the 
Agency‘s prior performance. According to many respondents, the first contract was not 
well crafted compared to the current contract. However, subsequent contracts became 
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more sophisticated due to the knowledge accumulated by DCSF. The architect phase 
must be repeated whenever new contracts are made, but this seemed simply to reflect 
the result of the assessment completed in the regenerate phase. There was no 
fundamental change in policy—for example, there was no discussion of something like 
backsourcing—found, thereafter.      
 
6.3.2.2 Regenerate phase 
 
The regenerate phase describes the step in which a strategy for the next contract is 
developed based upon an assessment of the existing contract. It is also termed the 
‗refresh‘ building block. There have been two explicit regenerate phases within TPS 
outsourcing. The first occurred in 2003, when the second-term contract was prepared, 
and another is now in place for the third-term contract from 2011
12
. 
 
The overall purposes pursued by DCSF in the two regenerate phases were the extension 
of KPIs and more complex and detailed documentation to guide supplier activities. As 
indicated, the number of KPI has increased to 51; this number was 21 in 1996 and 11 
during the Agency era. The most significant concern in this phase has been with control 
and accountability. As can be imagined, once the contract is finalised, how DCSF 
manages it while maintaining accountability becomes the primary concern. DCSF 
learned from past experiences; one senior officer of DCSF stated that:   
There was no training course or anything available [for contract 
management], I mean there was a certain amount of learning it on the job 
and doing what we thought was right. And we‘ve learned from that and built 
on the experience over the years both with the second contract and I‘m sure 
                                               
12
 The DCSF TPS Re-tendering team was created to prepare the next contract in the 
latter half of 2009. 
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where we‘ll go to with the next contract. You know, the lessons we kind of 
learned where we needed to be tighter in our performance indicators and our 
measurements and how you deal with the contract. 
 
Beyond performance management, another issue present at this stage is forming an exit 
strategy and creating the possibility of transferring to another provider. The ad hoc 
approach at TPS was summed up in the following statements made by another senior 
officer. 
There was working under [the first] contract which in today‘s terms would 
be considered far too loose and imprecise, so things like at the end of the 
contract, the contractor would have to - I can‘t remember how it was 
worded but it was something like the contractor would have to - behave 
reasonably in providing assistance to support the week ending. There was 
no specific understanding what that meant… what was reasonable and what 
might be required and all those sorts of things. So we learnt quite a few 
lessons from that. 
 
Accordingly, when preparing the second contract, DCSF established its right to buy 
resources from existing providers, including the second TUPE, which also signified the 
transfer of staff from Capita Hartshead to the next outsourcing supplier. Currently, 
DCSF are further interested in standard data format requirements for other providers in 
order to be able to migrate data into their own systems easily.      
 
Unlike what was observed in the architect phase, stakeholders did not raise any issues 
about the outsourcing policy during this regenerate phase. On the contrary, when 
preparing for the second-term contract in 2003, the teachers‘ union declared that it 
would support the incumbent supplier for another seven years. It appears that the union 
preferred to avoid any risk that would be caused by a change in supplier.   
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In any event, DCSF currently continues listening to other competitors‘ input to collect 
case knowledge and be in a position to draft a well-crafted contract proposal for the 
third-term outsourcing bidding. To summarise these current (2009/10) activities, DCSF 
is assessing the past performance of Capita Hartshead; but, more importantly, it is 
concentrating on developing more tightly articulated contract documents against control 
and accountability concerns during the regenerate phase.      
 
6.4 Contract structure dimension 
 
This section explains what (decision points), why (underlying context) and how 
(process) DCSF pursued the outsourcing of TPS administration in terms of contract 
structure. This is the second dimension to be explored in this case.  
 
6.4.1 Decision points and underlying context 
 
Decision points of this dimension consist of three components: ‗supplier grouping‘, 
‗pricing framework‘ and ‗contract duration‘. 
 
6.4.1.1 Supplier grouping 
 
6.4.1.1.1 Decision point 
 
‗Supplier grouping‘ means ‗how many suppliers provide the outsourced services‘. Four 
options of this component are ‗sole supplier‘, ‗prime contractor‘, best-of-breed‘ and 
‗panel‘. DCSF selected the sole supplier and prime contractor options, as both single 
and consortia composed of prime and subcontractors have been allowed to participate. 
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The former means one contractor aiming for sole accountability and seamless service. 
This is characterised by lower communication costs and higher switching costs (Cullen, 
Seddon and Willcocks 2005). Excessive dependency on a sole supplier is normally cited 
as a significant weakness of this option. The latter option may be helpful if 
subcontractors are expected to compensate a prime contractor for specific expertise, 
regional capacity, and so on. From the management viewpoint of the client, these are 
similar in practice in that a prime contractor should act as a sole supplier to clients.        
 
As mentioned before, many studies of BPO reveal that the single provider option is 
more prevalent. This option is attractive due to its single point of accountability. The 
sole supplier or a prime contractor used to assume all responsibility over the outsourced 
business process. This was also the case between DCSF and Capita Hartshead. With 
respect to the prime contractor option, Capita Hartshead could bring other 
subcontractors if it so chose. For example, Capita Hartshead might participate in the bid 
with a subcontractor of IS provision, unless it had a competitive system like HartLink. 
The option observed in the TPS outsourcing is that of sole supplier, but this option is 
selected by the supplier. DCSF also allowed the prime contractor option.  
 
6.4.1.1.2 Underlying context 
 
The context of the supplier grouping decision can be analysed through two IT 
governance concerns in the multidimensional IT outsourcing configuration framework. 
These governance concerns are risk management and control and accountability. In 
terms of the risk management concern, DCSF chose sole accountability options, such as 
the sole supplier and prime contractor options, without any dispute. There was no 
consideration of splitting the service scope or business process in order to assign them 
 240 
to separate multiple companies, pursuing the best-of-breed option. This can be 
interpreted as an avoidance of risk involved in complex management of multiple 
providers. As discussed above, sole accountability options are expected to reduce 
management costs. Capita Hartshead is the sole provider controlled by DCSF, and it is 
fully responsible for TPS administration.  
 
There is necessarily the risk of over-dependency on a single provider in these options, in 
particular in the sole supplier option. However, this risk can be reduced if the service is 
general and similar to a commodity. It is difficult to determine whether TPS is regarded 
as a commodity-like service or a public sector-specific service. It may be a matter of 
degree, but it is noteworthy that DCSF identified many candidate companies in its 
market testing phase, and there were seven competitors in the 1996 bid. Furthermore, a 
commodity-like feature, which means general technology and abundant potential 
bidders, is neatly described in the following two statements. First, a DCSF member 
collecting other suppliers‘ opinions for the next bid revealed:  
I think it was about eight or nine companies that we actually met with and 
we talked to them about the re-tendering exercise you know, we told them 
about the Teachers‘ Pension Scheme, gave them a history behind the 
scheme and where we were at now. And we talked to them about - how do 
they administer pension schemes in terms of are we missing something with 
how Capita are currently providing the administration? And as it was with 
that particular question, yes, there were a few little things that they did 
differently than Capita do now but on the main fundamentals, Capita are 
doing what the other companies are doing. Yeah, there‘s a difference of 
approach in terms of some like to focus more on quality, some like to get 
things through the door a lot quicker. You know, there‘s all the variations. 
But the other thing we talked to them about was - we‘re going to be 
retendering this contract what are going to be the obstacles that are going to 
stop you bidding? And the key thing that came out from those discussions 
was they want going forward, they want that level playing field with Capita. 
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And they‘re some of the key issues that, that we‘re going to have to 
overcome when we do start the retender project shortly [in 2010/11]. 
A staff member at Capita Hartshead suggested that the company‘s strongest competency 
is the IT used in TPS administration. However, there may be some competitors who can 
run TPS with their own information systems:  
The department is absolutely aware that it do not want to be beholden to one 
supplier. […] And it‘s very much about the secondary TUPE being able to 
take place. The interesting dynamic now, however, is of course the big risk 
in systems because of course, the department has gone from what were its 
own systems, which were compound and legacy, to a supplier system which 
is unique to us [Capita]. So whoever will come in to do the next contract, if 
we didn‘t win it, will have to come in with a system. But that‘s the same for 
any outsourcing company. 
This nature of TPS administration outsourcing, characterised by generalisability and 
substitutability, may alleviate DCSF‘s concerns about the risk caused by adopting the 
sole accountability option.  
 
Performance management is another concern that affects the context of the supplier 
grouping decision in the original configuration framework. However, it does not matter 
in DCSF. As investigated in the section about commercial relationships, DCSF felt 
confident about its performance management, and a concern over performance 
management was not identified when related decisions were made.   
 
6.4.1.2 Pricing framework 
 
6.4.1.2.1 Decision point 
 
‗Pricing framework‘ means ‗the method by which the payment to the supplier is 
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calculated‘. ‗Lump-sum fixed price‘, ‗unit pricing‘ and ‗cost based pricing‘ are set up as 
three options of this component, and the first of these was adopted by DCSF. The 
contract amount had a diminishing structure year by year. For example, the annual cost 
was £17 million in the first year, but this figure was reduced to £8.9 million by the 
seventh year of the 1996 contract. However, it was not calculated by the supplier‘s cost 
or delivered service unit. Instead, it is a lump-sum, fixed price based on the cost of 
labour. 
 
This choice was expected, as the lump-sum fixed price option can be effective when 
both service scope and cost are predictable (Cullen, Seddon and Willcocks 2005). 
DCSF recognised the TPS outsourcing arrangement as administration service 
outsourcing, which is characterised more heavily by staff employment than by variable 
IT components. DCSF was not concerned with additional costs caused by IS change. 
Following this logic, DCSF could pursue the cost-reduction made possible by the 
resulting personnel cuts. 
 
For example, a modernisation project was completed and implemented in 2007, 
designed to change amongst other things composite regulations, technical calculation 
methods, member classification. It required system modifications and its attendant 
additional costs. However, even in this case, the cost issue never arose. DCSF and 
Capita Hartshead recognised that such costs would be included under the fixed contract 
terms.        
 
6.4.1.2.2 Underlying context 
 
DCSF‘s ‗control and accountability‘ and ‗risk management‘ concerns need to be 
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explored. The relevance of this can be justified in that the pricing can work as a good 
leverage to achieve desirable performance and control. However, no specific driving 
force to adopt other options was identified. According to Willcocks et al. (2004), the 
unit pricing method seems prevalent in BPO. If this is indeed the case, DCSF can be 
charged at the unit of the delivered service (e.g., £1 per one thousand cases of pension 
payment, £1 per a statistical report). However, this practice would surely be complex 
and require extensive effort to calculate and verify service units. Alternatively, the 
lump-sum fixed price raises no additional management cost in terms of pricing. Most 
importantly, pricing terms and conditions seem very favourable for DCSF, as was 
disclosed by the case of the modernisation project. The following is a TP manager‘s 
answer to the question, ―Was the modernisation work included in the initial scope of the 
contract?‖ 
Yep, I mean basically, it‘s a fixed price contract and the department get any 
statutory changes. So we have to, if they make changes, we‘ve got to do it. 
So it could be very very onerous. 
DCSF was satisfied with this pricing policy, as it could then transfer all financial risk to 
the supplier, as emphasised by the following observation by an in-house staff member:  
The department decided to modernise the pensions scheme. And that, in 
itself, had a big impact on Capita in the sense of, of internal processes that 
they needed to redevelop, systems that needed to be redeveloped um, you 
know, obviously it wasn‘t across the piece but you know, it was a big 
project for Capita themselves. And in such a short timescale that they had to 
work to in respect of developing the administration to meet the new 
demands of the new scheme. And they did it, and costs or charges for that 
development work was never an issue and were not discussed. 
Under these circumstances, DCSF did not have to be concerned about the existing 
pricing option. Performance management was recognised as the DCSF contract 
management team‘s key expertise (mentioned previously). The team believed that the 
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audit system and performance evaluations were sufficient to control the supplier. 
 
6.4.1.3 Contract duration   
 
6.4.1.3.1 Decision point 
 
‗Contract duration‘ refers to the ‗agreed length of the contract‘, of which options are 
‗single term‘, ‗rollover‘ and ‗evergreen‘. DCSF‘s choice was the rollover option, which 
describes a fixed initial term and possible extension. It is the currently prevalent method 
in British government organisations‘ procurement practice. One example of this 
description is revealed in the following clauses, found in the 2011 TPS tender notice 
(DCSF 2009).  
II.3) DURATION OF THE CONTRACT OR TIME-LIMIT FOR 
COMPLETION: 
Starting: 1.10.2011. Completion: 30.9.2018. 
VI.1) THIS IS A RECURRENT PROCUREMENT: 
Yes. Estimated timing for further notices to be published: The contract will 
be for 7 years extendable by up to 3 years. This would mean, if the contract 
runs its maximum course, including extension, the procurement will re-
occur in 2019-20.  
This was the same option included in two previous contracts for TPS outsourcing. As a 
result, the two seven-year contracts with Capita Hartshead were awarded in 1996 and 
2003, respectively; finally, the second contract was extended by one year to September 
2011 in 2008.  
 
The decision to extend the contract duration from one to three years is normally 
determined by the client‘s assessment of the incumbent supplier‘s proposal for an 
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extension. This one-year extension was made through a contingent condition on the part 
of DCSF, which planned to move to another office building in March 2012 because the 
current office became superannuated. TP of Capita Hartshead is located on the same 
premises as DCSF, but DCSF had no space for TP in the new building. Therefore, 
DCSF formed a schedule that would address all parties‘ needs. If the next service 
provider, whether Capita Hartshead or a new company, began the contract in October 
2011, this would make the location more stable. For example, if there was no extension, 
the new contractor would then move to another place shortly after the commencement 
of the contract; if there were a two- or three-year extension, Capita Hartshead would 
find a new office location for only one or two years. To protect DCSF‘s interest, 
frequent bidding is commonly expected to secure the best value for the client. Under 
this condition, one year seemed sufficient to earn the time needed to prepare for bidding 
and to attract competitors.         
 
6.4.1.3.2 Underlying context 
 
Based on the same analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of long-term contracts in 
the Korean case, DCSF‘s rollover option can be regarded as a combination of long-term 
contract stability and short-term contract competition philosophy, by allowing for a 
longer contract term based on the supplier‘s performance. 
 
On this point, DCSF‘s choice can be understood as a strategy to mitigate the risks of 
both short-term and long-term contract duration. ‗Risk management‘ and ‗control and 
accountability‘ concerns are additional components with which to explore the context in 
which the contract duration decision was made. With respect to control and 
accountability, this option provides DCSF with the leverage to control Capita Hartshead. 
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DCSF maintains the right to determine the contract‘s extension beyond the routine 
performance assessment, based on the service provider‘s business improvement plan 
and KPI. Further specific grounds supporting detailed decisions (e.g., Why seven years, 
rather than five or ten years?) were not identified, reflecting that there were no 
antagonistic discussions about this issue. If—following Willcocks and Lacity‘s criterion 
above—a seven-year contract is the longest (‗short-term‘) contract that is likely to be 
effective, it is ideal and enables the relevant parties to enjoy the benefits of long-term 
and short-term contracts.  
 
6.4.2 Process of contract structuring: Engage phase 
 
The engage phase of the lifecycle perspective is applied to the analyses of phenomena in 
this contract structuring process. This phase consists of two building blocks: ‗select‘ and 
‗negotiate‘. Key activities in this phase are planning and managing tender processes, 
establishing award criteria and evaluating bidders, and negotiating and selecting 
contractors. These are very technical and statutory processes, particularly in the case of 
public organisations. In the British government, the OGC created related guidelines to 
be followed by the government to maximise the benefits of its spending. OGC 
summarises this legal framework as follows (OGC 2009, p. 21): 
Contracting authorities, through their accounting officers, are responsible 
for achieving value for money (VFM) in procurement, normally through 
competition. They must comply with legal obligations under EU rules and 
other international obligations, and follow OGC policies and standards on 
public procurement as set out in the Policy and Standards Framework. 
Public procurement in the UK follows British regulations that implement EU public 
procurement directives. Two principal UK regulations in force are the Public Contracts 
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Regulations 2006 and Utilities Contracts Regulations 2006. The former provides rules 
for the procurement of supplies, works and services; the latter applies rules for the water, 
energy, transport and postal services sectors (TSO 2006a; 2006b; OGC 2006b; 2009). 
Although these regulations were enforced from January 2006 onwards, there are few 
differences in practice between the former and current regulations (OGC 2006c). Both 
TPS contracts of 1996 and 2003 were completed under the old regulations.   
   
A basic process for complex project procurement like TPS outsourcing has three key 
stages: the ‗pre-procurement‘, ‗tender process and contract award‘ and ‗contract & 
supplier management‘ stages. The tender process and contract award stage occurs 
during the engage phase and consists of five distinct tasks, from ‗preparation‘, ‗pre-
qualification & selection‘, ‗competitive dialogue‘, ‗final tenders‘ to ‗contract award‘ 
(OGC 2009). 
 
DCSF followed these procedures regulating competitive bidding. The number of initial 
participants was seven for the 1996 contract, and three major bidders were selected in 
the pre-qualification stages. Finally, Capita Hartshead was awarded the contract through 
competitive dialogue. Capita‘s outsourcing contract performance and prior Hartshead 
Solway‘s expertise in pension‘s business were evaluated as its main strengths. 
 
Similar procedures were followed in 2003. A distinct characteristic then was DCSF‘s 
effort to improve the written contract and to craft a detailed exit strategy based on its 
experience over the previous seven years. These factors are described in the statements 
below, made by a DCSF staff member:      
So that the first contract was actually quite slim, the current contract is 
actually quite detailed. And one of the things for example, that we have 
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included in the contract this time was the bidders, I‘ve forgotten what it‘s 
called now [It means Response to SOSR], but their methodology statement, 
how they were going to do things. Again because first time around that 
wasn‘t part of the contract and there were some issues around us saying, 
well, when you bid for this, you said you‘d do these sorts of things and the 
answer was, well, that‘s not in the contract. So we learned quite a harsh 
lesson from that, so we made sure that this statement, the service 
requirements, the methodology statements, the response to the proposals are 
all now an integral part of the contract. 
One of the biggest things I think we picked up in looking to deliver the 
second contract—which, I‘m not saying it influenced the outcome of 
them— was exit strategies and transition to another provider….  I think the 
first contract was all about getting it up and started and perhaps the work 
that went into  how do you get out of it at the end of it all, how do you move 
on was not as well prescribed…. But it became clearer as we started to think 
about the current contract that we‘ve now got. And I think that‘s a lot better 
in terms of how the exit sort of strategies and the transitions to potentially a 
different provider might work the next time. 
In processing bids for the 2011 contract, DCSF is following the same procedures and 
expects to invite three or four bidders to tender or to participate (DCSF 2009). 
 
6.5 Organisation construction dimension 
 
This section explains what (decision points), why (underlying context) and how 
(process) DCSF and Capita Hartshead tried to create or transform their organisations. 
This is the last dimension to be explored in this section and focuses on the organisation 
changes directly caused by outsourcing adoption, whereas the first PPS case emphasised 
organisational transformation facilitated by the innovation of an existing outsourcing 
arrangement. Beyond the client‘s change, phenomena in TP run by Capita Hartshead are 
more deeply investigated, as most service delivery organisations were transferred to 
Capita Hartshead to form TP. In other words, TP had belonged to DCSF before 1996. 
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At this point, TP‘s change has significant implications for potential organisational 
change by other clients that retain related functions and organisations.   
 
Decision points in this dimension are composed of two components—‗organisation 
arrangements‘ and ‗processes and activities‘. The former pertains to the formal 
organisational arrangement setting, such as organisation form and staffing; the latter 
describes a set of authority allocation and implementing procedures and activities for 
resource management. Finally, the process of organisation construction can be 
explained as activities that occur during the operate phase of the lifecycle perspective.   
 
6.5.1 DCSF’s organisation construction 
 
6.5.1.1 Organisation arrangements 
 
In contrast with the PPS case investigated in the previous chapter, as demonstrated by 
the transformation of its existing bureaucracy, DCSF client organisation change is 
characterised as the removal of all delivery aspects of the organisation, while retaining 
only policy functions, and the creation of new functions for contract management and 
auditing. Since a new organisation format was settled in 1996, no significant changes 
have been reported. An old agency of about 500 staff members was reduced to an 
approximately ten-member, small policy unit; this number has since increased to about 
20 individuals. Most of them are assigned to legal and policy issues, while only four 
have remained involved in contract management functions that deal with transferred 
TPS administration responsibilities. This skeleton has also been maintained since then.  
 
Figure 6-1 shows the organisational format of DCSF involvement as of September 2009. 
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Under the Schools Directorate, the Terms and Conditions Division is responsible for 
TPS businesses. As it is now in the re-tendering process of the third-term contract, a 
TPS re-tendering team is temporarily present; at other times, this team is dismantled and 
does not exist. The TPS Finance and Contracts team is responsible for contract 
management functions, and all other teams deal with policy issues—except, of course, 
the TPS Re-tendering team. Except for some support staff, there are nine staff members 
in the Roles and Responsibilities/Conditions of Employment team; seven in the Pay and 
Pensions Policy team; four in the TPS Finance and Contracts team; and finally, four in 
the TPS Re-tendering team.   
 
Figure 6-1 : DCSF TPS organisation format 
 
* Source: DCSF organisation chart 
 
Overall, the Roles and Responsibilities, Conditions of Employment team is a pure 
policy unit that is involved in scheme management—for example, determining scheme 
policy, such as pensioners‘ qualifications and classification criteria, managing 
relationships with stakeholders, and legislating. Once a policy is established, the next 
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phase occurs in the Pay and Pensions Policy team, which handles fund management like 
scheme valuation, account estimation and planning. The TPS Finance and Contracts 
team (or ‗Contract Management team‘) is directly involved with contract management 
issues, including performance measurement, monitoring and controlling the supplier, 
and official relationship management between DCSF and Capita Hartshead.   
 
DCSF was confident of its staff members‘ experience and skills. Many retained 
employees had enough broad expertise in pension businesses. However, with respect to 
IT and contract management, DCSF lacked the necessary resources; outsourcing was 
adopted to solve the IT expertise deficiency. In terms of newly required contract 
management, DCSF naturally learned from its previous contracting experience. These 
aspects were analysed during the regenerate phase (see Section 6.3.2.2)    
 
A more serious and unique concern regarding organisation arrangements was 
knowledge retention in the outsourcing environment. It seemed that there was no 
concern about this initially, based on a belief in accumulated expertise. DCSF had 
developed the casework function to guide and validate everyday operations, as was 
investigated in the section on commercial relationship decisions. However, this early 
confidence reached its limit for two reasons. First, TP‘s abilities expanded beyond those 
of DCSF. TP staffs were originally experienced officials of the former DCSF agency, 
and Capita Hartshead management capabilities were rapidly established. Thus, TP 
became better able to administer TPS effectively without DCSF involvement.  
 
Secondly, and more importantly, DCSF recognised the risk of knowledge loss. With 
respect to staffing, DCSF‘s expertise was entirely grounded in human resources. 
However, these experienced employees eventually retired or rotated to other areas. 
 252 
Rotation system is the feature of public sector personnel management, so in-house 
knowledge became more superficial. One DCSF manager expressed his concern about 
this as follows:  
But we‘re looking for much more cross-functional working so that we don‘t 
just have three or four pensions experts and everybody else does something 
else. So we‘ve had to spread the knowledge wider across the unit… And 
that‘s quite an issue for us to make sure that we are able to do the job which 
we have done so well over the years because of the experience and 
background the people have. We will fail to do that when we don‘t have 
people with the same level of background knowledge. 
It became difficult for the understaffed in-house personnel to sustain this type of 
management philosophy after outsourcing. The problem was not only with the number 
of staff members. Although young officials were continuously recruited, they did not 
possess the same professional experiences in TPS operation, as their predecessors could 
claim.  
 
In terms of organisation format, the old spirit of DCSF involved combining knowledge 
of policy and administration projects, as explained by a DCSF manager:  
We‘ve always felt that it was very important that these sort of people work 
together in the sense that any changes in policy are reflected back into the 
contract. Or, of course, you know, what, what can emerge from the contract, 
that side sort of can play back into, can play back into policy. I mean it‘s a 
two-way thing. 
This was the underpinning context of two separate teams: the Pay and Pensions Policy 
team, located between pure policy and contract management, and the contract 
management team; both were established under the same head of the Pay and Pensions 
team. However, as revealed in his statement, the tie between policy and administration 
became increasingly loose due to the staffing issues described above. Alternatively, the 
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contract management team became more interested in performance management and 
audit and relationship building in order to improve TPS services. Considering the 
feature of BPO that focuses more prominently on the final performance of the 
outsourced business, there was little room to develop client involvement in day-to-day 
operations. There was no significant change found in organisation arrangements over 
the fourteen years of contract terms.     
 
The organisation construction-related context can be presented in terms of all IT 
governance concerns following the multidimensional IT outsourcing configuration 
framework. Among those, the key concerns underpinning organisation construction are 
performance management and control and accountability. The organisational design 
inevitably responded to other concerns as well regarding strategic alignment, the 
delivery of business value through IT, and risk management. For instance, DCSF had 
intended to participate in everyday operations in order to maintain its dominant position 
in the contract (strategic alignment view) and to lead Capita Hartshead with superior 
expertise (delivery of business value view). In addition, these actions could mitigate the 
risk of being captured by a supplier and prevent the service provider from deteriorating 
the TPS service (risk management view).  
 
However, the other two concerns regarding contractor‘s performance evaluation had 
more significant implication for organisation construction. A specialised contract 
management team was established for both independent performance management and 
dedicated control functions.      
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6.5.1.2 Processes and activities 
 
Except for policy functions, processes and activities observed in DCSF were no longer 
TPS administration-related because all of those were transferred to TP. DCSF 
management now concentrates on monitoring and communicating with TP or building 
relationships with stakeholders. All of these processes and activities were formally 
organised as diverse level meetings between DCSF and TP. This requirement was 
established as follows in SOSR of the 2003 contract (Capita 2003b, p. 98-99):  
Convene and facilitate monthly, quarterly and annual liaison meetings with 
the DfES [now DCSF], and ad hoc meetings as required by DfES, including 
meetings where external parties are present. The Governance Model 
outlined in the Method Statements details our intentions for such meetings. 
Capita will convene, host and facilitate Teachers‘ Pensions User Group 
quarterly meetings involving teacher and Employer representatives, DfES 
and the contractor.  
In accordance with these terms and conditions, meetings displayed in Table 6-2 occur 
between DCSF and TP, all of which are formally and regularly held. Among these, RTI 
meetings are held between policy people. The responsibilities of the TP technical team 
are to provide technical information to members of staff, principally about regulations 
that govern the TPS or the rules governing the principal civil service scheme. This team 
mainly works with the policy teams of DCSF in order to assist clients and to provide 
feedback for clients‘ drafts of regulations. They of course explain the regulation 
changes and their impacts upon TP staff, and they instigate the relevant changes to 
operational works. This term, the RTI meeting does not operate for contract 
management, but contributes to policy-knowledge sharing and cross-checking between 
DCSF and TP.             
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Table 6-2: Meeting list between DCSF and TP 
Meeting Frequency Participants (Chair) Agenda 
Keep-In-
Touch (KIT) 
Meeting 
Twice a 
month 
DCSF contract management team, 
TP staff members (Senior staff of 
contract management team) 
One for service 
improvement plan 
(most IT requests 
here) and the other 
for audit reports 
Monthly 
Contract 
meeting 
Monthly DCSF contract management team 
and TP managers (Head of TP)  
Performance 
evaluation 
Quarterly 
Strategy 
Meeting 
Quarterly DCSF contract management team 
and TP managers, including Capita 
Hartshead Managing Director 
(Head of DCSF Pay and Pensions) 
Strategic issues  
TP 
Administra-
tion Forum 
Twice a 
year 
(Darlingto
n/London) 
DCSF contract management team, 
TP managers and employers, and 
teachers‘ unions (Head of DCSF 
Pay and Pensions)  
Information and 
feedback with 
stakeholders 
Project 
Board 
Occasion-
ally 
Ad-hoc (DCSF, TP and Capita 
Hartshead Sheffield) 
e.g., Scheme 
modernisation in 
2007 
Regular 
Tree and 
Technical 
Issues (RTI) 
Meeting 
Twice a 
month 
DCSF policy team and TP 
technical team (in charge of 
pensions technique in terms of 
policy) 
Technical issues 
guided by strategy 
in strategy meeting 
* Source: Interview with DCSF and TP members 
 
 
The above meetings are presented as unique formal channels to encourage 
communication and to build relationships between DCSF and TP, by both parties‘ staff. 
DCSF involvement in TPS administration seemed to occur only through these channels. 
However, informal aspects are also supported by both parties. Informal channels 
supplement the lack of exact understanding of prescription or requirements described in 
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the formal side of relationships, particularly in the early stages of a contract, when the 
terms are not yet well defined. Even now, these efforts toward open and explicit 
communication are recognised as a very important factor of outsourcing success. 
 
Informal information channels can even be found in the highest levels of the 
organisation. For example, the director of the Terms and Conditions division meets the 
Head of TP to discuss strategy and relationship management on a quarterly basis; he 
also spends time with Capita‘s finance director once or twice a year to discuss overall 
contract management. On the other hand, a TP manager explained that many informal 
conversations took place during the process of policy change. Staff members of both 
parties exchange their opinions about any specific potential change before it appears as 
a formal agenda. The perception of the informal relationship supported by DCSF is 
described by a DCSF manager:    
You know, you shouldn‘t be at either extreme. You should get it right and 
we do have the formal and we do have a contract and we do have KPIs and 
they‘re very formal. But we have a lot of informal stuff that goes on, that 
kind of makes, in lots of way makes sure that you don‘t have the rows at the 
formal meetings cause you‘ve sorted thing you know, a lot of things out in 
the sort of background. […] I suppose to keep that balance right. And it 
doesn‘t become too formal and we don‘t, we don‘t loose that strength of the, 
the informal support that goes on now. 
 
Without exception, every respondent from DCSF and TP answered that they maintain a 
very strong relationship. Two novel characteristics of this relationship were presented as 
the co-location of the client and supplier, and the colleagueship developed based on 
previous relationship established in DCSF. This aspect is highlighted in the following 
concern of a DCSF staff member, who questions the planned physical separation of 
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DCSF and TP.     
I suppose, is of course, one of the things we are doing because of mainly our 
own accommodation arrangements and the fact the department itself is 
leaving this building and going down to the town centre, is it won‘t, there 
won‘t be shared accommodation. And how that might impact on the 
informal. I don't think it‘ll have an impact on the formal side of how we 
manage, how we manage the relationship but it‘s something that needs to be 
um, how we continue to make sure that, that good informal sides and that 
can stretch a bit, too. 
 
This governance structure focuses on the relationship between DCSF and TP—that is, 
between the client and supplier. DCSF‘s processes and activities surrounding TPS 
administration are connected with TP through the formal and informal channels 
introduced previously. Given this, what are the processes and activities of the DCSF 
policy team? The RTI meeting must be key for DCSF and TP policy people. However, 
no strong interface between the policy team and contract management team of DCSF is 
identified. As revealed in the above section, the combination of policy and operation 
was a long held tradition of DCSF, but it seems to occur more strongly between the 
DCSF policy and TP technical teams, rather than between the DCSF policy and contract 
management teams. A DCSF manager‘s serious statement, transcribed below, examines 
this observation well:     
They [policy and contract management] can still have some kind of a 
relationship I guess but it becomes a bit distant and a bit, and a bit cut off. 
 
In summary, a relationship map illustrating the processes and activities among DCSF 
and TP organisations is offered in Figure 6-2. The contract management team and TP 
are very strongly interrelated, evident from their monthly contract meetings.  
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Figure 6-2 : Relationship map of DCSF and TP organisations 
 
Performance evaluation and all control and monitoring activities take place in this 
channel. Within TP, policy and operation units are also strongly linked, as discussed 
later in Section 6.5.2. On the other hand, there are strong ties between DCSF‘s policy 
teams and TP‘s technical team. DCSF policy teams obtain operation-related knowledge 
required for policy setting through TP‘s technical team or through direct communication 
with TP operation teams. The RTI meeting is an official channel for the exchange of 
such information. On the contrary, the contract management team is relatively isolated 
from DCSF policy units, although it is located more closely to them in the organisation 
chart. The contract management team is more specialised in processing contracts and in 
relationship management with TP, rather than the contents of TPS administration. This 
is because the contract team lacks the resources to support policy work. All information 
accumulated in the process of administering TPS was delivered by TP organisations. No 
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intermediary role of the contract management team was identified. 
 
Finally, the underlying context can be reconsidered under the criteria of every IT 
governance concern, as done in the previous organisation arrangement section. For 
example, most resources held by the Terms and Conditions Division pertain to policy 
functions and processes that were selected as a core business of DCSF. This was the 
result of DCSF‘s strategic alignment concern. Thus, processes and activities design 
focus on performance management and control and accountability concerns. The 
governance structure of diverse meetings is aimed to assign and monitor tasks, evaluate 
performance and obtain information to maintain accountability of policy product.   
 
6.5.2 TP’s organisation construction 
 
TP‘s organisation was understood as being transformed from the old public sector 
agency to a new, private company organisation. The basic mission of TPS 
administration was not altered. However, two environmental changes occurred, 
represented by private sector management and advanced IT. On the one hand, TP was 
wholly transferred to private sector management, though there are still some civil 
servant staff members under TUPE; on the other hand, Capita Hartshead has brought 
significant IT innovation into TPS administration during the past fourteen years.  
 
It is not easy to discern the impact of each aspect on organisation construction. For 
example, do complex work processes operate more efficiently due to the adoption of IT 
or private sector management? In response to this question, some respondents argued 
that the innovation would have been achieved without outsourcing, if such IT 
investments were placed within the public agency. Neither positive nor negative 
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answers provided any solid evidence. Instead, the suggestions appear to have depended 
on the degree of trust/pride in the government bureaucracy‘s efficiency, which each 
respondent subjectively perceived. Therefore, it is unproductive to assume what would 
happen if the same IT investment were carried out in-house, or if only IT were 
outsourced, instead of BPO.   
 
The underlying context of TP organisation construction decisions will not be 
independently explored. Those discussions are located outside of the scope of this study 
because the interest of the supplier or bidder is, by nature, entirely different from the 
client‘s interest.    
 
6.5.2.1 Organisation arrangements 
 
When investigating changes in organisation arrangements, the impact of IT on such 
changes must be considered. The following quotation from a TP manager, who was also 
a former DCSF staff member, encapsulates how technology can impose restrictions on 
the design of an organisation.      
The IT systems to a significant extent drove the organisational structure as 
well which was the wrong way around. So for example, we had two separate 
systems, one which would do benefit calculations and another system which 
would do service records and contribution records and things like that. So 
because they were very separate systems which didn‘t talk to each other, 
you were forced into an organisational structure which actually was based 
on your access to these separate systems. 
This describes the situation of the old agency disclosing how IT could affect its 
organisational structure. In addition, this influence is far more apparent in the design of 
work processes and activities, as will be discussed in the next section. Figure 6-3 
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displays the TP organisation format.  
 
One key characteristic is that most organisations work across contracts. Except for the 
TP Operation and TP Employers team, which is responsible for only TPS operations, 
every organisation is in charge of other pensions outsourcing arrangements, although 
TP is dominant. In the strategy building step, many other arrangements are delivered 
from the TP Darlington site. These arrangements were derived from both the public 
sector and private companies‘ schemes. For example, the Payroll team under Pensions 
Service handles all payroll functions for schemes administered in TP. Regardless, the 
TP Operation and TP Employer and Pensions Service teams conduct operations, 
whereas the Pensions Technical team is responsible for policy-related missions.  
 
Figure 6-3 : Capita Hartshead TP organisation format 
 
* Source: TP organisation chart 
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IT experts in the Business Improvement (BI) team within Business Support deal with IT 
functions. Although the IT infrastructure of TP is managed by the IT department of 
Capita Hartshead in Sheffield, TP IT experts maintain TPS-specific functions, such as 
HartLink parameters and the TP Web site. There are six IT experts within a team of 15 
members, all of whom were transferred from DCSF. IT functions currently operate 
entirely under the overall business improvement perspective, rather than technology. 
This BI team is strongly tied with the Capita Hartshead‘s IT department in Sheffield. 
For example, the head of BI concurrently holds the position of senior manager in the 
Sheffield IT department.       
 
According to multiple interviewees, this organisation structure has been basically 
maintained without any significant changes since the creation of TP in 1996. However, 
the reduction of hierarchy is noteworthy. This was more the result of privatisation, not 
IT advancements. Government bureaucracy was streamlined; for example, at the highest 
level, there were a chief executive and four senior managers in the former agency. After 
the 1996 transfer to Capita Hartshead, one out of four senior member‘s positions 
disappeared, and all of these top managers were eliminated by 2000. The next 
descriptive statement made by a TP manager highlights this phenomenon.  
The only, the only thing I suppose was, as far as we‘re concerned, it 
[structure] never changed. We‘re still doing the same job, the same sort of 
operations sections if you like. The only thing that did change was - a level 
of management disappeared. If you think in terms of the Civil Service, you 
had, we had what we called assistants, clerical assistants, who went and got 
the files and photocopied and everything. Then you had a clerical officer 
who did the actual calculations on the work. Then you had an executive 
officer that authorised that. Then you had a higher executive officer who 
oversaw all that. Then you had a senior executive officer, then right up to a 
principal who was in charge of the whole division. So there was all, and 
your teams were eight people. One executive officer to eight people. […] So 
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what Capita did was look at the whole process and take away the executive 
officer level to start with and made those if you like, a core team who were 
knowledgeable people who we could feed on if we needed information. 
They kept these Assistant Operations Managers, got rid of the next level all 
together, because they never did anything but sit in little rooms and, I 
shouldn‘t say that but that‘s what happened. And then the director level if 
you like, became the Ops Manager [TP Operation and TP Employers] over 
the whole lot. So you only had one Ops Manager and so many Assistant 
Managers and as time‘s moved on, that‘s even shrunk.  
In addition to this vertical point of view, there has also been a reduction of staff 
members holding the same job, as represented by the curtailment of total staff number 
from 479 in 1996 to 250 in 2003. IT was certainly a key factor in this trend, as indicated 
by a TP staff member:       
When I started eight years ago, it was a team of roughly about 15 people 
and a target of about 20 days to do an application for something. Over four 
or five years, those targets halved and the team‘s halved in size as well so 
the efficiencies made by all the IT resource put in the developments is sort 
of changed the size of the company in a short space of time. 
Consequently, the organisational arrangements have dramatically changed in terms of 
hierarchy and size, although the organisation‘s functions and overall structure seemed to 
remain static.  
 
6.5.2.2 Processes and activities 
 
Pension administration work before outsourcing was very complicated and paper-based, 
as described below: 
There used to be nine miles of paper files down here. And we used to have 
to go done looking for files and on an afternoon if there was a file lost, a 
bell would ring and everybody had to stop and search for a file. That all 
went when Capita came in cause they brought the EDM process in and 
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scanned all the paper files on. 
This is a very simple example of business innovation enabled by IT. Unlike the case of 
organisational arrangements, there is no evidence of innovation based on private sector 
management; that is, all process innovation can be explained by IT. However, this IT 
investment and change management were completed by an external supplier, Capita 
Hartshead. Again, it is out of the scope of this study to separate these two aspects 
enabling innovation under this environment.  
 
The general workflow of TPS administration must now be introduced. When any task 
occurs, the Business Support team scans or inputs it into the Caselink system. Then, the 
system creates a Casetype that is loaded onto HartLink. Then, this appears in an SLA 
report the next day, which indicates the tasks to be completed and their deadlines. The 
tasks are also assigned to the appropriate teams. All following actions are conducted 
and finalised within the Casetype in the HartLink account of the responsible official. 
The official can refer to other staff members who have handled similar cases before. 
Every activity is linked with relevant tasks, including performance reports, and 
streamlined as a flow within an integrated system. However, IT-related work is 
separated from this workflow. For example, even a contact centre cannot answer any 
problems regarding the TP Web site; the contact centre can only reset user passwords. 
Otherwise, enquirers must log their queries through the Web site‘s email link.  
 
With respect to the relationship between two parties, most staff members are not 
involved in this. Communication with the client is wholly assigned to managers through 
official meetings or informal conversations. No working-level staff members responded 
that they were regularly involved with the client. One exception is the case of staff loans 
from TP to DCSF. Due to the understaffed client organisation, TP dispatches staff 
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members to the client, as required. One example of this rarity was the 2007 scheme 
modernisation project. A Pensions Technical team member joined DCSF to assist them 
for six months.  
  
On the other hand, examples of remarkable IT innovation cases do include (Capita 
Hartshead 2009): TP Web site, including secure access to statements and secure data 
transmission; EDM replacing files with imaging and workflow; HartLink adoption to 
replace the previous legacy system; contact centre with associated IT; and improved 
scheme communication, including text messaging and email.  
 
Procedures involving IT, from the initial request to realisation, can be generalised as 
follows. TP runs a system—Request Link—that is a work control system for change 
requests. Staff members must specify what they want to develop on this system. If the 
request is finally approved as valid, those would be progressed. The final approval 
authority belongs to three senior managers—that is, the heads of TP Operation and TP 
Employers, Pensions Service, and Pensions Operations Director. Approved requests are 
sent to IT staff, who then quantify how much time is needed to complete the project. 
After the change development, users of such functions test the change until it is passes 
evaluation; then, the operation side‘s managers approve the change and make it live. To 
coordinate these processes, the three senior managers above and the head of the BI team 
hold weekly service improvement meetings to share progress and to prioritise tasks.  
 
Regarding the management of IS, common applications are maintained by the Capita 
Hartshead IT department in Sheffield. For example, HartLink is a very flexible IT 
platform for the use of diverse pensions business. TP‘s IT experts developed and 
maintained TP-specific functions under the instructions of or collaboration with 
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Sheffield experts. However, it is very rare to modify existing software in terms of basic 
operation functions, such as calculation, payroll and the like. Otherwise, Capita 
Hartshead could not admit this kind of fixed price contract concerning the high risk of 
cost. There is no charged scheme for additional application development; even the large 
scheme modernisation project of 2007 did not cost DCSF extra funds or resources. 
Pension administration work is not so dynamic that it must be changed frequently. 
Nonetheless, TP was recently asked and is currently attempting to expand the use of 
online transactions, like members‘ diverse applications. TP is following procedures in 
accordance with the e-government trend to facilitate Web-based transactions for public 
service consumers. 
 
6.5.3 Process of organisation construction: Operate phase   
 
Organisation construction occurs during the operate phase of the lifecycle perspective. 
This phase consists of two building blocks: ‗transition‘ and ‗manage‘. There was an 
explicit transition period for the first contract. Capita Hartshead was awarded the 
contract in January 1996, and the contract commenced in October of the same year. 
Between those months, DCSF had to prepare to transfer the agency and to rebuild in-
house organisation, while Capita Hartshead set up TP. The biggest issue relevant then 
was the soft landing of labour transfer. From DCSF‘s perspective, they had to decide 
who would remain, how to secure continuous employment, how to manage the 
transferred staff members who decided to retain civil servants‘ rights after transfer, and 
so on. Nonetheless, no serious concerns were identified during that phase because most 
staff members could not prevent their transfer, and formal legal frameworks had already 
been established, such as TUPE.  
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Compared with DCSF, Capita Hartshead had to carry out a wider range of tasks, such as 
legacy system analyses and organisation consulting. For example, Capita consultants 
who were change managers at its headquarters—instead of pension‘s experts—found 
that the development of an in-house payroll system could reduce expenses. They also 
recognised the possibility of enhancing labour efficiency through the introduction of 
private sector management.   
 
Unexpectedly, no radical changes were perceived by most participants at the initial 
stage. All of these participants were ex-colleagues who had worked with one another for 
a long period of time. Moreover, they worked in the same office even after the transfer. 
Most respondents described very little change. The sole exception was upper-middle 
managers in TP, who were transferred from DCSF to Capita Hartshead. They felt more 
pressure under the private company‘s management. One respondent described this 
atmosphere as a ‗more disciplined environment‘. Ten consultants came from Capita, 
and instead of usurping responsibility, they acted as facilitators of change. True 
alterations across the entire staff in TP occurred with IT innovation and the 
accompanying radical staff reductions. EDM that was applied to operation works in 
1998 was popularly mentioned as the strongest tool that changed work processes. Most 
stakeholders support the view that there was no critical confusion during the transition 
and early management periods, despite certain trial-and-error practices. One example of 
these was the attempt to implement a new organisation structure. Capita Hartshead once 
removed some mid-managers and imposed a collaborative organisational style under the 
title of a self-managed team. However, this change did not last because it was 
disorganised—for example, there were no precise job descriptions. 
 
During the ‗manage‘ building block, there was a serious loss of service quality in the 
 268 
first stage, as indicated by the following statement of a DCSF manager: 
One of the things that we faced fairly early on in the first contract was a 
very significant decline in service standards, which was unexpected and 
actually very unwelcome from our point of view. One of the lessons that we 
learnt I think is that Capita were very good in the transition phase between  
award of contract and starting of the contract going live and there were lots 
of really good first rate people who were about making sure that everything 
was geared up towards them taking over. But once actually the contract 
went live, they just disappeared into the mists and there was a sense of 
abandonment I think to a degree. There was also quite a push to build on the 
Capita base here in terms of the pensions administration work that they 
undertook. And I think Capita would argue that there was a raiding of good 
quality experience teachers‘ pension staff to fill other contracts and we 
suffered very badly as a result of that. So I think one of the lessons we learnt 
from that is actually to pin things down much more precisely and to be 
much clearer about what we were expecting from the delivery in terms of 
service standards and the limitations on to the extent to which we would 
allow those to drop. 
Clearly, there was a temporal problem in terms of service quality, perhaps caused by the 
drastic staff reduction that occurred within a short time span. Seventy employees 
(approximately 15% of the total staff) were redeployed to other sections within six 
months after the contract commenced. Staff reduction without sufficient IT-enabled 
business innovation might aggravate this problem. To address the issue, DCSF 
summoned the higher managers of Capita group in order to provoke their continuous 
interest in TP; this move was considered to be a very strong solution by senior managers 
of DCSF.   
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
DCSF pursued the innovation of TPS administration through a BPO arrangement with a 
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leading British supplier, Capita. Although the motive for this action was the British 
government‘s nationwide privatisation policy, this TPS administration outsourcing was 
pushed forward through the evaluation of the department‘s long-term business strategy 
and as the result of market analyses. About 98% of total staff members around the 
business were transferred to a private company, and remaining employees were 
assigned to policy teams; others became responsible for new contract management 
functions. Overall, this BPO was evaluated as successful in achieving cost reduction 
and service improvement, and also the local area development proposed by DCSF. The 
enablers of this achievement were determined to be IT innovation and (private sector) 
management brought by Capita Hartshead.    
 
These phenomena, from the viewpoint of the client, were analysed in depth by this 
thesis‘s multidimensional IT outsourcing configuration framework, as summarised in 
Table 6-3. Implicit in the purpose of this framework, a comprehensive analysis was 
attempted, although some limits to applying the framework to BPO were discussed. The 
TPS outsourcing case could be understood in a combined perspective among strategy, 
contract structure and organisation construction dimensions. Nine decision points were 
determined through the mutual interrelationships and contextual backgrounds of each 
dimension. A principal decision was identified as scope grouping, and this affected the 
entirety of TPS administration. For example, large relative financial scale, total 
ownership, and sole supplier/prime contractor options were explained to be very 
consistent with this comprehensive BPO decision. Other decisions were also explored, 
involving a combination of certain choices and their underlying contexts. The primary 
context underpinning the service scope decision was the government-wide privatisation 
policy and DCSF‘s pursuit of a small, policy-centred department. These above 
observations fitted well into the lifecycle perspective of outsourcing management 
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adopted.    
 
With respect to organisational change in the client, this case is characterised by a radical 
removal of all delivery aspects of service from DCSF, caused by the ‗total‘ outsourcing 
of the business process. A governance model of this contract management was 
investigated as creating communication channels, together with informal channels, 
between the client and supplier; performance management and control were maintained 
through KPI evaluations and the audit system. Unexpectedly, a serious culture shock—
caused by the large staff transfer—was not observed for two reasons. First, the work 
environment was not significantly altered. Former employees of DCSF were still 
working together in the same building, although their affiliations had changed to a 
private company. Second, Capita was cautious when adopting the new management 
system. The company regarded itself as a supporter and change manager, instead of a 
supervisor. Although transferred upper-middle managers recognised the potential for 
heavy workloads, most other staff members did not share their concerns. Most 
interviewees supported the standpoint that change management of Capita was good 
enough during the transition period.         
  
A novel finding was the isolation of the contract management function from in-house 
policy teams. The DCSF case presents a good example of the decision-making 
processes represented by a role-based horizontal organisation, instead of a hierarchical 
contractual relationship. Mutual dependence on knowledge and information was found 
to be significant between the policy-related functions of DCSF and TP, rather than 
between policy and contract management teams within DCSF. In addition, there have 
been few apparent changes to the client organisation since the late 1990s. However, 
significant changes have occurred in the background. The contract management team‘s 
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intended involvement in day-to-day operations was transformed to performance 
management and to strengthening the audit system, due to the lack of human resources 
in terms of number and expertise. These observations should be understood as 
consequences of DCSF‘s overall BPO strategy.  
 
In addition to the client‘s organisational change, TP organisation was also explored, and 
it revealed possible transformations caused by outsourcing. Organisational change 
amongst transferred activities could be explained by two aspects—private organisation 
management adoption and IT innovation. The impact of the former involved the 
elimination of hierarchy in organisation arrangements; and that of the latter resulted in 
the transformation of processes and activities. Although these two aspects were related, 
TP staff members stated that effective innovation and transformation occurred after the 
unified adoption of IT. The management of IS seemed less complex than that observed 
in the Korean case. First, the basic functions of pension administration do not change 
frequently; furthermore, the supplier‘s system seemed to be a very flexible platform 
upon which to support diverse options of pensions business. Also, the client was not 
interested in IS because the client did not recognise IS as an independent object to 
control or monitor; therefore, no interference was likely to occur, as far as the supplier‘s 
business performance was satisfactory.  
 
Finally, and similar to the Korean case, institutionalised behaviour and perception was 
also relevant to this case. Many staff members worried about the loss of expertise 
required for policy-making. They suggested that these could be obtained only through 
involvement in day-to-day operations. Interestingly, this was a concern only of senior 
managers, who held extensive experience in TPS business, from operation to policy, 
before outsourcing. Whether they now belong to DCSF or TP, these senior managers 
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mentioned the importance of fundamental knowledge obtained through the everyday 
operations that they performed earlier in their careers in the organisation.  
 
While this may be true, it also reflects the view of structuration theory, which is that 
social systems are the reproduction of human behaviour within an institutionalised 
context; this provides the background theory to the thesis at hand. Although structural 
and bureaucratic arrangements have been transformed in some depth, human 
perceptions and behaviours that are contextually accumulated did not alter easily. 
Furthermore, DCSF reserves the right to buy every resource from Capita Hartshead, 
including the second TUPE, as an exit strategy. Many competitors also exist in the 
market. Under these circumstances, the risk of being seized by an external supplier can 
be reduced. Their major concerns were not about service quality or cost, but were more 
related with the identity and authority as an independent organisation in charge of TPS 
business. Younger staff members, however, were not concerned with this. It is self-
explanatory in that they have different contextual backgrounds compared with those of 
their seniors.   
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Table 6-3: Framework-based TPS outsourcing summary, in terms of client 
D
im
e-
n
si
o
n What? Why? How? 
Decision point Options Description Context Process 
S
tr
at
eg
y
 
Scope 
grouping 
Entire 
service 
scope 
Outsourcing of all 
resources and processes 
 Focusing on core businesses and the nature of deal, based 
on BPO adoption 
 Risk mitigation thanks to purchasability of service 
 Service characteristic in terms of recipient and geographic 
coverage 
cf. Strategic alignment, delivery of business value through 
IT, risk management, and control and accountability  
Architect 
 Applying the 
government 
policy of 
privatisation 
 Market-
testing and 
selection of 
service scope 
and resources 
to be 
outsourced 
 Persuading 
stakeholders  
 
Regenerate 
 Reflecting 
and 
consolidating 
contract and 
relationship 
All business 
units 
Use of outsourcing 
service without exception 
All 
geographies 
Nationwide service from 
Darlington site 
Financial 
scale 
Large 
relative  
Outsourcing of all IT and 
most related costs  
 Result of taking entire service scope option 
cf. Same concerns with above scope grouping 
Large 
absolute  
£8.86 million per annum 
Resource 
ownership 
Total 
ownership 
Supplier‘s assets, 
facilities and labour 
 No appropriate prior in-house resources 
 Nature of deal based on BPO adoption 
cf. Control and accountability concern 
Commercial 
relationship 
Arms-length 
 
Distinct accountabilities 
between exclusive two 
parties 
 Exclusive accountability 
 Selection and concentration under limited in-house resource 
cf. Control and accountability, and performance management 
concerns 
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D
im
e-
n
si
o
n What? Why? How? 
Decision point Options Description Context Process 
C
o
n
tr
ac
t 
st
ru
ct
u
re
 
Supplier 
grouping 
Sole 
supplier or 
Prime 
contractor 
Allowance of sole 
supplier or prime 
contractor entry to bid 
(Resulting in sole 
supplier) 
 Single point of accountability 
 Nature of deal based on BPO adoption 
 Risk mitigation thanks to purchasability of service 
cf. Control and accountability, and risk management concerns 
Engage 
 Collecting 
opinions 
from market 
 Applying 
government 
procurement 
procedures 
Pricing 
framework 
Lump-sum 
fixed price 
Labour cost based fixed 
price 
 Simple and low management cost 
 Risk transfer by all inclusive pricing policy 
cf. Control and accountability, and risk management concerns 
Contract 
duration 
Rollover 7-year and extendable by 
up to 3 years 
 Government regulation 
 Flexibility sustaining both stability and motivation 
cf. Control and accountability, and risk management concerns 
O
rg
an
is
at
io
n
 c
o
n
st
ru
ct
io
n
 Organisation 
arrangements 
Policy and 
contract 
management 
Focusing on policy unit 
and creation of a small 
contract management 
team 
 Aiming at small policy-centred organisation 
 Self-confidence in knowledge of business and experience 
of performance management 
cf. All IT governance concerns 
Operate 
 Securing staff 
transfer 
 
NB. IT 
innovation and 
private sector 
management 
adoption in 
transferred area 
Processes 
and 
activities 
Regular 
meetings 
and informal 
relationship 
Establishing diverse 
formal meetings and 
separating policy and 
contract management 
functions 
 Constructing effective control and cooperative work with 
understaffed resource  
 Balance between formal and informal communication 
cf. All IT governance concerns 
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7 SYNTHESIS AND COMPARISON OF CASE STUDIES 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
SYNTHESIS AND COMPARISON OF CASE STUDIES 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents a synthesis, and a comparison across the two case studies. To 
avoid confusion, it is worth stating in advance that the analysed phenomena and derived 
implications cannot be generalised in any simplistic manner. This thesis embodies 
interpretive case research focusing on an in-depth understanding of social processes, 
human behaviours, and change within specific contexts. Therefore, only two empirical 
cases were chosen and these have been intensively explored. These cases were not 
selected as representative of global outsourcing practices or even public sector 
outsourcing practices, but rather each case was selected as a case in itself in order to 
explore the distinctive context, content and processes related to the relevant outsourcing 
decisions and their enactment over time.   
 
More specifically, the results of PPS‘s case study cannot be extended to all Korean 
government bodies or the whole IT outsourcing industry in Korea, let alone that of East 
Asian countries. Assuming that the fundamental distinction between the PPS and DCSF 
cases is the perceived significance of internal management against outsourced functions, 
certain Korean government organisations may, and some indeed do, still transfer their 
IT functions to third parties with less involvement than does DCSF. On the other hand, 
some British government organisations may be, and are, involved in day-to-day 
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operations more strongly than PPS. In practice one contribution of this research is to 
demonstrate what Cullen, Seddon and Willcocks (2005) found which was both a 
remarkable diversity in configuration in both IT outsourcing and BPO cases, but also no 
obvious pattern in the levels of success achieved by any one set of configuration choices. 
Their argument that because outsourcing arrangements can be so different, it is a 
mistake to treat them all as instances of the same phenomenon, is definitely confirmed 
by the present thesis findings.   
 
This aspect is not found in the general outsourcing literature, and also deepens the more 
generic finding by an international comparative study on e-government—involving the 
UK, the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands and Japan—conducted 
by Dunleavy et al. (2006). According to them, the Netherlands‘ government 
organisations generally show much more interest in internal IT capabilities compared 
with the UK. The US government also shows a strong involvement tradition compared 
to other Western countries except for the Netherlands. In contrast, the Japanese 
government has the tendency to transfer more resources and responsibilities to private 
companies compared with the UK.    
 
The demonstration of each case‘s representative nature and the possibility of 
generalisation based on this comparative case study are not within the scope of this 
research. Instead, the comparative analyses in this chapter provide a more convincing 
understanding of each case in terms of its original and specific context and its social 
process beyond the individual description presented in previous chapters.       
 
As presented in Chapter Four, Pettigrew (1997) suggests that a longitudinal case study 
is the best research method for contextual research; its structure was established using a 
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set of four components including context, content, process and outcome. This 
proposition was embedded within the reinvented analytical framework of this thesis as 
the multidimensional IT outsourcing configuration framework illustrated in Figure 4-1 
in the conceptual framework chapter. The descriptions and analyses of the two case 
studies have followed this framework throughout Chapters Five and Six. Table 5-6 and 
Table 6-3 summarise the result and the process of using this framework. Based on the 
outcome components of three dimensions (strategy, contract structure, and organisation 
construction), the questions ‗why‘, ‗how‘, and ‗what‘ are coherently explored within 
this framework.  
 
The benefits of this approach are well expressed by Pettigrew (1997, p. 342) as follows: 
Building an outcome into a process research design has a number of 
advantages. Firstly, the outcome both simplifies and complicates the study 
by providing a focal point, an anchor for the whole investigation. Secondly 
and crucially, there is the possibility to explore how and why variations in 
context and process shape variability in the observed outcomes across the 
comparative investigation. How policy outcomes are shaped by the process 
and the context is after all one of the central distinguishing questions that 
can be posed in process research. In many social science fields, and 
certainly in equilibrium models in Economics, the interest is only in the 
result of the process, not the process itself. Process research is capable of 
generating sound knowledge not only of processes and outcomes but also of 
why and how outcomes are differentially shaped by processes. 
This chapter synthesises and compares two case studies according to the criteria of this 
framework in order to maintain consistency and gain the benefits Pettigrew suggests. 
Observable similarity and dissimilarity are analysed in the section on content and 
outcome analysis, which is followed by the section on context and process analyses. 
Finally, a section of discussion and implications will present the holistic understanding 
of these syntheses and comparisons.       
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7.2 Outcome and content analysis 
 
This section compares decisions made by PPS and DCSF. In-depth analyses of context 
and process will follow in the next two sections. The purpose of this section is to clarify 
the similarities and differences of the decisions made by these two organisations within 
identical components of the framework. In the case of PPS, what will be compared are 
the existing decisions resulting from the transformation in 2005. These changes will be 
analysed and compared in terms of context and process at a later point.  
 
7.2.1 Strategic dimension 
 
Strategy has been dealt with as the first outcome in comprehending the four decision 
points. It involves a set of decisions outlining the consequences of outsourcing in terms 
of scope grouping, financial scale, resource ownership, and commercial relationship 
management. The comparison between PPS‘s and DCSF‘s decisions in this dimension 
is summarised in Table 7-1. PPS and DCSF took the same options at most decision 
points except resource ownership, where PPS chose onsite ownership and DCSF chose 
total ownership. However, the specific elements of these largely similar decisions are, 
upon investigation, quite different. 
 
In terms of their commercial relationship, both organisations selected the arms-length 
option. There is no relationship, such as shared equity, between PPS and SDS or DCSF 
and Capita Hartshead. One party in each contract is a government organisation and the 
other is a private company. On the one hand, there was no alternate consideration 
observed in DCSF‘s case. DCSF conducted contract management based on a 
performance control perspective. Capita Hartshead periodically reports its performance 
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to its client, DCSF, and DCSF evaluates it. Although both parties set up diverse 
channels for the purpose of communication, these channels are not meant for 
participation in day-to-day operations, but for the review of a performance report or the 
sharing of information.  
 
Table 7-1: Comparison of strategic dimension between PPS and DCSF  
Decision 
point 
Selected options Comparison 
(P: PPS after transformation; D: DCSF) PPS DCSF 
Commercial 
relationship 
Co-sourced 
→  Arms-
length 
Arms-length P: Exclusive relationship in terms of 
process control  
D: Exclusive relationship in terms of 
performance control 
Scope 
grouping 
Entire service 
scope 
Entire service 
scope 
P: Outsourcing of entire IT functions  
D: Outsourcing of entire business process 
All business 
units 
All business 
units 
No difference 
All 
geographies 
All 
geographies 
No difference 
Financial 
scale 
Large 
relative  
Large 
relative 
P: 60-70% of total IT budget for IT service 
outsourcing, IS development 
outsourcing, and system operation  
D: 100% of budget for business process 
operation 
Large 
absolute  
Large 
absolute 
P: £2.3m IT service outsourcing (2007) 
D: £8.9m TPS administration outsourcing 
(2007-08) 
Resource 
ownership 
Labour buy-
in → Onsite 
Total 
ownership 
P: Supplier-owned labour and supplier-
controlled asset  
D: Supplier-owned labour, asset, and 
facility 
 
On the other hand, PPS‘s arms-length relationship is exercised during everyday 
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operations. PPS‘s in-house employees work as process managers who are in charge of 
the final approval of each process. These authorisation processes are structurally 
embedded in the integrated e-GP service management workflow. This can be 
conceptualised as an exclusive relationship in terms of process control, though there are 
also performance control activities such as periodical service level evaluations. The 
philosophy of performance management had been declared, but the emphasis on a 
service level itself was not significant. 
 
Within the scope grouping, no difference was found in the recipient and geographic 
scope components. These decisions followed the business and technological 
environment. In this term, standardised and integrated service character supports these 
decisions. Outsourcing service was delivered to all business staff, and it was not 
required to come from regionally separate sites. On the other hand, there was also a 
qualitative difference within the same service scope option, similar to that of the arms-
length commercial relationship. DCSF transferred all resources to Capita Hartshead and 
outsourced the entire TPS administration process to the company, whereas PPS 
delegated the IT functions for its e-GP services mainly to SDS and two other private 
companies.  
 
Third, both organisations‘ decisions regarding financial scale resulted in large relative 
and large absolute options. As explained in previous chapters, financial scales were 
regarded as being dependent upon the decisions of scope grouping in both cases. There 
was no evidence of original and independent effects on this component caused by 
financial conditions. PPS consumed 60-70% of the total IT budget for IT service 
outsourcing, IS development outsourcing and system maintenance fees from 2004 to 
2007. In the case of DCSF, due to the characteristics of BPO, all related budgetary 
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elements could be investigated for use with the contract; no budget was appropriated for 
IT within a TPS account.   
 
The final content of the strategic outcome is resource ownership, which shows different 
options only within this dimension. Onsite and total ownership options were chosen by 
PPS and DCSF, respectively. DCSF‘s TPS was administered by Capita Hartshead‘s 
assets, labours and facilities. Prior DCSF-owned employees and legacy systems were 
transferred to Capita Hartshead from the beginning of the outsourcing in 1996. On the 
other hand, only labour was provided by SDS in PPS‘s case. All assets and facilities are 
owned by PPS. However, as mentioned in Chapter Five, SDS has maintained control of 
assets (hardware and software) since the transformation 2005.      
 
To sum up the presented differences, every option chosen by the two organisations was 
the same except for resource ownership. However, qualitative differences within the 
same option were also found in the arms-length commercial relationship, entire service 
scope and large relative financial scale decisions. Some of these differences can be 
explained by the characteristics of IT outsourcing and BPO. As discussed in Chapter 
Six, the entire service scope and the large relative financial scale were only possible in 
BPO. The total ownership option was presented as almost unique to BPO as well. 
However, a more important determinant of these differences seems to be the perception 
of IT or related business processes as a core business of each organisation. This will be 
explored in detail later in the section of discussion and implications.       
 
7.2.2 Contract structure dimension 
 
The contract structure dimension consists of three decision points: supplier grouping, 
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pricing framework and contract duration. Contract structure as an outcome in this 
context means a set of diverse decisions and relationships that constitute a contract 
document and authorised practice. The comparison of contract structure between PPS 
and DCSF is summarised in Table 7-2. As confirmed by this Table, PPS and DCSF 
chose different options at all three decision points.  
 
Table 7-2: Comparison of contract structure dimension between PPS and DCSF  
Decision 
point 
Selected options Comparison 
(P: PPS after transformation;  D: 
DCSF) PPS DCSF 
Supplier 
grouping 
Sole supplier or 
Prime contractor → 
Best-of-Breed 
Sole supplier 
or Prime 
contractor 
P: Separating IT functions and 
selecting different suppliers   
D: Sole accountability 
Pricing 
framework 
Lump-sum fixed 
price → Hybrid of 
lump-sum fixed and 
cost-based pricing  
Lump-sum 
fixed price 
P: Combined pricing based on 
the function points analysis  
D: Labour cost-based fixed price 
Contract 
duration 
Single term  
(1-yr → 3-yr) 
Rollover P: 3-year contract  
D: 7-year and extendable by up 
to 3 years 
 
The first point is supplier grouping. DCSF maintained the sole supplier or prime 
contractor option during three consecutive contracts, from 1996 to the existing bid 
announcement for the third term contract. There was always a sole supplier, Capita 
Hartshead, but DCSF also allowed the participation of a prime contractor. On the other 
hand, PPS‘s choice was best-of-breed in the transformation of 2005. Before then, PPS‘s 
choice was the same as DCSF‘s sole accountability option (sole supplier or prime 
contractor). Although there was a contract for system maintenance/operation with 
another company, if the scope of this discussion were limited to IT service outsourcing, 
it could be evaluated as sole accountability option. In 2005, PPS divided its IT service 
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outsourcing into external and internal and applied the best-of-breed option there.   
 
The next component is the pricing framework. DCSF‘s choice was a lump-sum fixed 
price based on labour costs, whereas PPS transformed prior lump-sum fixed price into a 
hybrid structure consisting of both lump-sum fixed and cost-based pricing. The latter 
was applied to flexible contingent application development outsourcing; and the former 
remained in the conventional KONEPS service operation outsourcing side. As discussed 
in Chapter Five, the basis for cost assessment was also changed to the FP counting 
method. This change was introduced as an innovation of cost assessment from input 
(labour) to output (target system scale).  
 
The last aspect of this dimension is contract duration, which was also not equal between 
the two organisations. DCSF‘s contract term was set up as a seven-year rollover 
extendable by up to three years. PPS maintained the single term option, but the contract 
term was extended from one to three years in 2005. PPS‘s extension of contract term 
was the result of consideration of the contract stability enhancement which was not 
required to DCSF. In any case, the options were selected based on each government‘s 
procurement regulation.  
 
As previously shown, every decision in this dimension differed between PPS and DCSF. 
PPS‘s case in particular illustrates the aspect of mutual relationship from decision to 
decision. For example, the newly separated service scope grouping worked as a 
fundamental background for the transformation of supplier grouping and the pricing 
framework.   
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7.2.3 Organisation construction dimension 
 
The third output was conceptualised as an organisation construction, which means the 
design and execution of in-house resources in terms of organisation arrangements, and 
processes and activities. A comparison summary of this dimension is provided in Table 7-3.   
 
Table 7-3: Comparison of organisation construction dimension between PPS and DCSF  
Decision 
point 
Selected options Comparison 
(P: PPS after transformation; D: 
DCSF) PPS DCSF 
Organisation 
arrangements 
Hierarchical 
bureaucracy → 
Horizontal 
bureaucracy 
Policy and 
contract 
management 
P: Re-deployment of internal 
experts responding to 
horizontal ITIL processes   
D: Focusing on policy unit and 
creation of a small contract 
management team  
Processes 
and activities 
Hierarchical 
bureaucracy 
→ITIL process-
based ITSM  
Performance 
evaluation, 
regular meetings 
and informal 
relationship 
P: Recomposing a process-based 
workflow supported by 
ITSM system  
D: Establishing formal 
communication channels 
 
In terms of organisational arrangements that are represented by the organisation‘s form 
and staffing, DCSF followed a conventional path. As a BPO arrangement, DCSF 
transferred all operation staff and organisation to Capita Hartshead. The remaining 
internal organisation was minimised to become small and policy-focused. To manage 
the outsourcing deal, a contract management team was created with a small number of 
staff. On the other hand, strong IT divisions remained within PPS. In spite of a 
complicated and repetitive transformation and restoration, the fundamental rationale of 
the innovation was the deployment of the organisation‘s form and staff to a process-
based horizontal structure, replacing the prior business domain-based hierarchical 
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bureaucracy. A contract management function and a service level evaluation function 
were established within an existing IT division in 2005. However, these were less 
important for PPS than for DCSF.  
 
The other component is processes and activities. DCSF and Capita Hartshead set up 
diverse level regular meetings as formal communication channels to do contract 
management work. These were found to be the key mechanism to control and monitor 
Capita Hartshead‘s operation work. DCSF began to accept the performance 
management-centred control, though they initially considered stronger involvement in 
everyday operations. In contrast, PPS became more directly involved in outsourced 
operations. They operated as process managers and tried to control the service 
management process under the condition that technology-related works would be 
exclusively transferred to SDS. The key practice enabling this process-based 
management style was ITIL, which describes a set of the best practices of IT service 
management. Performance management is separately conducted by the review and 
assessment of SDS‘s performance report. A number of official meetings (fewer than 
DCSF) operate as well between PPS‘s IT division in charge of contract management, 
SDS and business divisions.       
 
7.3 Context analysis  
 
The purpose of this section is to compare the underlying context of different decisions 
made by PPS and DCSF. This once again employs the analytical framework used in 
Chapters Five and Six. More specifically, identical IT governance concerns function as 
criteria of the comparison and will be more descriptive than those in the content and 
outcome comparison in the previous section. Based on this comparison, synthetic 
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interpretation will be attempted in the discussion and implication section.   
 
7.3.1 Strategy dimension 
 
According to the results of individual empirical investigations, nearly identical IT 
governance concerns can explain why specific decisions of PPS and DCSF were made. 
The only distinction is the application of a strategic alignment concern applied to the 
commercial relationship decision only within PPS. This mapping relationship is 
displayed in Table 7-4. Indicated abbreviations in each attribute represent involved 
decision points responding to specific IT governance concerns and applied 
organisations.   
 
DCSF‘s case confirms a more conventional view of IT outsourcing determinants. In 
contrast to the PPS, DCSF‘s context is linked with the outsourcing determinant 
discussion in that most of concerns form backgrounds from when DCSF adopted 
outsourcing in 1996. On the other hand, PPS‘s context describes why it transformed 
prior pseudo-IT outsourcing into an IT outsourcing contract. By interpreting Table 7-4, 
we can conclude that DCSF selected outsourcing because TPS is a non-core business 
(strategic alignment); it is required to access advanced private IS (delivery of business 
value through IT) and needs to avoid the risk of large IT investment (risk management). 
As a result, DCSF had to devise a control mechanism (control and accountability) and 
the performance evaluation emerged as a solution (performance management).  
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Table 7-4: Comparison of the context of strategy decisions between PPS and DCSF  
IT 
governance 
concern 
Comparison 
PPS rationale DCSF rationale 
Strategic 
alignment 
(CR/SC/FS)  
Developing in-house capabilities 
under the perception of e-GP as 
core business 
(SC/FS) 
Developing in-house capabilities 
under the perception of TPS 
administration as non-core business 
Delivery of 
business 
value 
through IT 
(SC/FS) 
Regarding e-GP management as 
authoritative business rather than 
supportive IT 
(SC/FS) 
Employing advanced private sector 
IT for TPS service improvement 
Performance 
management 
(CR) 
Increasing the importance of 
performance control in search of 
distinctive accountabilities 
(CR) 
Increasing the importance of 
performance control under exclusive 
accountabilities 
Risk 
management 
(SC/FS) 
Avoiding the loss of knowledge 
(SC/FS) 
Avoiding large IT investment risk 
Control and 
accountability 
(CR/RO/SG/FS) 
Concerning control mechanism 
under new exclusive accountability 
(CR/RO/SG/FS) 
Concerning control mechanism in 
terms of contract management 
 
* CR: Commercial relationship; SG: Scope grouping; FS: Financial scale; RO: 
Resource ownership 
 
On the other hand, PPS‘s case addresses a slightly inconsistent context. First of all, PPS 
recognised e-GP management as one of its core functions (strategic alignment). 
Accordingly, it was concerned about the loss of knowledge (risk management) in 
determining e-GP management to be a business that should be delivered by its own in-
house capabilities (delivery of business value through IT). In spite of these conditions, 
the lack of in-house resources—representing the characteristics of public sector 
organisations—forced PPS to adopt outsourcing. Under these circumstances, PPS‘s 
initial choice was buy-in contracts that mean external resources under internal 
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management. However, this approach revealed many limitations in gaining the expected 
benefits, as presented in Chapter Five. After all, PPS‘s IT outsourcing innovation was 
symbolised by performance management and ITIL-based IT service management 
process control. It was the result of a new control mechanism (control and 
accountability) and an emphasis on performance evaluation (performance management). 
 
Under these circumstances, what is the key difference between the two organisations‘ 
concerns? It must be whether or not IT was regarded as their core business. PPS might 
follow a similar path to DCSF if it perceived e-GP management to be a non-core 
business. This aspect is also unveiled by the fact that strategic alignment was not 
applied to explain the context of the commercial relationship decision in DCSF. As 
displayed in Figure 4-2 in Chapter Four, the initial framework included the strategic 
alignment within the related IT governance concerns of commercial relationship. (Note 
that this framework was devised as a result of the literature review and this thesis‘s pilot 
research conducted on PPS.) However, DCSF, who categorised the TPS administration 
as a non-core function, did not have to concern about other options in commercial 
relationship. On the contrary, PPS needed to concern the strategic alignment in order to 
separate the roles and responsibilities of internal and external staff for the purpose of 
developing original in-house capabilities against the problems in its previous 
disorganised co-sourced relationship.   
 
7.3.2 Contract structure dimension 
 
Within the contract structure dimension, performance management, risk management 
and control and accountability concerns were investigated to explain the contexts of the 
two organisations‘ related decisions. This performance management concern was 
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related to the PPS case only. Table 7-5 summarises them.   
 
Table 7-5: Comparison of the context of contract structure decisions of PPS and DCSF  
IT 
governance 
concern 
Comparison 
PPS rationale DCSF rationale 
Performance 
management 
(PF/CD) 
Considering pricing and contract 
duration as tools for suppliers‘ 
motivation 
- 
Risk 
management 
(SU/PF/CD) 
 Taking the risk of complexity 
caused by switching supplier 
and complicated pricing  
 Avoiding the risk of instability 
caused by 1-yr contract  
(SU/PF/CD) 
 Avoiding the risk of complexity 
by adopting sole accountability 
and lump-sum fixed pricing 
 Avoiding the risk of long/short-
term contract by adopting mid-
term contract duration  
Control and 
accountability 
(SU/PF) 
 Maintaining consistency 
between control authority and 
its responsibility 
 Using pricing as a control tool 
(SU/CD) 
 Little concern about over-
dependency on specific supplier 
owing to the high replaceability 
of service 
 Control by the evaluation of 
extension 
 
* SU: Supplier grouping; PF: Pricing framework; CD: Contract duration 
 
First, performance management contributes to the explanation of pricing framework and 
contract duration decisions in PPS. PPS assumed that cost-based pricing and a long-
term contract would motivate suppliers. These two transformations were declared as key 
innovation practices after acrid disputes occurred at PPS. However, such concerns were 
not observed at DCSF. A multi-year contract had already been established as a common 
contracting method in the UK government; therefore, DCSF seemed not to have 
concerns about it. Similarly, the pricing method was not used for the purpose of 
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motivation; it was recognised as more important in terms of risk management, as will 
soon be discussed.   
 
From the viewpoint of risk management, DCSF preferred to mitigate risk by reducing 
complexity. It chose the sole accountability option in supplier grouping and lump-sum 
fixed pricing. Regarding the latter, DCSF was able to transfer all financial risk by 
making Capita Hartshead absorb any additional cost related to service provision. In 
contrast, PPS decided to take the risk of complexity by using multiple providers—
including switching a vendor in the internal buy-in contract—and complicated cost-
based pricing. In terms of contract duration, PPS tried to mitigate the risk of instability 
by adopting a three-year contract, replacing its previous single-year contract term.       
 
Finally, regarding control and accountability concerns, PPS chose to maintain 
consistency between control authority and its responsibility in 2005. The prior 
discrepancy between authority and responsibility was perceived to be the cause of 
PPS‘s disorganised relationship management. For example, PPS divided its previously 
integrated scope into an internal service buy-in contract and an external IT service 
outsourcing contract and gave more responsibility regarding internal service operation 
works to its in-house experts. In this way, the autonomy of SDS in external service was 
enhanced. In addition, PPS also used a new pricing method based on costs as a control 
mechanism. Compared to this, DCSF was not concerned about over-dependency on a 
single supplier thanks to the replaceability of pensions administration service 
outsourcing. The rollover contract duration option was also a control tool based on the 
evaluation of a supplier regarding the decision of contract extension.  
 
In conclusion, PPS showed a tendency to take the risk of a complex contract structure, 
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whereas DCSF tried to avoid it. It is the finding of this thesis that this tendency was 
necessarily linked with the decisions made in strategy dimension. The underlying 
background of PPS‘s risk-taking was the development of in-house capability and 
knowledge retention in outsourced services that were regarded as PPS‘s core businesses. 
Furthermore, PPS recognised that complexity management itself should be its new IT 
competency. The adoptions of a complicated pricing method or of multiple providers 
sourcing are examples of this. In addition, the differences between the two organisations 
and their related contexts were disclosed by the analysis of IT governance concerns 
applied to each decision point. For example, PPS transformed its pricing framework and 
contract duration options based on performance management concerns, since 
performance management emerged as a new capability required for outsourcing contract 
management. However, it was not new to DCSF. Consequently, no related concern was 
found in DCSF.      
  
7.3.3 Organisation construction dimension 
 
Every IT governance concern was understood to involve most decisions also in the 
organisation construction dimension. What this means is that all decision points and IT 
governance concerns were found to operate in a comprehensive manner. For example, 
the strategic alignment concern determined PPS‘s rationale of process-based 
management to be a core capability, and this rationale gave direction to all decisions 
regarding organisational arrangements and processes and activities. Under these 
circumstances, the comparison focuses on the description of differences and their 
contexts. In DCSF‘s case, only the client‘s side (since TP is understood to be the 
supplier‘s side) is within the scope of the discussion. Table 7-6 summarises the context 
comparison in this dimension.   
 292 
Table 7-6: Comparison of the context of organisation construction decisions between 
PPS and DCSF 
IT 
governance 
concern 
Comparison 
PPS rationale DCSF rationale 
Strategic 
alignment 
(OA/PA)  
Process-based organisation 
construction under the perception 
of process control as a strategic 
capability 
(OA/PA) 
Policy-centred organisation 
construction under the perception of 
TPS policy as a strategic business 
Delivery of 
business 
value 
through IT 
(OA/PA) 
Developing IT outsourcing 
management as a new business of 
PPS‘s IT function 
(OA/PA) 
Concentrating on TPS policy 
business by use of outsourced 
administration service 
Performance 
management 
(OA/PA) 
Setting up performance 
management function and 
organisation 
(OA/PA) 
Focusing on performance 
management in contract 
management organisation  
Risk 
management 
(OA/PA) 
Avoiding the loss of knowledge 
(OA/PA) 
Less risk perception based on the 
replaceable character of pensions 
administration outsourcing service 
Control and 
accountability 
(OA/PA) 
Process-based control and 
accountability exercised through 
ITIL process allocation 
(OA/PA) 
Performance-based control and 
accountability exercised through 
diverse communication channels  
* OA: Organisation arrangements; PA: Processes and activities 
 
The fundamental distinction between the two organisations is their differing perceptions 
of core capability in contract management. On the one hand, PPS sought deeper 
involvement in operation processes, though the core capabilities were designed based 
on the exclusive accountability principle. On the other hand, DCSF regarded its core 
capability as a performance management capability to avoid shared processes with 
Capita Hartshead. Based on these separate principles, PPS implemented process-based 
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organisation forms, processes and activities, while DCSF pursued a policy-centred 
organisation, focusing its contract management on performance evaluation.  
 
Risk management can also be viewed from another angle. PPS was concerned about the 
loss of knowledge, so it tried to find solutions. Its initial approach was a direct 
involvement as the managers in charge of the supplier‘s workforce control, as was 
observed before 2004. Since 2005, PPS has struggled to find a different solution based 
on new IT outsourcing management skills such as process control and performance 
management. The rationale for this was a change in core capabilities from the old 
input/direct/technology-based control to the new performance/ITIL process/IT service-
based control. In contrast, regardless of its similar concerns about loss of knowledge, 
DCSF continues to increase its ability for performance evaluation and sophisticated 
contract structure, as represented by its feasible exit plan.  
 
7.4 Analysis by process  
 
The analytical framework used in both case studies employs the lifecycle perspective on 
sourcing process developed by Cullen, Seddon, and Willcocks (2006) to contribute to 
the phasic understanding of phenomena. The phases consist of architect, engage, operate 
and regenerate. 
 
Most differences in the outsourcing processes are related to contents or context 
components that have been presented above. For example, an intensive consideration of 
the development of new outsourcing arrangements to replace the previous buy-in 
contract was observed in PPS during the architect and regenerate phases, but this was a 
matter of content rather than something peculiar to the process-related features. The 
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nature of activities conducted by each organisation seemed to be not very different. 
Both organisations invested in following the general processes of nine building 
blocks—investigate, target, strategise, design, select, negotiate, transition, manage, and 
refresh—within four phases. In spite of this, a comparison can be made based on the 
different context of each organisation. The following comparison results can be 
interpreted as answers to the ‗how‘ question implied by this process component.  
 
First, PPS‘s IT outsourcing was entirely driven by its IT divisions, whereas business 
units played the main role in DCSF. The reasons for this seem simple. PPS initiated its 
outsourcing innovation due to the identity crisis of its in-house IT experts. In contrast, 
DCSF‘s IT division did not appear in the process investigation. The fundamental 
background of this difference might be, again, the different perceptions of IT as a core 
business.      
 
Second, there was a great deal of evidence that PPS emphasised its public relations to 
justify its outsourcing innovation during the architect phase. In addition, it obtained an 
ISO/IEC 20000 specification for the same purpose. Public relations were required 
because there was no precedent for the transformation in many respects. However, it did 
not happen in DCSF, which paid attention to the public relations regarding improved 
services and has been benchmarked by many other organisations to learn the factors of 
its success. However, DCSF seems not to be as proactive as PPS. In terms of 
outsourcing and organisational change, DCSF did not have any incentives because the 
TPS outsourcing was a typical BPO deal encouraged by government policy.  
 
Third, during the engagement phase, both organisations processed procurement work in 
accordance with relevant regulations. This is a common practice of public organisations. 
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However, the level of competitiveness was quite different between the two. The 
pensions administration outsourcing industry is a relatively competitive market; 
therefore, DCSF showed much more interest in attracting bidding participants and 
setting up a feasible exit plan describing the incumbent contractor‘s responsibility to 
support the next contractor in taking over the service in case of a change in supplier. In 
contrast, e-GP service‘s outsourcing is not a very competitive market. Consequently, 
PPS emphasised internal management design to control suppliers and monitor 
performance.  
 
Finally, within the transition period, complexity took a different shape. The 
deterioration of TPS‘s service quality was reported in DCSF during the initial transition 
stage in 1996. A radical reduction in the number of employees was a possible cause. In 
addition, due to the characteristics of the large-scale BPO deal, there were considerable 
efforts made in terms of personnel management because most of the staff was 
transferred to Capita Hartshead. This was serious because it was a transfer from the 
public sector to the private sector. Such phenomena were not observed in PPS; the 
mainstream service provider and its constituents were maintained during the transition 
period. The transformed structure focuses on re-building the relationship between client 
and supplier. Consequently, it took in-house IT experts awhile to adapt themselves to 
their new roles and responsibilities. As discussed in Chapter Five, this was successful in 
some points and not in others.  
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7.5 Discussion and implications  
 
7.5.1 Outsourcing environment 
 
The result of a comparison between PPS and DCSF describes many points of similarity 
and dissimilarity in terms of managerial decisions and social processes. Based on these 
findings, this comparison provides many implications for related studies and practices 
on outsourcing. These will be presented in a holistic manner across all decision points 
and IT governance concerns, rather than as in the previous sectionalised analyses; 
theoretical perspectives will be employed to understand and interpret findings.  
 
Overall, the two cases of PPS and DCSF are quite different. PPS implemented IT 
outsourcing by focusing on building in-house capability as a core competency; 
accordingly, it retained relatively strong in-house IT expertise accompanying 
bureaucratic organisational change. Meanwhile, DCSF adopted a typical BPO strategy, 
transferring all resources to a third party and concentrating on performance management 
through the newly established function of contract management. The most significant 
difference between the two cases is derived from their opposite decisions regarding the 
core/non-core distinction. This was a common contextual characteristic penetrating all 
other decisions, human perceptions, social processes and resulting phenomena. This was 
originally explored as a component within the strategy dimension; but, this thesis found 
that it was, in fact, the starting point of all subsequent decisions about contract structure 
and organisation construction. As another important point, even in the cases of 
apparently the same decisions, structural elements inside those and underlying social 
contexts were investigated as being totally different in many cases.    
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However, many similarities exist as well. For instance, many of the decisions made by 
PPS and DCSF were the same. Yet, it is noteworthy that similar social contexts were 
extensively observed. The examples are the common concerns about in-house 
knowledge dilution, suppliers‘ opportunistic behaviours, accurate performance 
evaluation, and so on.  
 
Following these overall understandings, this comparative study reveals some standards 
to interpret findings and explore implications. These standards originate from the 
differences in terms of business and the technological outsourcing environments. Two 
transcendental distinctions were assumed: ‗IT outsourcing vs. BPO‘ and ‗Korea vs. UK‘. 
These two are expected to primarily distinguish the characteristics of the PPS and DCSF 
cases. Additionally, from the collected findings and associated analyses, three further 
criteria were derived as follows: ‗core vs. non-core perception of outsourced functions‘, 
‗high vs. low supplier switching costs‘ and ‗high vs. low variability in terms of business 
and applied IT‘. These criteria were invented, in that these were identified, from the 
literature and the case research experience, as common elements leading to holistic 
understanding through comparison. For instance, the recognition of e-GP as core 
business forced PPS to devise a complex scope grouping and the application of various 
management skills; whereas, the opposite stance of DCSF led to different results, 
including ‗total‘ outsourcing. In addition, DCSF‘s relatively low supplier switching 
costs, caused by the existence of alternative competitors, allowed DCSF to be less 
concerned about being captured by a single supplier, while PPS did think much of that 
possibility. Finally, frequent application change requests in PPS underlay the context of 
pricing framework and scope grouping decisions transformation. By comparison, such 
dynamic aspects are relatively innocuous in DCSF. The PPS and DCSF cases can be 
categorised as illustrated in Figure 7-1.   
 298 
Figure 7-1: Distinction between PPS and DCSF outsourcing environments 
 
 
 
7.5.2 Discussion and implications 
 
The first explicit standard to consider in the contribution or implication of this thesis is 
the regional difference in the two cases. Both are central government organisations, but 
we can assume that some differences may be explained by their countries. To state the 
conclusion first, this thesis found that this regional distinction had some, but limited, 
explanatory power.   
 
The UK is one of the strongest NPM governments, the characteristics of which are 
described as downsizing and private sector involvement (Dunleavy et al. 2006; Flynn 
2007; Walsh 1995). In particular, Dunleavy et al. (2006) found many overall similarities 
between NPM governments—the UK, Australia, and New Zealand—in their seven-
country comparative study. Apparently, phenomena observed in DCSF can be explained 
by the NPM tradition in the UK government. For example, it chose radical privatisation, 
PPS DCSF 
Core function 
Korean context UK context 
IT outsourcing BPO 
High switching costs 
High variability 
Non-core function 
Low switching costs 
Low variability 
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represented by total BPO; this was encouraged by the government-wide reform 
programme. By contrast, PPS decided to use relatively limited IT outsourcing, retaining 
significant in-house functions even within those areas. However, the Korean 
government also declared small and efficient government as its aim, and e-government 
initiatives were one of the measures to achieve it. That idea formed the context of why 
many government organisations were not allowed to increase their numbers of 
employees in spite of the radically increased workload of e-government systems 
management.  
 
Consequently, this thesis is unable to find significant differences explained by cultural 
differences between the two countries. This is consistent with Dunleavy et al.‘s finding 
that there was little impact caused by the cultural differences in IT outsourcing practices 
presented in Chapter Two. As revealed by in-depth interviews with incumbent and prior 
DCSF staff, many of the UK government officials showed similar concerns or even 
hostility toward the outsourcing, which was also observed in the Korean PPS‘s public 
servants. There was some contrary evidence that even PPS took the path toward a total 
BPO approach in the desktop and LAN management outsourcing where these activities 
were regarded as a non-core business. It is more appropriate to explain the observed 
differences by other criteria, such as core/non-core perception. For example, this thesis 
suggests, within the empirical studies of this thesis, that TPS administration was 
outsourced as a BPO not because DCSF belongs to the UK government, but because 
TPS was selected as a non-core business.  
  
Another transcendental distinction criterion is the nature of deals. TPS administration 
outsourcing is a BPO deal, whereas PPS‘s e-GP outsourcing is an IT outsourcing 
contract. This is followed by numerous related differences that were explored by our 
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micro-level analyses. For instance, the following options selected by DCSF were 
investigated as unavoidable choices of BPO: an arms-length commercial relationship, 
the entire service scope grouping, large relative financial scale, total resource ownership 
and a sole supplier/prime contractor supplier grouping. These may be conceptualised as 
general distinctions of BPO from IT outsourcing. However, except for total resource 
ownership and the sole supplier/prime contractor supplier grouping, most decisions 
were the same as those of PPS. In addition, PPS could choose those options if it desired 
to do so. However, are the specific practices which resulted from the same decisions 
also identical between the two organisations? The answer is ‗No‘.  
 
As in the previous discussion, the characteristic contexts of each organisation explain 
more phenomena than the nominal taxonomy of BPO and IT outsourcing can do. For 
instance, if PPS was unconcerned about the service operation capability, it must have 
chosen the sole supplier/prime contractor option that was the previous option before 
2005, because the separation of internal/external application outsourcing must not have 
been required. On the other hand, within the same entire service scope option, the two 
practices are quite different. PPS designed deeper involvement in day-to-day operations 
across the entire service scope, whereas DCSF solely emphasised a performance 
management concern. These examples demonstrate well that the differences can be 
understood better by the contextual and specific distinctions of the two cases, rather 
than different universal rationales of BPO and IT outsourcing.       
 
According to the findings of the empirical study and literature review, this thesis 
identifies the need for more conceptual studies regarding BPO. It is very obvious that 
generically BPO amounts to an outsourcing deal containing strong IT components. 
However, with the varying expansion of IT-related outsourcing practices, the 
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distinctions amongst IT buy-in, IT outsourcing and BPO increasingly seem to be 
becoming muddied in the emerging outsourcing research literature. This thesis 
categorised the two researched deals as follows. PPS‘s IT outsourcing before 2005 was 
through buy-in arrangements, because there was no SLA, and there was a tightly knit 
relationship between the two parties‘ individual staff members, though many activities 
were significantly outsourced. PPS‘s IT outsourcing after 2005 can be referred to as IT 
outsourcing, because there existed an SLA, and efforts to build a structure for exclusive 
accountabilities though strong in-house involvement were observed. DCSF‘s TPS 
administration is a BPO deal, in that there are SLA and strong exclusive accountability 
accompanying a large-scale labour transfer to host entire business processes beyond IT. 
However, in spite of the importance and the accomplishment of IT to TPS service 
quality, involved IT components and related activities were not critically highlighted.   
 
The above discussion reveals that actual outsourcing practices do not mechanically fit 
related concepts in the literature. For this reason, this thesis concludes that more 
conceptually informed empirical studies are required, particularly, in the newly 
developed concept of BPO. Nonetheless, several intellectual frameworks derived from 
previous IT outsourcing researches were found to be applicable to the empirical 
analyses of the BPO case. An implication of this thesis is that little knowledge may be 
gained if outsourcing research only focuses on the generalised features of BPO and IT 
outsourcing at the macro-level. Contextualised, in-depth, interpretive research can 
discover hidden attributes, processes and management practices behind the terms 'IT 
outsourcing' or 'BPO'.  
 
Beyond the two transcendental criteria discussed above, three standards were derived 
from the results of this thesis‘s empirical study. The first and most important one is the 
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perception of outsourced functions as core/non-core businesses. As previously 
discussed in Chapter Two, Hancox and Hackney (2000) found that the core/non-core 
classification has little importance as outsourcing determinants against the conventional 
propositions of outsourcing research. The authors suggest that it is common to both the 
public and private sectors.    
 
One of conventional views of IT outsourcing determinants is that organisations 
outsource non-core functions in order to concentrate on more strategic core functions. 
That rationale seems to apply more straightforwardly to DCSF, because it outsourced 
TPS administration based on just such a decision. However, it was not clear that it was 
the critical determinant of outsourcing adoption, in that outsourcing was decided by 
pan-governmental policy in DCSF. DCSF just selected the TPS administration as its 
non-core business in responding to this government policy. On the other hand, PPS 
persistently recognised e-GP services as its core business. PPS had no choice but to 
adopt outsourcing, mostly because the increase of in-house experts needed to operate 
new systems was not allowed due to a pan-government policy.  
 
The recognition of a function's core/non-core character exercised more significant 
effects on subordinate, specific decisions regarding strategy, contract structure and 
organisational design. For instance, categorising e-GP management as its core business, 
PPS pursued a complex mechanism to develop its own capabilities within outsourced 
functions; whereas DCSF has focused more on the performance evaluation. Similarly, 
regarding the requirements of cost reduction and service improvements as outsourcing 
determinants—which is one of criteria of the public- and private sector outsourcing 
comparison presented by Hancox and Hackney (2000)—no evidence was observed 
across both cases that outsourcing was initially introduced to achieve those, though the 
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agenda was emphasised by both organisations. In concluding, outsourcing determinants 
did not seem to primarily reside in core competency evaluation, cost reduction, or 
service improvement requirements in either case. Both cases adopted outsourcing 
primarily in accordance with government policy, as Hancox and Hackney (2000) also 
found.    
 
However, contrary to Hancox and Hackney‘s (2000) proposition, IT is perceived as a 
strategic resource by PPS; this is a critical difference compared against DCSF. Many 
other decisions were different between the two organisations following on from this 
distinction. This aspect will be revisited at the end of this section.  
 
The other two criteria derived from the empirical findings of this thesis are vendor 
switching costs and the business/technological variability of outsourced functions. PPS 
accepted the high vendor switching costs of e-GP service outsourcing, in that it is a 
peculiar service only to PPS and no similar services are offered in private industry, as 
explained in Chapter Five. Under this circumstance, PPS showed little interest in 
motivating or threatening SDS through the use of potential competitors. Accordingly, 
PPS came to emphasise deeper involvement in everyday e-GP service operation in order 
to control SDS. Of course, another rationale of this decision was to retain and develop 
capability in this area because it is regarded as its core business (see below). In any case, 
if there were other private solutions to advance e-GP, PPS might not insist on its own 
system. In this case, PPS could abandon its e-GP system, as DCSF did.  
 
In contrast, DCSF did not try to develop its own pensions administration IS because it 
can purchase it from a related market. This may affect its perception of IT as a non-core 
function. Following this perception and the market environment, DCSF can choose to 
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concentrate on performance evaluation in terms of contract management. Its strategy 
must be: ‗If there is any problem, we can switch vendors‘. Consequently, DCSF showed 
greater interest in performance management and in exit plan to prepare for such an 
occasion.  
 
As revealed in this discussion, the switching costs can be a universal environment factor 
impacting outsourcing practices and phenomena. All IT concerns must be differentiated 
according to whether the employed IT can be easily switched or not. If yes, the involved 
IT must be regarded as less strategically important (strategic alignment); more 
alternatives can be accessed for service improvement (delivery of business value 
through IT); only performance can matter (performance management); risk may be 
reduced (risk management); and stronger negotiation power can be retained (control and 
accountability). In this respect, switching costs seems to be a universal component 
which gives shape to every outsourcing deal.  
 
On the other hand, the business and technological variability of functions is another 
critical distinction point. There was a sharp comparison observed in the two cases. The 
DCSF environment was investigated as relatively static, particularly in terms of IT 
change. In contrast, PPS‘s environment was very dynamic, due to both business 
requirements (such as changes in regulation) and technological requirements (such as 
new service development and existing function enhancement). About 150 IT system 
change requests have been completed on a monthly basis in PPS, as reported in Chapter Five.  
 
This distinction can explain many differences found in our empirical investigations. For 
example, lump-sum fixed pricing can be accepted by DCSF and Capita Hartshead, 
thanks to this feature. In the case of PPS, ongoing disputes about the scope of the 
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contract in terms of frequent modifications caused PPS to consider the introduction of 
cost-based pricing. The background of the commercial relationship change from co-
sourced to arms-length can be explored via this characteristic. IS change is technology-
based work by nature. In this respect, the role of external IT experts needs to be 
respected—in particular, concerning the complexity of an integrated computing and 
business environment. Nevertheless, PPS‘s in-house IT experts hesitated to transfer 
those roles to SDS. It was a result of a dispute about what core capability is, as 
presented in Chapter Five. Consequently, the co-sourced commercial relationship did 
not operate well prior to 2004, and exclusive accountability became to be emphasised 
after 2005. In the case of DCSF, the separation of policy and administrative works were 
more obvious. There were no in-house IT experts left; furthermore, there were no 
frequent requests for IT. Under this circumstance, possible intervention of the two 
parties can be minimised. As discussed above, variability forms an important business 
and technology environment in outsourcing.                       
 
Returning to the discussion of core/non-core perception, this thesis suggests that 
core/non-core classification matters very significantly. However, it is not important as 
an outsourcing determinant as viewed by conventional research, but, rather, critical as a 
factor to give shape to a client organisation's outsourcing strategy, contract structure and 
organisational construction. The analysis of this requires a comprehensive viewpoint 
encompassing all of the above discussion. It is the reason why this needs to be finally 
discussed, and presented as the conclusion of this thesis.     
 
First, the core/non-core classification strongly depends on an organisation's business 
competitiveness. However, the above two environmental features were also linked with 
the evaluation. On the one hand, if the outsourced function can be easily purchased from 
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outside, such functions would not tend to be core businesses. On the other hand, if the 
functions were in a very static environment, less attention would be paid to those. This 
aspect can be directly inferred from the opposite environments of PPS and DCSF.   
 
Second, a client organisation which regards outsourced functions as core businesses 
does not abandon the opportunity to learn business and technological expertise within 
outsourced functions; this effort may require complex contract structure and 
organisation construction. In the case of PPS, it would like to willingly take the risk of a 
more complex management scheme regarding pricing, supplier grouping and processes. 
As appeared in the disputes over buy-in and outsourcing in PPS, much confusion might 
need to be tackled to arrive at internal management and outsourcing accountabilities. 
Compared with this, DCSF, which categorised TPS administration as a non-core 
business, was able to design those relatively simply, concentrating on performance 
evaluation.  
 
Third, the importance of internal management—represented by organisational 
arrangements, and processes and activities in this thesis—would be maximised if a 
client organisation considered relative functions as core businesses. In Chapter Two, the 
reason client organisational change has been ignored was presumed to be the 
misunderstanding that outsourcing means the cutting off of all responsibilities, 
resources and decisions within outsourced functions. The DCSF case may show this 
aspect. It did so and strengthened the policy and contract management functions as its 
core businesses. However, PPS did not do this. It restructured IT divisions, redeployed 
internal staff, redesigned management processes, reallocated relevant authorities and re-
educated employees to adopt new management skills, based on an IT service 
management philosophy that replaces the previous information systems operation and 
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maintenance perspective. As presented above, it may cause confusion and conflict 
regarding the traditional missions of employees in practice or the conventional 
conceptualisation of IT outsourcing in academia. Nonetheless, PPS‘s case provides an 
implication for required in-house capabilities, IT outsourcing contract constitution, 
organisational design and outsourcing relationship management.        
 
To understand it more precisely, this aspect need to be interpreted by the use of the 
theoretical perspective employed in this research, entitled as a structuration theory-
informed formal organisation perspective. Phenomena observed in both organisations 
describe the change of bureaucratic social orders presented as a constituting component 
of bureaucracy as institution by Kallinikos (2006). Organisation arrangements and 
outsourcing contracts can be conceptualised as structure, and involved outsourcing 
management practices can be regarded as instantiation or emergence of technology 
within this thesis‘s subject. All of these form the social system of each organisation. 
Regarding human behaviours, in spite of structural change and reinforced rules, 
institutionalised behaviours did not seem to change easily. The PPS organisation 
restoration plainly showed that aspect. We can see the coexistence of old and new 
regimes to constitute social systems. In the case of PPS, the changes to human practices 
were isolated from certain solid structures that were separately changing or restoring. 
These seem to follow another path of institutionalisation.   
 
Similar phenomena were observed in DCSF. There were many changes, such as the 
adoption of BPO and the introduction of advanced IS. However, operators remained, 
though they were transferred from the public sector to the private sector. Structural 
change did not correspond with human behaviour. When they were first transferred, 
most did not feel the impact of the change. It took time for all, and it can be interpreted 
 308 
as time for institutionalisation. In any case, traditional bureaucratic virtues, such as 
centralisation, standardisation, formalisation and specialisation, were still operating over 
entire processes and in the outcomes of seeming changes.  
 
In conclusion, a contextual/processual, structuration theory-informed approach to 
studying two outsourcing cases over time has been grounded through combining and 
utilising configuration and lifecycle frameworks derived from the outsourcing research 
literature. The resulting analytical framework and approach permitted micro-level 
analyses of IT outsourcing and BPO cases over relatively long time periods. The 
disaggregation made possible by these analytical moves revealed the distinctive features 
of the two outsourcing arrangements and the underlying distinctive logics in each case.       
 
 The thesis‘s research approach and findings offer a starting point for developing further 
a contingency theory of management of outsourcing built around the proposition that 
most major problems in outsourcing are due to agency issues between the client 
(principal) and supplier (agent) and that different types of outsourcing arrangements 
lead to different types of agency problems that require different types of management. 
The configuration model we have applied here emerges as an instructive way of 
disaggregating structural attributes to provide insight for management as to the rationale, 
risks and issues inherent in each of the different choices available, and what 
management must do to make a configuration work. In fact, while there will inevitably 
be demand for prescriptions as to the ‗best ways‘ of configuring outsourcing 
arrangements, the present study suggests there are no easy answers. The mix of intent, 
the context for which the deal is being configured, and how well the deal is actually 
resourced and managed, invariably combine in unique ways, making each total 
configuration specific to its circumstances.  
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8 Conclusion  
CHAPTER EIGHT CONCLUSION 
 
 
8.1 Thesis overview and key findings 
 
This thesis describes the author‘s PhD research on outsourcing and clients‘ bureaucratic 
organisation changes. Two cases from Korea and the UK government organisations are 
involved; the results are presented as longitudinal case studies with some comparisons 
made. The nature of this research is explorative and empirical. As revealed by the 
research questions in Chapter Three, this thesis primarily seeks for the answers to ‗why‘ 
and ‗how‘ questions such as: why bureaucratic client organisations are concerned about 
IT outsourcing or BPO; in consequence, how they construct or change their strategy, 
organisational arrangements and outsourcing contracts; and, what are the contexts and 
social processes that let those constructions go forward. To achieve these, intensive 
empirical investigations are conducted by use of a cautiously invented analytical 
framework.  
 
The research interest was initially motivated by the author‘s own concerns during his 
professional experience as an IT manager. Research questions are focused on clients‘ 
organisational change and related social processes brought about by outsourcing. This 
was constructed grounded on the research interest and the results of the IT and BPO 
outsourcing literature review. The SIM surveys of IT executives‘ management concerns 
confirm the wide significance of IT outsourcing in contemporary organisations, as 
discussed in Chapter One.       
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In terms of framing this research, Figure 3-1 in Chapter Three displays a 
methodological approach given as a hierarchy of critical realism (ontology), 
interpretivism (epistemology), structuration theory-informed formal organisation 
perspective (theoretical perspective), processual analysis-informed multidimensional IT 
outsourcing configuration framework (analytical framework), longitudinal comparative 
case study (research strategy), and diverse research methods. The linkages from one to 
one are demonstrated where appropriate—that is, overall consistency from ontology to 
research methods is, we suggest, maintained.  
 
The use of literature or theories is more focused on the development of relevant 
intellectual frameworks than on dealing with in-depth disputes regarding the original 
concepts. For example, Giddens‘s structuration theory is a very complex social theory 
embracing a long history of critique. However, this thesis employs exclusively his 
voluntarist-inclined conceptualisation of human beings‘ institutionalised behaviours, 
instantiated structure and mutual interactions. As explained in Chapters Two and Four, 
structuration theory is used as a meta-theory, identified as a type of its various usages in 
Table 2-4, to reinforce the formal organisation perspective which remains the primary 
theoretical perspective of this thesis.  
 
These restrictive applications of philosophical perspectives and literature are set up and 
justified in the light of the research‘s purpose and scope. On the one hand, as 
interpretive research, this thesis does not aim to build or test theories; on the other hand, 
those perspectives and theories are selected, examined and exercised for the purpose of 
empirical study. All of these are instruments used to construct research questions; to 
frame and guide the research; and to analyse and interpret data and findings. This usage 
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is designed in Chapter Three as methodology; demonstrated in Chapter Four as 
conceptual frameworks, and utilised in following investigation chapters. The employed 
philosophy and literature and their engaged key concepts are summarised in Table 8-1. 
 
Table 8-1: Employed key concepts in involved philosophy and literature 
Literature Key concepts and applications 
Critical 
realism 
 Perception of subject-independent but interpretable/constructible 
social reality  
 Identifying structural components like organisation arrangements 
and outsourcing contract, which can be constructed by human 
behaviours 
Interpretivism  Existence of subjective interpretations of actors/researchers and 
requirements of signifying hidden meanings behind the observed 
 Employing interpretive research strategy focusing on context and 
social processes 
Structuration 
theory 
 Voluntary human beings‘ institutionalised behaviours, instantiated 
structure, and mutual interactions 
 Operating as a meta-theory to inform formal organisation 
perspective and, consequently, providing a grand social theory to 
interpret phenomena 
Formal 
organisation 
perspective 
 Juxtaposition of bureaucratic and post-bureaucratic orders within 
contemporary formal organisation (bureaucracy as institution) 
 Understanding organisation change as the recomposition of formal 
organisation instead of decomposition of bureaucracy 
 
 
Within this intellectual context, the processual analysis-informed multidimensional IT 
outsourcing configuration framework, is illustrated in Figure 4-1 and 4-2, is the original 
intellectual creation of this research. This enables a contextual approach to be adopted 
in investigating longitudinal IT/BPO outsourcing and client organisation structures. 
Though unique components of the organisation construction dimension—organisation 
arrangements, and processes and activities (see definitions in p. 122)—are added by the 
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author, other diverse levels of elements came from a number of prior researches on this 
subject as supplied by descriptions in Table 4-1, 4-2 and 4-4. The use of this framework is 
the central element of this research in that this determines the technical structure of data 
analyses and presentation throughout all the thesis‘s empirical investigation components.   
 
This framework has been configured to narrow the gap between existing literature and 
the thesis‘s requirements. Literature on IT governance (ITGI 2007; Webb, Pollard and 
Ridley 2006), IT outsourcing configuration (Cullen, Seddon and Willcocks 2005) and 
the lifecycle perspective (Cullen, Seddon and Willcocks 2006) are integrated into this 
framework via a processual analysis framework (Pettigrew 1997). Pettigrew (1997) also 
shed light on the research strategy. This thesis‘s longitudinal case study approach—of 
which components are context, content, process and outcome—is proposed by 
Pettigrew as a very suitable process research method. The addition of the two 
components in the previous paragraph and the conceptualisation of three dimensions as 
outcome components of the processual analysis scheme are motivated by this thesis 
author‘s own recognition and the result of the pilot study of this research.  
 
Regarding empirical findings, three standards classifying outsourcing environment are 
derived from these case studies as core vs. non-core perception of outsourced functions; 
high vs. low supplier switching costs; and high vs. low variability in terms of business 
and applied IT. These were suggested as possible common criteria to describe the 
outsourcing environment. Within the two cases‘ contexts, the combination of the 
perception as core business with high switching costs and variability characteristics, 
which are observed in PPS, drives a client organisation to have the tendency to involve 
internal management in everyday operation of services. On the contrary, the opposite 
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characteristics of DCSF led to a client organisation focus on performance management 
and the components of a contract regarding an exit plan. More complex development of 
the organisation‘s design was pursued by PPS, whereas a specialised contract 
management capability was the concern of DCSF. Consequently, the above three 
standards emerged as rationales for strategic choices of the client organisations when 
they moved to outsourcing        
 
Against expectation, explicit distinctions such as cultural differences of two 
governments and divergence of IT outsourcing and BPO did not sufficiently explain the 
core of the phenomena regarding outsourcing and client organisational change. Based 
on the results of longitudinal analyses, core/non-core perception of related functions, 
embedded in the context of each case, is identified as a critical rationale to determine 
client organisations‘ strategy and in-house organisational construction as well as 
outsourcing contract structure. This rationale is found to be influenced by the other two 
characteristics of the outsourcing environment mentioned above.   
 
This research has been suitably conducted methodologically speaking. First, the 
selection of the research strategy of longitudinal case studies is justified by general 
discussion of Yin (2003) and the process research focus suggested by Pettigrew (1997). 
Conventional data collection methods of participant observation, interview and 
document analysis are given as proper methodology, considering the research scope and 
the author‘s data accessibilities. In addition, argumentation analysis provided novel data 
analysis methods, suitable given the nature of phenomena involving controversial issues. 
Finally, Klein and Myers‘s (1999) seven principles were observed to give direction to 
the analyses of data in interpretive research. 
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Besides these, the author‘s ex-participant‘s position was considered an ethical issue in 
terms of the researcher‘s involvement. Argumentation analysis is supported as a tool to 
overcome this issue as well, in that obvious disclosure of the author‘s own position can 
enhance the objectivity of data analysis and presentation. In addition to this, the solid 
application of the processual analysis method in empirical investigation is also expected 
to avoid the risk of the author‘s possible prejudice. By following Checkland and 
Holwell‘s (1998) rigour for action researchers, the processual analysis-informed 
multidimensional IT outsourcing configuration framework operates as a pre-declared 
analytical framework to guide the research. Logically speaking, possible bias caused by 
the author‘s subjective position could be reduced if the action researchers‘ rigour was 
maintained, assuming that action research is the most subjective formal research method 
in terms of researchers‘ position.    
 
Lastly, the presentation of results is critical in obtaining readers‘ trust. With respect to 
interview method, in accordance with Myers and Newman‘s (2007) criteria, the details 
of interview processes were addressed. Regarding overall justification of methodology, 
Golden-Biddle and Locke‘s (1993) three criteria were employed. To be more authentic 
to the readers, the presentation of vivid phenomena observed in everyday operation of 
the cases was described. This was reflected in lengthy texts in two empirical 
investigation chapters that count for a substantial proportion of this thesis. In terms of 
the plausibility criterion, this research covered areas of interest to IS or public 
management scholars interested in such areas as outsourcing, bureaucracy, and 
organisational change. Additionally, regarding how critical the major finding of this 
thesis is, its distinctive contribution is to suggest  that outsourcing should be understood 
and researched as an embedded component of contemporary organisation management 
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instead of  as a  ‗cutting-off‘ and ‗decomposition‘ of existing organisations. This, of 
course, also has practical implications for the way contemporary organisations are 
constructed, how change is processed and how an organisation and its external services 
providers are managed.     
     
8.2 Construction of contribution 
 
As introduced in Chapter One, the intended contribution is categorised into either 
academic or practice. The latter can be discussed with respect to the management 
implications of this thesis‘s results, whereas the former primarily explains the 
significance of outsourcing in organisational change studies and the adequacy of the 
research framework in future research.  
 
8.2.1 Practice contribution 
 
This empirical study has implications for contemporary organisations‘ management 
concerns. As disclosed in the SIM survey results introduced in Chapter One, IT-related 
outsourcing needs to be tackled at a corporate level. In this respect, this thesis‘ novel 
characteristics of comprehensive understanding of outsourcing phenomena from 
strategy, contract structure to organisation construction deserves to be noted, though 
those cannot be directly generalised to other cases. Based on the findings, however, 
contributions to practice can be offered. 
 
First, practitioners need to consider first the outsourcing environment classified in this 
research. Those are explained as ‗core vs. non-core perception of outsourced functions‘, 
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‗high vs. low supplier switching costs‘ and ‗high vs. low variability in terms of business 
and applied IT‘. In particular, organisations are required to pay attention to positioning 
related business somewhere between core and non-core functions. As presented to date, 
this effects not only the decision of outsourcing adoption, but also the detailed design of 
other components regarding outsourcing and client organisational change. Practitioners 
are expected to learn more from the two practices of PPS and DCSF when they 
understand the context and social processes found in each case.  
 
Second, the revised processual analysis-informed multidimensional IT outsourcing 
configuration framework can be used as a concrete analytical framework to be 
applicable to any client organisation. Involved decision points (scope grouping, 
financial scale, resource ownership, commercial relationship, supplier grouping, pricing 
framework, contract duration, organisation arrangements, and processes and activities) 
and a broad concept of IT governance (strategic alignment, delivery of business value 
through IT, performance management, risk management, and control and 
accountability) are common elements of all client organisations. In this respect, every 
organisation can identify its own options and compare those not only with the decisions, 
but also with the processes and contexts of PPS and DCSF.    
 
As the last practice contribution, this research has a number of implications for client 
organisations. The components of a client organisation are rarely emphasised. For 
instance, global outsourcing service providers have a tendency to develop and present 
what they can do, what the benefits are to be gained by outsourcing, and how they will 
deliver services. Furthermore, as examined in this research, academic outsourcing 
research focused on client organisations‘ structures, processes and capabilities and how 
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they can be and are changed as a result of outsourcing are very neglected. In this respect, 
PPS‘s process-control-based organisation model—represented by complex 
organisational arrangements and international standard management processes (see 
Figures 5-2, 5-3 and 5-4)—can provide unique lessons to organisations in similar 
contexts. In particular, an attempt to apply outsourcing management processes to ITIL 
processes provides unique references to the many organisations who are considering, or 
who have already embarked upon, ITIL adoption within an IT outsourcing environment. 
Meanwhile, DCSF‘s conventional performance-control-based organisation model—
represented by the creation of contract management functions and establishment of 
official communication channels (see Figures 6-1, 6-2 and Table 6-2)—can be 
benchmarked by many other organisations situated in similar environments.      
 
Though this thesis does not address the issue of outsourcing success, the observed 
phenomena and described contexts, contents, processes and outcomes of two case 
organisations provide valuable opportunities for other practitioners, given that both 
cases were considered to be successes by the majority of the relevant stakeholders, and 
in terms of financial and service outcomes.  However, it is also noteworthy that any 
comparison or application of these results should be founded on the exploration of their 
own contextual characteristics.     
 
8.2.2 Academic contribution 
 
Academically, although IT outsourcing can be regarded as just a business practice, it is 
worth revisiting it through the lenses of appropriate theories because the impact on an 
organisation and its implications for IS and organisational studies are significant.  
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First of all, the original contribution of this thesis is to supplement the lack of studies on 
the structure of bureaucratic client organisation and its change in contexts of IT 
outsourcing. As examined in Chapter Two, no prior researches dealing with this subject 
in a major way were found. Even in the client organisation-focused literature, most 
work concentrated on finding outsourcing determinants, success factors and human 
resources. On the other hand, some relevant literature from IT governance studies did 
not pay attention to IT outsourcing components. Similarly, the IT and organisational 
change literature, including that on public management, were examined but found not to 
focus much at all on the significance of  outsourcing.  
 
Under these circumstances, Kallinikos‘s (2006) formal organisation perspective 
emerges as a candidate for explaining IT outsourcing as an enabler of organisation 
change. In this thesis, the application of the formal organisation perspective to real 
organisational settings provides rationales for recognising the aspects of traditional 
bureaucracy that penetrates contemporary network organisations.  
 
In insisting on the survival of traditional bureaucratic orders even within the network 
organisation, Kallinikos (2006) suggests the juxtaposition of networks (representing 
outsourcing) and underlying traditional bureaucratic orders like centralisation, 
standardisation and specialisation. With respect to Kallinikos‘s perspective, this 
research reveals abundant examples of the decomposition and recomposition of existing 
bureaucracies facilitated by outsourcing. On this point, the research provides empirical 
data to describe both decomposing and recomposing bureaucracies in modern 
organisations. Consequently, in this area, this thesis bridges the gap between existing IT 
outsourcing literature and organisation studies.   
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Secondly, this research reappraises IT outsourcing as a significant domain in 
organisation studies. For example, Kallinikos (2006, p. 155) connects IT development 
with transformational characteristics of bureaucracy, stating as follows: 
Administrative simplification, flatter hierarchies, better cross-functional or 
cross-agency communication and improved responsiveness to 
environmental contingencies represent examples of the kind of changes 
associated with the informatized rendition of organizational tasks and 
operations. 
 
Nevertheless, outsourcing is not an isolated topic: he just shows that it is an important 
instance of decomposing and recomposing bureaucracy. However, IT outsourcing can 
be acknowledged as one of the consequences of what has been called informatisation 
and this research shows that outsourcing can provides important momentum to leading 
organisational change in bureaucratic organisations.  
 
Third, the outsourcing-related research and literature can be strengthened by the 
theoretical underpinnings and in-depth case study findings produced by this thesis. This 
research expands the application of structuration theory and formal organisation 
perspective to outsourcing studies; social context and institutionalised human practices 
underlying IT outsourcing have been explored by use of the processual analysis method. 
Similar suggestions appear repeatedly in the works of Cullen, Seddon and Willcocks 
(2005; 2007). Their view, however, was concentrated on functional contract structures 
such as service scope and contract duration, and little consideration was given to clients‘ 
organisational change, historical/technological context, business strategy or capabilities, 
which must be connected with final decisions on IT outsourcing structures.  
 
In addition, this thesis is somewhat novel in showing how to apply a structurational 
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view to the interpretation of phenomena in the area of IT outsourcing and organisational 
change. For example, in DCSF, actors‘ open interpretations are mutually related with 
structure. Materialistic structure, such as the BPO contract, official transfer of 
employees, and DCSF‘s and TP‘s organisation restructuring, cannot be understood 
without the consideration of human perceptions. Even though structures were 
transformed, old staff members, who had worked in DCSF as public servants, were still 
concerned about the loss of knowledge within client organisations. Members of the staff 
who had very short experience as government officials did not recall any significant 
change of working mode when they were initially transferred. Instead, they seemed to 
be more affected by other structure change like IT innovation. In the cases of much 
younger staff that had not belonged to DCSF before, they were not concerned about the 
client‘s knowledge. TPS administration is not the business of DCSF to them. It seems to 
be recognised as a purely Capita Hartshead‘s job to them. PPS‘s organisation 
transformation/restoration and ITIL process survival (see Figure 5-4) also confirm this 
structurational understanding, as was lengthily discussed in Chapter Five.  
 
Finally, this thesis proposes and confirms the applicability of two methodological 
instruments. The first one is the employment of the longitudinal case study as a research 
strategy for IT outsourcing studies. As revealed by the literature review in Chapter Two, 
the contextual approach has been scarcely applied to this field. Confirming this, Kern 
and Willcocks (2002) suggested that those researches are required to involve the 
longitudinal case study approach in outsourcing literature. These authors also 
emphasised the need for social theories that explore interrelationships among structure, 
human behaviours and contexts. This thesis provides an example of that attempt.  
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With respect to the second instrument, this thesis provided two well founded analytical 
frameworks extendible to other IT outsourcing-related researches, and also 
demonstrated their applicability. These can be listed as the processual analysis-informed 
multidimensional IT outsourcing configuration framework and standards for IT 
outsourcing environment classification. These frameworks can be reused by other 
researchers in the areas of outsourcing and organisational change in a contextual manner. 
Researchers can put their own data into the multidimensional IT outsourcing 
configuration framework, and analyse different outsourcing environments using the 
criteria of ‗core/non-core‘, ‗switching costs‘ and ‗business and technological variability‘. 
 
The classification standards of the outsourcing environment are directly derived from 
the findings of this present study, whereas the other tool is the result of many other 
pieces of research, as was discussed. However, it can be identified as a unique model, in 
that it has been reinvented as an independent framework. Except for two components in 
the organisation construction dimension, all the components of processual analysis, IT 
outsourcing configuration framework, lifecycle perspective of sourcing process, and IT 
governance are in the pre-existing research literature. The contribution can be referred 
to as the collection, conceptualisation and integration of that previous individual 
academic work. As practitioners can apply these frameworks to their strategy building, 
so can outsourcing researcher apply them in their own study work.                  
 
8.3 Limitations and further research direction 
 
The limits of this research need to be discussed. Some are the result of the delimited 
research scope; others are related to the mode of presentation of the results.   
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First, as repeatedly stated, the results of this thesis cannot easily be generalised. There 
are two reasons for this. On the one hand, this research addresses the specific contexts 
of PPS and DCSF. Even the extension of results to the entire Korean or British 
government is not valid because no evidence of their representativeness was found and 
even pursued. This fits the rationale of interpretivists‘ approach to explore in-depth 
understanding of localised contexts and human behaviours.  
 
On the other hand, this research did not conduct any institutional-level exploration. For 
example, overall cultural characteristics of each government were not dealt with. If this 
were done, there might be relatively wider room for a generalised discussion about each 
case, though it could not provide anything like a general solution within this thesis‘s 
interpretivists‘ epistemology. The research boundary forms the background of this 
delimitation. As revealed in the research questions, the focus of this research is internal 
management. The research objects are restricted to certain client organisations‘ local 
contexts, their constituents‘ perceptions, resulting phenomena and related social 
processes within those organisations. In Chapters Five and Six, some environmental 
context, such as government-led IT outsourcing environment of Korea and NPM 
tradition in the UK government, were employed to explore related phenomena. 
However, those rare cases were restricted to the directly related areas. Higher 
institutional level variables, for example, the degree of decentralisation or business 
practices, are defined as outside the research scope.    
 
As another research scope boundary, this thesis does not explain the success of the cases, 
but the change of components. This was explicitly presented in the introduction chapter. 
Outsourcing success is one of the common research subjects in IS studies. However, its 
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meaning and scope were defined as too complex, and, given the research objectives, 
theoretical underpinning and methods, not necessary, to be dealt with as an associated 
supplementary topic of this thesis. Consequently, readers are required to take the neutral 
position. This is not research on what client organisations should do, but research on 
why and how it happens. 
 
Second, as presented in Table 8-1, the research literature is restrictively and purposely 
used in this research. However, this does not imply that the stipulations in that literature 
were distorted when employed here. For example, to justify the use of structuration 
theory as meta-theory, the literature was studiously reviewed to identify the range of 
legitimate modes of its application to empirical studies. However, the classification and 
frequency analysis of such diverse modes of application were not the purpose, nor the 
described product of this exploration.      
 
Third, this thesis may be misunderstood as being overly descriptive rather than 
sufficiently analytical (e.g., computer-assisted method) in its documentation. However, 
it is written in an analytical manner from a different angle. This limitation is related to 
the research method and the researcher‘s position. Due to the participant observation-
centred data collecting in PPS case, relatively large parts of physical data exist in the 
forms of final or draft documents. In particular, many were produced by the author 
himself when he was working for PPS. These documents were referred to when specific 
factual events, such as figures, need to be recalled. However, most interpretations of an 
actor‘s statements and behaviour, which is really significant in this interpretive research, 
exist in the author‘s mind. The author was in charge of the outsourcing innovation 
project and able to observe and discuss with, and interview many stakeholders. These 
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were partly adjusted by further interviews held in 2009, but those were not critical.    
 
As discussed in the methodology chapter, the rationales against this position were the 
action researcher‘s rigour proposed by Checkland and Holwell (1998) and 
argumentation analysis. As these authors suggested, action researchers are necessarily 
subject participants. If they were able to maintain scientific rigour by following an 
intellectual framework declared in advance, it must be applicable to this thesis author‘s 
situation. In this respect, the presentation of the empirical study in this thesis was 
always thorough, and in keeping with the pre-established processual analysis-informed 
multidimensional IT outsourcing configuration framework. The empirical investigations 
were presented, analysed and compared in the standardised formats of three dimensions, 
each of which mechanically consisted of decision points and underlying context, and 
process. As presented, the explanation of each domain was also standardised across the 
case studies.  
 
During the research, some areas for further research were identified. The first and 
simplest of these is the application of this thesis‘s conceptual framework to other 
organisation settings. The structuration theory-informed formal organisation perspective 
and processual analysis-informed multidimensional IT outsourcing configuration 
frameworks do have considerable potential for universal use in outsourcing-related 
longitudinal researches, as hopefully this present thesis has demonstrated.  
 
Second, similar frameworks can be developed in other particular domains of the 
outsourcing field. For example, this research focuses on IT service outsourcing. 
However, IS development outsourcing can be a feasible area in which to apply a similar 
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approach. In addition, a BPO-centred approach could be another possible area. 
Considering that not a few IT outsourcing-originated concepts were modified in order to 
apply BPO, there might be some room for the development of a BPO-specific 
framework. Another important candidate subject to be combined with this thesis is the 
development of human resources and organisational capability. For example, further 
research on the human and organisational capabilities needed to achieve the 
transformation of strategy, contract structure and organisation construction could prove 
very significant for academics and practitioners alike.  
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Informed Consent Form for Research Study for Individual Interviewees 
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Appendix 2: Representative Argumentation Analysis 
 
 
Representative argumentation analyses using Toulmin‘s (2003) argument structure are 
presented here. Consecutively associated claims form an argumentation representing the 
key arguments that are revealed in PPS case.   
 
 
 Argumentation supporting PPS outsourcing transformation 
 
 
 
Associated claims: 
 
(1) PPS needs to retain in-house capabilities regarding e-GP; (2) Outsourcing should be 
adopted; (3) In-house capabilities are no longer technological; (4) Arms-length 
commercial relationship transformation contributes to in-house capability building; (5) 
Relevant components need to be transformed, together with a change in the commercial 
relationship; (6) Client should concentrate on key functions regarding IT service 
management.  
 
 
Argumentation analysis of each claim: 
 
PPS needs to retain in-house 
capabilities regarding e-GP. 
E-GP management is a 
core business of PPS. So,  
Since 
E-GP has become the symbol of PPS’s innovation and confidential 
government procurement administration.  
Claim 1 
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In-house capabilities 
are no longer 
technological. 
In-house expertise is lacking in 
terms of technology and 
management skills. 
So,  
Since 
Clients tend to depend on external suppliers in an outsourcing 
environment, particularly in terms of technology. 
Claim 3 
Systems are enlarged, integrated and complexified. 
On account of 
Outsourcing should 
be adopted. 
PPS lacks in-house IT 
resources. So, unavoidably, 
Since 
The number of IT staff cannot be increased.    
Claim 2 
The expansion of government is unacceptable, since it is in opposition to the e-
government reforms that promote downsizing and greater efficiency. 
On account of 
In-house IT experts can 
expand exceptionally.  
Unless 
Arms-length 
commercial relationship 
transformation 
contributes to in-house 
capability building.  
No independent 
responsibilities of 
internal staff are 
observed under 
existing co-sourced 
commercial 
relationship. 
Government clients hold prominent position 
against suppliers in Korean culture.  
So, presumably, 
Since 
In-house staff can shift 
their responsibilities onto 
suppliers’ staff members. 
On account of Exclusive roles and 
responsibilities are ignored.  
Unless 
Claim 4 
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Client should concentrate on key 
functions regarding IT service 
management.  
Even after the transition, 
PPS will lack in-house IT 
staff. 
So,  
Since 
Requisite new function units exceed the number of in-house staff members. 
Claim 6 
Relevant components need to be 
transformed, together with a change 
in the commercial relationship. 
Exclusive 
accountabilities 
cannot be 
sustained without 
the transformation 
of prior client 
organisation and 
contract structure. 
Overall strategy was set up to replace the old workforce and its IS 
technology-centred control with a performance-based IT service 
process control because of the determination that core capability is not 
technological system management but IT service management. 
So, 
Since 
Existing structure assumes previously disorganised roles 
and responsibilities between client and suppliers. 
On account of 
Claim 5 
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 Argumentation opposing PPS outsourcing transformation 
 
 
Associated claims: 
 
(1) PPS needs to retain in-house capabilities regarding e-GP; (2) Outsourcing should be 
adopted
13
; (3) Client can be captured by external suppliers; (4) Co-sourced commercial 
relationship is the best way to obtain technological knowledge and control suppliers; (5) 
Proposed transformations are inadequate other than contract duration and pricing 
framework change; (6) In-house experts need to retain their supervisory positions for all 
functions, even though those positions are nominal at present. 
 
 
Argumentation analysis of each claim: 
 
 
 
                                               
13
 Claim 1 and 2 are shared with those of supporters. All parties were in agreement with 
the suggestions that e-GP is a core business of PPS and outsourcing is unavoidable. 
All in-house staff agreed to the statement ―In-house IT expertise is lacking in terms of 
technological and management skills.‖, included in supporters‘ Claim 3. However, the 
claims expressed in Claim 3 reveal the differences in recognition within PPS, more 
specifically, IT-experts and non-IT-experts. 
Client can be captured 
by external suppliers. 
In-house expertise is 
lacking in terms of 
technology and 
management skills. 
So, almost, 
Since 
Understaffed in-house IT divisions cannot 
exercise necessary control over large-scale 
outsourcing suppliers.  
Claim 3’ 
Technology-based input control is essential to monitor 
opportunistic behaviours of commercial suppliers. 
On account of 
Unless 
Significant competitors exist 
in the related outsourcing 
industry. 
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In-house experts need to 
retain their supervisory 
positions for all functions, 
even though those positions 
are nominal at present. 
Even after the 
transition, PPS will 
lack in-house IT 
staff. 
So, almost, 
Since 
Any type of client’s role in each function 
needs to remain, in order to be distributed 
to in-house staff later as they are recruited.  
Claim 6’ 
On account of 
Once any function in which the client has a role has been moved, its return 
will be impossible.  
Unless 
The number of in-house IT experts 
can be increased immediately. 
Proposed 
transformations are 
inadequate other than 
contract duration and 
pricing framework 
change. 
Exposed problems 
like fallible control 
system are the matter 
of human resource but 
that of management 
structure. 
Top priority need to be given to the ability to operate e-GP system without the 
help of external suppliers, considering the importance of e-GP as a core business. 
So, 
Since 
Existing system is optimised for 
in-house experts to be able to 
participate in e-GP operation. 
On account of 
Claim 5’ 
Co-sourced commercial 
relationship is the best way to 
obtain technological 
knowledge and control 
suppliers. 
In-house experts are 
holding supervisors’ 
positions.   
So, almost, 
Since 
In-house experts have opportunities 
to learn from suppliers and keep a 
close eye on the suppliers’ activities 
by participating in every activity. In-house experts relinquish their 
supervisory roles. 
Unless 
Claim 4’ 
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